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Abstract 
How are beliefs about the nature of knowledge reflected and reproduced in 
language use? It is clear that some linguistic resources, e.g. the modal verbs may 
and must, indicate one’s epistemic stance with respect to a proposition, i.e. one’s 
judgement of how likely it is to be true. What is less clear is how the use of such 
resources relates to speakers’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge per se, i.e. 
their epistemic policies (Teller 2004). To investigate the putative relationship 
between epistemological variation and linguistic variation, I examine samples of 
written and spoken English from a community that is particularly 
epistemologically diverse: academia. 
I synthesize research on social epistemology, sociolinguistics, linguistic 
anthropology, and Academic English (AE) to propose an explanatory model 
of variability in the expression of epistemic stance. Then, using AE as a case 
study, I evaluate the predictions of this model both quantitatively via corpus 
analysis of research articles and regression modelling of interview data, 
as well as qualitatively via analysis of discursive practices in terms of 
experience-organizing frames (Goffman 1974) and the semiotic notion of 
indexicality (e.g. Irvine 2001), whereby ideological differences produce, and 
are reproduced by, linguistic differences. 
This research makes contributions to a number of fields. It questions the 
analytic validity of disciplinarity, providing support for a unifying theory of 
variation in AE based instead on an epistemologically principled analysis of 
institutional language use. The indexical basis of sociolinguistic research on 
language and belief/identity is problematized by attending to epistemological 
context; the ramifications of this will be explored in future research. I develop a 
linguistic metric of epistemic belief, offering a means of developing a quantitative 
social epistemology to complement that field’s highly articulated theoretical work. 
Applications beyond academia are possible in areas concerned with knowledge 
management and transfer, such as public health. 
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Chapter 0. Outline of Thesis 
In this thesis I examine the relationship between epistemological variation and 
linguistic variation. This relationship has not been investigated before, although 
several research traditions have developed relevant empirical and theoretical 
groundwork for it. I spend the first two chapters laying out this groundwork and 
explaining how it refines my general research question into several smaller ones 
to be addressed in subsequent chapters. My general research question is: How are 
beliefs about the nature of knowledge reflected and reproduced in language use? 
Previous research on this area has largely ignored epistemological considerations, 
either focusing on a restricted set of linguistic forms isolated from their 
communicative context (e.g. research on evidentiality and modal semantics), or 
producing a wealth of observational data but lacking a theoretical framework with 
which to interpret its empirical findings (e.g. research on Academic English). To 
attempt to answer this research question in an epistemologically principled and 
sociolinguistically realistic way, I synthesize research on social epistemology, 
sociolinguistics, linguistic anthropology, and Academic English (AE). 
In Chapter 1, I introduce the reader to the field of epistemology, and I 
explore how individuals’ epistemological commitments—i.e. their beliefs about 
the nature of knowledge—can be formulated as a social variable in a similar way 
to sociodemographic categories such as class and gender, which are more familiar 
to sociolinguists. Indeed, much of the first chapter on epistemology is intended as 
a general introduction for sociolinguists who are not familiar with the basic 
concepts in epistemology relied upon later in the thesis. By considering the nature 
of knowledge itself, and then looking at how beliefs about it relate to each other, I 
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propose a typology of variability in epistemological commitments (or epistemic 
policies). I argue that the consequent proliferation of epistemic policy bundles can 
be arranged on a continuum of epistemic policy range (EPR) from relatively 
narrow to relatively wide. I focus in this thesis on the language of academia, i.e. 
the communicative practices of a population that is particularly epistemologically 
diverse. I make the ethnographic claim that, while narrow and wide EPRs are 
adopted by individuals in all academic disciplines, there is a tendency for the 
sciences to favour narrow EPRs, and for the arts to favour wide EPRs. So, by 
looking at the fundamentals of epistemology, I orient the reader to this area of 
inquiry and then develop a typology of epistemic policies. Then, I apply the 
notion of epistemic policy range to my test population. Chapter 1 concludes by 
suggesting some possible linguistic correlates of variable epistemic policy. 
In Chapter 2 I review the sociolinguistic and linguistic anthropological 
research on stylistic variation. This provides the conceptual tools to understand 
how language style—ways of speaking—can vary in relation to variable epistemic 
policy. I review the notion of indexicality, whereby a social variable may become 
linked—via the taking of stance—to a linguistic variable via the processes of 
iconization, recursivity and erasure (see Chapter 2). I argue that epistemic policy 
and disciplinarity, as social constructs, both have the potential to become linked to 
particular patterns of linguistic behaviour. If this is the case, I argue, then any 
academic in whatever discipline could choose to “sound more scientific” or to 
“sound more artsy” merely by deploying the appropriate linguistic forms that 
index those disciplinary areas. Two empirical questions then arise from this: first, 
are there indeed forms of language that can sound more like arts or sciences? 
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Secondly, are disciplines (or groups of them) being indexed by linguistic forms, or 
is it rather the underlying epistemic policies that disciplines rely to which 
linguistic forms are becoming indexically linked? 
 I devote a similar amount of time to this area for the benefit of readers 
from social epistemology backgrounds as I do on epistemology for the benefit of 
sociolinguists: this is an inter-disciplinary thesis that brings together these two 
fields in a way that has not been attempted before. I show that existing 
explanations of stylistic variation in terms of formality, prestige, cultural capital, 
audience design, and so on, all presuppose that speakers have beliefs about their 
own identity, beliefs about the structure of society, and beliefs about the social 
effect of linguistic variables. These beliefs are the basis on which speakers judge 
one form of language to be more ‘appropriate’ than another in some particular 
situation. I argue that this central role of beliefs compels sociolinguists to take an 
epistemologically principled approach to style research. 
The situation type I focus on in this thesis is the communication of 
knowledge down what Heritage (2010) calls an ‘epistemic gradient’, i.e. from 
someone who knows something to someone who does not know it. In 
communicating knowledge, speakers take a stance towards what they say, 
presenting their claims as certain or doubtful, good or bad. This stance gets 
expressed linguistically, for example by embedding the knowledge claim under a 
complementizer phrase such as It must be the case that… or I’m sorry to say 
that… In the rest of the thesis, I explore the relationship between variation in 
epistemological commitments and the variable linguistic expression of stance. I 
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carry out this investigation in the context of a test population where epistemology 
seems to be particularly pertinent: academia. 
I discuss how the notions of community of practice and discourse 
community may be applied to academia. Both communities are defined by shared 
beliefs and shared communicative practices. I make the case that the beliefs and 
practices that unify these communities are epistemic policies. Within a 
community of practice, such as a weekly reading group, these epistemic policies 
are produced and reproduced in talk during mutual engagement towards a shared 
goal. Within a discourse community, a relatively wide or narrow range of 
epistemic policies is permitted (narrow and wide EPR), and these are maintained 
through textual communication such as journal articles, textbooks and emails. 
Thus, I describe academia as a nested set of communities that may be described at 
various levels of organization with reference to EPR. The level of description at 
which this thesis is aimed is that of the discourse community; the relevance of the 
community of practice is to highlight an important avenue for future research. 
Finally, I review the empirical findings from research on AE, which I 
suggest has to date suffered from a lack of theorization. I argue that the theoretical 
framework that I provide here, then, is able to explain those findings, and to raise 
further questions about the relationship between language and epistemology both 
within academia and beyond. 
These two chapters, one reviewing epistemology and disciplinarity, and 
one reviewing language variation, community structure and AE, allow me to 
refine the general research question into the more specific questions listed below. 
Based on the arguments in Chapter 1, I initially operationalize epistemic policy 
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variation as disciplinary affiliation in Chapter 3. Based on the review of linguistic 
literature in Chapter 2, I identify several linguistic variables used in the 
construction of stance, for example modal verbs and adverbs (e.g. must/may and 
certainly/possibly), and evidential verbs (e.g. demonstrate/suggest). It is a 
relatively novel approach to treat these linguistic items as sociolinguistic 
variables, but I argue (following Pichler 2010 among others) that it is warranted 
since stance is a discourse-level variable phenomenon (see below). 
• Are there general patterns of linguistic variation across academic disciplines?
o Are there “typical arts” and “typical science” linguistic styles?
o Do academics in disciplines that span arts and science (e.g. psychology
and sociolinguistics) differentiate themselves linguistically in similar
ways (using these putative typical styles)?
• Is there evidence for linguistic variation that tracks epistemic policy?
o Is epistemic policy a better explanatory factor for linguistic variation in
AE than disciplinarity?
• Is there empirical support for a connection between epistemological variation
and linguistic variation via indexical processes (e.g. recursivity)?
• Is the epistemological differentiation in discourse communities (re)produced
similarly in talk and text?
Before describing how these questions will be answered in the empirical chapters 
(3 to 5), I will explain the nature of the linguistic variable under investigation in 
this thesis, which is an innovative extension of the discourse-level variable. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.3.2), the prototype of a sociolinguistic 
variable is at the level of phonology, for example variable (t) in words like bottle. 
Variable (t) has several variant forms in English, such as the Standard English 
English aspirated stop [th], the Standard American English flap [ɾ] or the non-
standard English glottal stop [ʔ]. The assumption that variants are different ways 
of saying the same thing becomes more difficult to justify as one moves to 
structurally more complex linguistic levels such as morphosyntax (e.g. was/were 
alternation), or to discourse-level linguistic phenomena (e.g. the general extenders 
and whatever/and stuff). 
In the present work I identify a discourse-level variable: the linguistic 
expression of epistemic stance. In Examples (1a–c), the same propositional 
content that there is a pussycat, is embedded within additional linguistic material 
that does not change that proposition, but which communicates my epistemic 
stance towards it, i.e. whether and why I believe it. 
 (1) a. There is a pussycat. 
b. I saw a pussycat.
c. I thought I saw a pussycat.
Example (1a) may be called a “bald statement”, i.e. it merely expresses the 
propositional content. Example (1b) adds information about the sensory channel 
by which this information was acquired, and Example (1c) renders this 
information less certain than in Examples (1a) and (1b). These examples illustrate 
different epistemic stances towards the same proposition. To look at stance as a 
linguistic variable, it is necessary not only to identify what forms it can take, but 
also where it can occur, i.e. the envelope of variation. I identify the envelope of 
17 
variation for the expression of epistemic stances with the clause, i.e. the smallest 
linguistic expression of a proposition, as in Example (1a). Example (1b) is a 
grammatically larger clause containing the proposition in Example (1a). All the 
linguistic material that contributes to the expression of an epistemic stance 
towards a proposition is treated as a single variable (see also Section 4.3.1) 
My empirical starting point (in Chapter 3) is a cross-disciplinary 
comparison of modal and evidential language in three corpora of at least 40 
research articles each (totalling 1.1 million words).1 A “Two Cultures” corpus was 
composed to represent the received opposition between “Science” and “The Arts” 
(after C. P. Snow 1959): it contains articles from Science and Nature, as well as 
the New Left Review and Tamara Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry. Two 
further corpora were based on epistemologically diverse disciplines of 
sociolinguistics and psychology; each included journal articles of both a more 
scientific and more critical theoretic bent. An analysis of these corpora provides 
empirical evidence of linguistic variation between epistemologically diverse 
groups.  
Following Dines’ advice2, I conduct a frequency-based analysis on three 
different elements that can contribute to an epistemic stance: modal verbs, modal 
adverbs and evidential verbs. These forms relate most directly to the definition of 
knowledge by conveying the degree of commitment to a proposition (modality) 
and the method by which that degree of commitment was decided (evidentiality). 
Modal semantics and evidential morphology have both been studied from formal 
1 Details of the methods used are given in the initial parts of the empirical Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
2 ‘If some variants are initially inaccessible because they are not transparently related either 
syntactically or semantically, then analysis will necessarily begin at the level of differential 
distribution; the higher frequency of one form in one social group.’ (Dines 1980: 21). 
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and typological perspectives, but they have not been considered as variables that 
might track epistemic policy before. I do not claim to identify an exhaustive list of 
modals and evidentials, but rather I identify a small set of them with which to get 
a first look at variability in epistemic language across in text. 
Next, I include additional epistemic language elements to look at 
variability in epistemic stance language in talk in Chapters 4 and 5. The analysis 
in these chapters is based on transcribed sociolinguistic interviews with 34 
academics, again in an epistemologically diverse range of disciplines, but in 
subjects that only partially overlap with Chapter 3. This enables a broader 
coverage of disciplines, and it also means that patterns that generalize across 
many discipline types may be identified. In these chapters I identify six different 
types of epistemic stance element, including modal verbs and adverbs, and I 
combine them into a single numerical score (called the epistemic stance index, 
ESI) indicating the strength and polarity of the epistemic stance of each clause. 
Positive ESI scores indicate relative certainty, as indicated by elements such as 
must, certainly, always, and negative ESI scores indicate relative doubt, as 
indicated by items like may, possibly, sometimes. The variable elements in each 
ESI score are defined exhaustively with respect to the interview data, and the 
combined score (the sum of all the positive and negative scores of the epistemic 
elements in each clause) is then made the dependent variable of mixed models 
looking separately at linguistic and social predictors (after Labov 2001a; see 
discussion at start of Chapter 4). Since the ESI is a composite score based on the 
behaviour of several different parts of speech acting in concert, the linguistic 
factors affecting ESI scores contribute a large amount of noise regression models. 
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On the other hand, in Chapter 5 I demonstrate that social factors, notably EPR, 
affect ESI scores in a more harmonious manner. This is a compelling reason to 
keep the internal and external factors separate in regression modelling of complex 
linguistic variables such as the ESI. Through comparison of the effects of 
disciplinary affiliation and epistemic policy on the stance score, I show that 
disciplinarity is indeed of less analytic utility than has been previously assumed in 
the AE literature. 
In addition to operationalizing epistemic policy as disciplinary affiliation, 
interview participants were also classified into two types according to their 
epistemic policy range (as discussed in this chapter below): narrow (having a 
restricted range of methodologies constrained by a monolithic theory of 
knowledge); and wide (using a diversified range of methodologies informed by 
multiple non-contiguous epistemologies). These categories partially overlap 
respectively with Science and Arts, but they are based on the general nature of 
knowledge-making practices rather than on historically contingent institutional 
divisions. Interviews covered a range of topics including personal biography, 
“impact”, and research. The topics were chosen to elicit diverse epistemic stances, 
e.g. recounting first-hand experience versus disciplinary consensus knowledge. 
This meant that it was also possible to look at variable stance construction within 
a single speaker, within a single discipline, and also between groups of speakers. I 
show that epistemic policy range is more useful than disciplinary affiliation as a 
predictor of epistemic language use. In short, I develop a novel, epistemologically 
principled measure of epistemic beliefs which is not only more valid than 
disciplinary affiliation, but it also has greater predictive power in terms of 
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linguistic variation. Some consequences of this for social epistemology, 
sociolinguistics, and AE are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Table 0.1 shows how the research questions identified above relate to the 
methods used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Table 0.1 Research Questions 
Research Question Addressed how and where 
Are there general patterns of linguistic variation 
across academic disciplines? 
Corpus analysis of research 
articles. 
Frequency analysis of 
modal verbs, modal adverbs 
and epistemic verbs. 
See Chapter 3. 
Are the Science and Arts poles of linguistics and 
psychology similar? 
Is there empirical support for a connection between 
epistemological variation and linguistic variation 
via indexical processes (e.g. recursivity)? 
Is there evidence for linguistic variation that tracks 
epistemic policy? 
Mixed modelling of factors 
affecting epistemic stance 
scores in interviews. 
See Chapters 4 and 5. 
Is epistemic policy a better explanatory factor for 
linguistic variation in AE than disciplinarity? 
Is the epistemological differentiation in discourse 
communities (re)produced similarly in talk and 
text? 
Comparison of Chapters 3, 
4 and 5. See Chapter 6. 
To summarize, Chapters 1 and 2 present the epistemological and sociolinguistic 
background to the rest of the thesis. Chapter 3 looks at variation in epistemic 
stance language in text in an exploratory, frequency-based manner, while 
Chapters 4 and 5 expand the number of variants considered, and combine these 
into a numerical score in order to present a more complete picture of epistemic 
stance variation in AE. Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings and discusses 
their wider significance. 
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Chapter 1. Epistemological Difference 
The underlying epistemology, history, and theory of a field cannot be 
separated from its rhetoric. The rhetorical action is mounted within a 
conceived world and in pursuit of ultimate as well as immediate goals. 
The more you understand the fundamental assumptions and aims of 
the community, the better able you will be able to evaluate whether 
the rhetorical habits you and your colleagues bring to the task are 
appropriate and effective. Much of the rhetorical change we have 
observed in various periods has been driven by the gradual realization 
of the rhetorical consequences of epistemological commitments and 
communal goals. […] 
More locally, it is useful to understand how your individual 
assumptions and goals fit in with the epistemology and goals of the 
community you are participating in and contributing to. If your work 
is simply harmonious with disciplinary assumptions and projects, and 
if the discipline has forged a rhetoric adequate to its beliefs and tasks, 
you can adopt the local rhetoric with a fuller understanding and 
commitment. If, however, you find yourself in some way at odds, you 
can begin to understand the rhetorical task before you—both in 
developing terms appropriate to your emerging claims and in finding 
ways to make your claims intelligible and persuasive to peers 
committed to other beliefs and rhetorics. 
(Bazerman 1988: 323–34) 
Charles Bazerman’s advice for writers and teachers of technical English 
composition foreshadows several of the ideas and arguments explored in this 
thesis. The central aim of the present work is to explore the relationship between 
epistemology and language. Bazerman uses the terms ‘epistemology’ and 
‘epistemological commitments’ to refer to beliefs about the nature of knowledge, 
including answers to questions like: What is knowledge? How do we acquire it? 
Can we acquire it? In this sense, epistemology is the foundation on which all 
belief systems are built: it dictates how—and whether—we come to believe 
anything at all. This introductory chapter is concerned with understanding what 
epistemological commitments are, how it is that they can vary from person to 
person, and how to operationalize that variation. 
22 
Bazerman says that epistemology ‘cannot be separated from its rhetoric’ (1988: 
323). In other words, our beliefs about the nature of knowledge are formulated, 
shared, and performed linguistically. Bazerman says that rhetoric must be 
‘appropriate and effective’ in view of ‘the epistemology and goals of the 
community you are participating in’; and he holds that language must be 
‘harmonious’ with the epistemological commitments of one’s audience (1988: 
323–324). Bazerman assumes that epistemology is variable, and that language use 
is variable, and that if you want to ‘make your claims intelligible and persuasive’, 
then you need to express your claims in a form that appears to match the 
epistemology of your audience (1988: 324). So, Bazerman suggests a linkage 
between epistemological commitment and linguistic form, but he also suggests 
that claims can be linguistically reformulated so as to evoke different 
epistemological commitments. In other words, there is a “loose fit” between 
epistemology and language: one does not fully determine the other. This 
underdetermination of meaning by form is key to recent approaches to 
sociolinguistic variation. 
Several distinct research traditions have laid the groundwork for 
understanding the relationship between language and epistemology, or rather that 
aspect of it that concerns the present thesis: the relationship between linguistic 
variation and epistemological variation. Since this relationship is an essentially 
inter-disciplinary research object, I draw on multiple research paradigms in order 
to characterize it and investigate its behaviour.  
In the rest of this chapter I explore the “social turn” in epistemology which 
has made a variationist treatment of epistemology conceivable. I develop the 
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notion of the epistemic policy, i.e. belief-forming practices. These are the 
component elements of Bazerman’s ‘underlying epistemology’. In other words, 
epistemic policies are fundamental conceptual units that comprise one’s beliefs 
about, and attitudes towards, knowledge. I then show how this typology applies in 
the case of academia. 
I now turn to the basic concepts of epistemology: what is knowledge and 
how do we acquire it? I review the classical analysis of knowledge in Section 1.1, 
and I show how this has been developed in social epistemology in Section 1.2. 
The social epistemological notion of epistemic policy is introduced in Section 
1.2.1, and placed in the context of social psychological and language socialization 
research. In Section 1.2.2, I develop a typology of epistemic policy, and I show 
how this can be used in the case of academia in Section 1.2.3. I review work in 
experimental philosophy which has looked at epistemological variation in Section 
1.3. 
1.1 Classical epistemology 
Classical epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with characterizing 
the nature of knowledge. Its research questions are often pithily expressed as 
“What is knowledge?” and “Do we have any of it?” (see e.g. Campbell et al. 
2010: 1). The traditional use of the word epistemology is simply to name a sub-
specialism of philosophy; classically, epistemology is not the kind of thing a 
person can “have” (Paul Elbourne, p.c.). Classical epistemology seeks to analyse 
knowledge per se, and it is not concerned with what individuals happen to believe 
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about the nature of knowledge. However, epistemology is not a completed 
science: no conclusive and indefeasible analysis of knowledge has yet been found. 
Debate continues among epistemologists as to what the most useful analysis is, so 
clearly professional philosophers differ in their beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge. In this section, I review the most fundamental areas of dispute among 
epistemologists, and I argue that these are also areas of dispute—and hence 
variability—for laypeople (Section 1.2). 
Epistemological questions are as old as thought itself, but the analysis of 
knowledge is usually dated back to Plato (Ichikawa and Steup 2014; Campbell et 
al. 2010). Plato is credited with proposing that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge are that it be justified, true belief (see e.g. Fine 2003: 1–
6). In other words, to know something, you have to believe it, that belief has to be 
true, and that belief has to be justified somehow. Plato argued that these 
conditions were individually necessary and jointly sufficient for something to 
count as knowledge. I will symbolize the justified-true-belief analysis of 
knowledge as JTB. 
Each of these conditions is problematic, and has its own research 
literature. Furthermore, it has also been proposed that these conditions are not 
jointly sufficient for the attribution of knowledge in some situations (see e.g. 
Gettier 1963), and not individually necessary in others (e.g. Radford 1966). 
Nevertheless, the JTB analysis of knowledge is a useful starting point in order to 
understand one of the central ideas in this thesis—epistemological variation—
since it is precisely the disputed character of the analysis of knowledge that makes 
a variationist approach to epistemology possible. I now look at each element of 
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JTB individually, starting with B for belief, then T for true, and finally J for 
justified. 
The belief criterion is the most (naively) perspicuous element of JTB in 
that it requires that knowledge be held by a knower, i.e. that a person 
“apprehends” and “commits to” the proposition3 in question. It is not enough for 
something to merely be justified and true (take these terms at face value for the 
moment). For example, if you enter the following calculation into a calculator: 
log57 9 × √60 0668  
and look away while the answer appears, then what appears on the screen is 
justified and true (to the extent that the calculator is infallible), but to say that the 
calculator knows the answer is to speak metaphorically, personifying the 
calculator. After all, which aspect of personhood is being attributed to it? It seems 
to be the ability to apprehend and commit to the answer, neither of which is 
literally appropriate. Already at this point it is possible to envision objections. 
What if there is some other property apart from apprehension that qualifies an 
inanimate object as a knower? What if the calculator were so advanced that it was 
deemed to be “sentient”? How is the human mind/brain different from a 
computer? These objections, while fascinating, constitute several overlapping but 
distinct research programmes (e.g. artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, 
cognitive science) and are therefore beyond the scope of this thesis (for an 
overview see Cole 2014). Furthermore, exploring these objections further would 
take our discussion very far away from what non-philosophers think about when 
3 For the present argument, a proposition is “a thing that can be true or false”; it can be used to 
complete a sentence like this: I believe that____________. 
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they think about knowledge, which is the kind of epistemological issue that 
concerns this thesis. 
Another metaphor that gets applied to knowledge is that it is a substance 
that can be contained, for example, in a book. However, it would be incongruous 
to claim that the book knows anything. Similarly, if the calculator printed out the 
answer rather than revealing it on its screen, we would not be any more inclined to 
say that the calculator (or the print-out) knows anything. This suggests that 
knowledge and knowing might have different conditions. Perhaps knowing should 
be analysed as believing a justified truth B(JT). This would make knowledge 
“merely” justified truth (JT). Note that this analysis is formed on the basis of how 
one talks about knowledge in Standard English, which is a popular approach in 
(Anglo-American) analytic philosophy (see e.g. Austin 1962; based on 
Wittgenstein’s 1922 “ordinary language” approach). The popularity of the 
approach is no guarantee of its efficacy however, and it is far from clear that 
analysing “how to do things with words” enables analytic philosophers to “carve 
nature at its joints”. 
I am primarily concerned in this thesis with propositional knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge that rather than knowledge how. It is an accident of the English 
language that these two distinct types of knowledge are referred to with the same 
word, cf. other Germanic, Romance, Finnic languages etc. Knowledge that x can 
be called propositional knowledge since the x is a proposition. This contrasts with 
knowledge how to drive, and also knowledge of, e.g. a person as in I know Mary. 
Unless otherwise stated, when I use the word know or knowledge, I am referring 
to the propositional kind. Belief that x, then, seems to be required in order to know 
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that x, but it may not be required in order for x to count as knowledge. In other 
words, the act of knowing seems to require that K = B(JT), i.e. it requires 
believing some piece of knowledge (JT). These may be viewed as facts about (the 
Standard English) language, or about knowledge, or both. I argue in this thesis 
that knowledge and epistemological commitments are not merely reflected in 
language, but they are produced by our use of language. Given this linguistic 
constructionist approach, the variable communicative use of words like know or 
knowledge is of greater importance than are a priori intuitions about their 
semantics in Standard English or about the analysis of knowledge. In short, I 
argue that an analysis of empirical data concerning the socially-situated use of 
evidential language on the one hand, and the variability in beliefs about 
knowledge on the other, will ultimately be more informative about the 
relationship between epistemology and language than a classical analysis of 
knowledge in the tradition of analytic philosophy. I return to the belief criterion in 
Section 1.2.2 below. 
The truth criterion4 may be naively assumed to require that, in order to 
count as knowledge, a proposition needs to “match” or “correspond” to a state of 
affairs in the world. This is called realism about truth, because it assumes that the 
truth of a proposition depends on the existence of a reality beyond one’s own 
mind. In contrast, non-realism about truth does not require a correspondence to an 
extra-mental reality. For a realist, then, the sentence snow is white is true if, and 
only if, there is a substance called snow which is actually out there in the world 
(not merely imagined) and it has the property of being white in colour. For a non-
4 I.e. the “T” of JTB “justified true belief” or B(JT) “belief in (a justified truth)”. 
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realist, snow does not have to actually exist or actually be white for the sentence 
snow is white to be true! All that is required is that the proposition that snow is 
white is not contradicted by any other true propositions (e.g. snow is yellow). (For 
a detailed review of realist and non-realist approaches to truth, see e.g. Kirkham 
1995). 
Non-realism seems very counterintuitive to the layperson. One situation 
where it seems less counterintuitive is in the case of time-limited or 
geographically local knowledge. Physicists living before the advent of Einstein’s 
theory of relativity knew that Newton’s laws of motion applied to all material 
objects in the universe.5 After Einstein, they had to revise that knowledge, so it 
seems like they never really knew it in the first place. However, this implies that 
we can only know things that can never be disproved: our best explanatory 
theories do not count as knowledge since they are always subject to revision. This 
seems counter-intuitive. The alternative is to say that the pre-Einsteinian 
physicists did know Newton’s laws, but then knowledge, presumably, has to 
simply be analysed as justified belief JB (including justified false belief). 
Mathematical knowledge in contrast is provably true, but this means simply that it 
is internally consistent (i.e. consistent with axioms and logical laws). 
Mathematical knowledge makes no claims about a “real” world beyond the realm 
of its own propositions;6 it is non-realistic knowledge. 
5 With the exception of light. 
6 Propositions are often held to be abstract objects, like numbers. In Footnote 3 above, the first part 
of the definition holds in this abstract sense, i.e. a proposition is “a thing that can be true or false”. 
However, the second part, that a proposition can complete a sentence like I believe 
that____________  is not true in this abstract sense since a sentence is an utterance, and is thus 
part of the real world. A proposition can be expressed in a clause, and a clause can complete the 
sentence template. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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Alternative resolutions to the problem of fallible knowledge include the position 
that it is “true under some circumstances”, was “true at the time” or was “true for 
them”. Newton’s laws of motion are strictly not true under any circumstances, but 
for most practical Earth-bound purposes, they are “true enough”. That is, they 
correspond to reality to a degree that is sufficient for most purposes, or, they 
disagree with reality to such a small extent that no one normally notices any 
discrepancy. Newton’s laws are taught in school as facts. The idea that a 
proposition can be true at one time and not at another is not problematic per se. 
For example the year is 1980 used to be true, but it is not true anymore. But were 
one to find out that, in fact, it had never been 1980 because of some fantastic 
miscalculation in the Gregorian calendar system, one would be more likely to say 
people thought it was 1980 rather than people knew it was 1980. If that calendar 
system is correct, then what about people using the Korean calendar, who thought 
at the time that the year was 4313? Or did they know it was 4313? Was it 
simultaneously true for me that it was 1980, and true for people living in Korea 
that it was 4313? This last question seems to have a deflationary answer that, yes, 
we were of course both correct because 1980 is 4313 in the Korean system. They 
are just different ways of saying the same thing. To put it another way, one 
version is true-in-English and the other is true-in-Korean. And in this case, to 
translate between the systems, you just have to add 2333. Translating non-
mathematical ideas between languages is not so straightforward, and may not 
always be possible. This idea is reflected in Wittgenstein’s (1953) notion of self-
contained language games which share family resemblances, but possibly not an 
exact equivalence. 
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So, the truth criterion comes in two major varieties: realism and non-realism. 
Assuming one commits to either version, one is compelled to also hold various 
supplementary beliefs due to the above considerations, e.g. that truth is local or 
universal. A similar situation obtains for the justification criterion: it comes in 
different types that entail different supporting beliefs, depending on how one 
answers the question: What kind of justification “counts” as adequate for the 
acceptance of a belief? I explore this question next in the context of so-called 
Gettier problems.  
The JTB analysis of knowledge was the consensus view from antiquity 
until the mid-twentieth century when Gettier (1963) adduced some instances of 
justified true belief that do not seem to count as knowledge. Here is one such 
Gettier problem developed by Goldman: 
Consider the following example. Henry is driving in the country-side 
with his son. For the boy’s edification Henry identifies various objects 
on the landscape as they come into view. “That’s a cow,” says Henry, 
“That’s a tractor,” “That’s a silo,” “That’s a barn,” etc. Henry has no 
doubt about the identity of these objects; in particular, he has no doubt 
that the last-mentioned object is a barn, which indeed it is. Each of the 
identified objects has features characteristic of its type. Moreover, 
each object is fully in view, Henry has excellent eyesight, and he has 
enough time to look at them reasonably carefully, since there is little 
traffic to distract him. Given this information, would we say that 
Henry knows that the object is a barn? Most of us would have little 
hesitation in saying this, so long as we were not in a certain 
philosophical frame of mind. Contrast our inclination here with the 
inclination we would have if we were given some additional 
information. Suppose we are told that, unknown to Henry, the district 
he has just entered is full of papier-maché facsimiles of barns. These 
facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns, but are really just 
facades, without back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used 
as barns. They are so cleverly constructed that travelers invariably 
mistake them for barns. Having just entered the district, Henry has not 
encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine barn. But if 
the object on that site were a facsimile, Henry would mistake it for a 
barn. Given this new information, we would be strongly inclined to 
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withdraw the claim that Henry knows the object is a barn. How is this 
change in our assessment to be explained? 
(Goldman 1976: 772–73) 
Throughout this example, Henry apparently holds a true belief that an object he 
sees is a barn. In the first part of the scenario, this true belief is adequately 
justified by his looking at the object ‘reasonably carefully’. However, once we 
find out that there are facsimile objects about, this method of justification no 
longer seems adequate, and we are therefore unwilling to say that Henry knows 
that the object is a barn. One possible reason why the method of justification is no 
longer adequate is that it no longer rules out the possibility that Henry could hold 
a true belief by accident. Even though we know that he happens to be right in this 
case, the fact that his method of justification is too weak to work in general means 
that in this case—where his belief is actually justified—no longer counts as 
knowledge! Justification has to be reliable. This leads to the position of so-called 
reliabilism.7 But what makes a method of justification reliable? 
Armstrong (1973) suggested that a belief is reliable if its truth is nomically 
caused, i.e. caused by the laws of nature. This is a generalization of Dretske’s 
(1971) notion of a reliable indicator (see also Swain 1981; Alston 1988). For 
example, a thermometer indicates the temperature, and on the basis of reading the 
thermometer, we can know the temperature. In this case, we are aware of how we 
know what the temperature is: the justificatory process is available to our 
conscious reflection. One popular example in the epistemology literature of 
reliable justification that is not available to conscious reflection is the case of Mr 
Truetemp (Lehrer 1990). Mr Truetemp’s brain has been rewired so that he is 
7 Or ‘process reliabilism about justification’ (Goldman 2011). 
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always able to estimate the temperature correctly, but he is not aware that his 
brain has been so rewired. When he believes, correctly, that it is 22 °C, would you 
say he knows the temperature? This question tends to divide people (see e.g. 
Weinberg et al. 2001). Those that say that Mr Truetemp knows the temperature, 
because he is in possession of a justified true belief, are externalists about 
justification. For externalists, it does not matter that Mr Truetemp does not know 
how he knows the temperature, or even that he does not necessarily know that he 
knows the temperature. It is sufficient merely that his true belief is reliably 
justified (in a mind-external manner). Those that reject this position and say that 
indeed Mr Truetemp does not know the temperature—precisely because he does 
not know how he came to know it—are internalists about justification. Internalists 
require that a knower have reflective access to the justificatory process, i.e. that 
justification be mind-internal. 
The JTB analysis of knowledge (K = JTB) thus consists of at least two 
broad positions about justification (internalism versus externalism), as well as at 
least two broad positions about truth (realism and non-realism). It is also possible 
that knowledge could be analysed as JB or JT in some situations (such as the pre-
Einsteinian physicists and the calculator respectively). In principle, one could 
identify knowledge with belief (K = B), e.g. in the case of fideism about religious 
knowledge (see e.g. Plantinga 1983). In this latter case, the details of truth and 
justification are irrelevant, or, alternatively, faith could be viewed as a self-
justifying route to true belief. This has some parallels with the thesis that 
knowledge may be best regarded an un-analysable primitive concept after all (see 
e.g. Williamson 2000). 
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Given these principal distinctions in the classical analysis of knowledge, there are 
a number of possible positions about what knowledge is. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
this. If all three components of JTB are required for knowledge, then there are 
four analyses of knowledge possible (shown in the top row). For example, 〈KJTB, 
Treal, Jint〉 represents the position that knowledge is JTB, realism about truth, and 
internalism about justification. If the definition of knowledge includes fewer 
components, then there are fewer permutations, with the analytically simplest 
choice being fideism (K = B). The arrows simply represent all the ways to remove 
one criterion at a time from JTB down to B. Given the know/knowledge 
distinction (JTB versus B(JT), this diagram represents half of the typology 
possible based on the discussion so far. If the B for belief criterion is removed 
from every element, then the same number of typological possibilities exists, with 
the bottom row being the null case 〈Ko〉 which requires none of the JTB conditions 
to be met in order for something to count as knowledge. 
〈KJTB, Treal, Jint〉 〈KJTB, Treal, Jext〉 〈KJTB, Tnon, Jint〉 〈KJTB, Tnon, Jext〉 
〈KTB, Treal〉 〈KTB, Tnon〉 
〈KJB, Jint〉 〈KJB, Jext〉 
〈KB〉 
Figure 1.1 Some possible analyses of know/ledge 
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Given an analysis of knowledge, it is possible to ask whether somebody knows 
something or not. To answer the question, one merely has to inspect the scenario 
and determine whether the criteria in the chosen analysis have been met. For 
example, given an analysis of knowledge 〈KJTB, Tnon, Jint〉, did the pre-Einsteinian 
physicists have knowledge of Newton’s laws of motion? Well, they believed 
them, so the B criterion is met. The laws matched every experiment that could be 
done at the time, so the laws were “true for them”, i.e. they were true in a non-
realist sense of truth, so the Tnon criterion is met. Indeed, experimental data 
counted as evidence that the laws were true, and physicists had access to this 
evidence and could reproduce it. So they would have been justified in holding the 
belief that the laws were correct, and furthermore they would have had reflective 
access to this justification, so the Jint criterion is met. So, all conditions of the 
analysis are met, and we can say that the physicists did have knowledge of 
Newton’s laws of motion. If we judged the case according to a weaker analysis of 
knowledge such as 〈KJB, Jext〉, then we can still attribute knowledge. In this case, 
the B condition is met as before, and the J condition is met because if the Jint 
condition is met, then the Jext condition is met. This is because, in order for 
someone to have reflective access to a reliable method of justification (as required 
by internalism Jint), there must exist a reliable method of justification (as required 
by externalism Jext). The reverse implication is not true. 
In practice, it might be very difficult to determine whether the criteria of 
some analysis of knowledge have been met (unless one commits to the null 
analysis Ko). In other words, it might not always be possible to determine whether 
or not someone does know something. Epistemologists have also been concerned 
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with the related but more fundamental question of determining whether or not 
someone can know something. In other words, given an analysis of knowledge, is 
it in fact ever possible to meet the criteria? There are three main responses to this 
question: yes, no, and maybe. Klein (2014) labels these positions respectively as 
epistemism, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhonian skepticism, and I will 
summarize his review of those terms now.  
Epistemism is the position that we can have knowledge. All of the 
preceding discussion has tacitly assumed an epistemist position. This might be 
regarded as the “commonsense” position: “Of course we can have knowledge! 
How is that even a question?” 
Academic skepticism is the most radical form of doubt possible. It consists 
in denying that we can know anything. This has been variously called Cartesian 
skepticism or possible worlds skepticism. Klein (2014) gives the example of the 
film The Matrix to illustrate the latter term. In The Matrix, most people are living 
in a computer simulation that appears totally real to them. Given that this is a 
possible scenario that could actually be happening right now, how could we ever 
know about it? If we cannot know whether the whole of what we think of as 
reality is actually a simulation, then how can we know anything? (Cf. Putnam’s 
1981 discussion of the “brain in a vat” scenario). 
In terms of propositional knowledge, this raises another problem. 
Academic skepticism says that there are no knowable propositions. But, there are 
no knowable propositions is itself a proposition. Academic skepticism applied to 
propositional knowledge thus appears to be self-contradictory. One remedy to this 
is to commit to neither epistemism nor Academic skepticism. This position of 
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withholding assent is referred to by Klein as Pyrrhonian skepticism. (Note that we 
are compelled to formulate Pyrrhonian skepticism as ‘withholding assent’ rather 
than positively rejecting epistemism in order to avoid the same kind of self-
contradiction as in Academic skepticism.) I will discuss a second remedy in 
Section 1.2.1 below. 
These three responses to skepticism may apply to any of the analyses of 
knowledge presented above. This gives 3 × 2 × 9 = 54 possible positions. I will 
symbolize the three positions on skepticism as S+, S– and So, i.e., respectively, 
the position that we can have knowledge, that we ca not have knowledge, and the 
position of withholding commitment to either S+ or S–. This typology has only so 
far included the principal points of distinction in classical epistemology. There are 
many others. However, now that I have shown how it is possible to describe 
epistemological variation in an abstract way with this restricted typology, I will in 
the next section consider how this typology can be applied to individuals and 
communities. 
1.2 Knowledge in a social world 
The above discussion makes it clear that the criteria for attributing knowledge to 
somebody are in dispute among epistemologists. The fields of social epistemology 
and experimental epistemology have made further contributions to our 
understanding of the nature of knowledge. In this section I discuss the idea of a 
social epistemology and elaborate on the notion of epistemic policy (van Fraassen 
2002; Teller 2004). I develop a typology of epistemic policy which includes the 
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analysis of knowledge and skepticism from the last section. I then show how I 
will apply this typology to the case of academia. In Section 1.3 I foreshadow some 
methodological considerations for this thesis.  
The field of epistemology has been complicated by criticisms of the 
analytic approach itself. Classical epistemology is reductive in that it assumes that 
knowledge, however characterized, is the same thing for everybody at all times. 
Critical approaches to epistemology reject this assumption, and have therefore 
been collectively called ‘anti-classical approaches’ to epistemology (Goldman 
2010). In other words, anti-classical epistemology claims that knowledge cannot 
be treated as ‘context-free or super-cultural’ (Barnes and Bloor 1982: 27). In 
terms of the T criterion, epistemologists can approach the analysis of knowledge 
as either realists or non-realists about truth. Classical epistemologists might 
presuppose an analysis of knowledge (e.g. JTB) and then use that for framing 
their investigations of knowledge as an object. Anti-classical epistemologist might 
in contrast reject this approach because, if the JTB analysis turns out to be false, it 
would only be false within an analysis that had already presupposed it! We can 
side-step this contradiction, but not the substantive challenge it raises for classical 
epistemology, with the notion of epistemic policy developed in the next section. 
Classical epistemology is also individualistic, i.e. it assumes that 
knowledge is possessed by individuals, while social epistemology assumes that 
knowledge is irreducibly social. This social aspect of knowledge refers not just to 
the culturally-embedded nature of knowledge production, but also to the 
possibility of knowledge being distributed among more than one individual e.g. in 
a committee or research institution. We saw in the discussion above that it is 
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plausible for knowledge to be instantiated in an inanimate object, but not for that 
object to know anything. When it comes to committees or organizations, this 
distinction is less clear (e.g. The Government knows exactly what it is doing). I 
will be concerned in this thesis with the case of academia, and will sometimes 
write of disciplines or the academy knowing things or ratifying positions on 
knowledge. By this I simply mean that there is some degree of consensus within 
that level of organizational structure in respect of that knowledge or belief. 
In this thesis, then, I modestly assume that I am uncovering “facts”, i.e. 
finding out things that obtain in the actual world. The object of my enquiry is the 
linguistic construction of epistemic commitments. A linguistic constructionist 
approach to epistemology is an anti-classical approach in the sense that I am not 
aiming to uncover a universal analysis of knowledge that transcends the 
particularities of human society. Rather, I am concerned with the mutually 
constitutive relationship between linguistic variation and epistemological 
variation: the way these variations maintain one another. To investigate this 
relationship, I focus on the discursive processes that create and maintain epistemic 
beliefs. In other words, I am more interested in what people believe and say about 
knowledge than what knowledge is in the abstract, because I maintain that what 
people believe about it, say about it, do with it, elucidates the meaning of 
knowledge more powerfully than an armchair analysis grounded in a monolithic 
conception of “natural” language ever could. 
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1.2.1 Epistemic policy 
I argued in Section 1.1 that a classical, ordinary-language analysis of knowledge 
requires that in order to know a proposition p, you have to believe that p, and p has 
to be justified and true. I symbolized this analysis of knowledge as JTB or B(JT).8 
Immediately this raises questions such as: Whose language? What is “ordinary” 
language? What is belief? What is justification? And what is truth? I propose that 
the answers to these questions are partially constitutive of an epistemic policy. An 
epistemic policy is an experience filter: a way of seeing and interpreting the 
world. It comprises an analysis of knowledge (e.g. ‘knowledge is JTB’), ways of 
finding things out (e.g. introspection, experiment, prayer), and it is imbued with 
values, attitudes and norms i.e. non-propositional content (see below). We all 
have several epistemic policies at our disposal that are suited better to particular 
epistemic tasks. For example, to find out where I left my keys, I will use 
introspection, and I may re-enact what I did the last time I had them. These ways 
of finding things out may be unreliable, but they seem to me to be appropriate for 
the task: they are in principle capable of producing an answer to my question, 
even if that answer is doubtful and imprecise. I would not try reading about the 
history of keys, doing an attitude survey about keys, or working out what type of 
metal the lock was made of. These ways of finding things out, while perhaps more 
reliable, do not speak to the question at hand. They draw my attention towards 
data that do not bear on the question of where my keys are; they are ways of 
8 B(JT) means belief in a justified truth. Justified truths can be called knowledge (e.g. knowledge 
stored in a book), but it would be odd for many people to say that a book knows anything. The 
verb know, then, seems to require belief by a knowing subject, while knowledge seems to be able 
to exist without a knower. 
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seeing the world that, given my immediate goals, lead not to false information, but 
to the “wrong kind” of knowledge. 
In all of the epistemic policies just mentioned, it would be possible to 
maintain an analysis of knowledge as JTB. That is, to remain committed to the 
idea that for me to know that p means that p is justified, true and that I believe that 
p. If I dispensed with the truth criterion, so that knowledge was JB then I would
already know where my keys were: they would be anywhere I (justifiably) believe 
them to be (e.g. I believe that the keys are in the fridge because that’s where I 
keep lots of important things). It’s very difficult to imagine ever applying this 
definition of knowledge for the purpose of finding a set of keys because when you 
went to get your keys, you would invariably find them absent from where you 
expected, but then still insist that you know where they are since the truth of the 
matter is irrelevant to knowledge. Furthermore, many non-realist notions of truth 
are also vulnerable to this kind of problem in the key-hunting scenario. For 
example, if I committed to a theory of knowledge as JTB, but assumed non-
realism about truth, then I might be able to say it’s true for me that the keys are 
there even if everyone else insisted that they were not. 
Non-realism about truth is, then, perhaps an unlikely commitment given 
the task of looking for keys. It is however much more obviously appropriate for 
finding out about people’s perceptions of pain, or generating emotional responses 
or aesthetic judgements to research objects, where truth is more likely to be seen 
as being a subjective matter. Epistemic policies, then, are useful in different 
circumstances. In other words, epistemic policies are beliefs, attitudes and norms 
(as defined below) relating to knowledge in particular contexts. 
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I said above that social epistemology regards knowledge as ‘irreducibly social’. 
One interpretation of this is that the criteria for knowledge are subject to social 
influences rather than being ‘context-free or super-cultural’. In other words, what 
knowledge is depends on how people use it. This means that intuitions from the 
armchair cannot be relied upon to reveal the nature of knowledge; even if people 
were consciously committed to e.g. realism about truth, their commitments would 
be subject to change because of social facts. Elzinga’s (1985, 1987, 1997) notion 
of epistemic drift describes ‘the tendency for epistemic criteria to drift from ones 
that are likely to push back the frontiers of knowledge to ones that are likely to 
serve some socially desirable ends’ (Fuller 2002: xxi): 
 
In the extreme the regulative governing internal quality control may 
be crowded out, whence research becomes directly instrumentalized 
and assessed in respect to its utility in society, in practices outside 
science; what was research ceases to be the kind of investigative 
process we normally associate with research. On the other hand, in 
less extreme cases relevance and accountability pressures may be 
accommodated while upholding internalist quality control 
mechanisms, in which case the content of research agendas may 
undergo substantial change, and new fields opened. 
 
(Elzinga 1997: 423) 
 
Fuller argues that such ‘perversions of the research agenda’ are not as insidious as 
‘the tendency for measures of reliability to be used as surrogates for measures of 
validity in the evaluation of knowledge claims.’ (2002: xxi–xxii, original 
emphasis). In other words, while Elzinga is concerned that the relationship 
between power and knowledge is distorting what gets researched, Fuller is 
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concerned that it is distorting what counts as knowledge. It is this latter possibility 
that I engage with in the present thesis. 
The notion of epistemic drift illustrates how the social context of 
knowledge formation can change what knowledge means. The notion of epistemic 
policy captures the synchronic aspect of this variability in how knowledge is 
conceived of, and I will elaborate its non-propositional content in order to 
illustrate this. I said above that an epistemic policy is a ‘belief-forming strategy’, 
but it also comprises attitudes, values and norms related to the nature of 
knowledge. For example, an epistemic policy may include the belief that the 
correct analysis of knowledge is 〈KJTB, Treal, Jext〉. Belief is a ‘propositional 
attitude’ (see e.g. Russell 1956), i.e. it is a mental relation that one can bear to a 
proposition, but one could equally well doubt, think, or consider that knowledge is 
〈KJTB, Treal, Jext〉. Attitudes comprise affective responses, positive and negative 
evaluations and behaviours (Maio et al. 2003), and they can be about abstract 
objects like knowledge and ideas (Bohner and Dickel 2011: 392). ‘Values are 
widely considered to be largely stable social and internal constructs that guide 
social evaluation and action’; they are a more persistent form of attitudes which 
‘transcend specific situations’ (Schwartz and Bilsky 1987: 551, my emphasis). 
Norms are ‘the customary rules that govern behavior in groups and societies’ 
(Bicchieri and Muldoon 2014). Bem (1993) uses the metaphor of the lens to 
describe norms: ‘every culture has hidden assumptions that act as cultural lenses 
through which members of society view and shape the world’ (Preves and 
Mortimer 2013: 151). 
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The inclusion of this non-propositional content in the theoretical construct 
of epistemic policy allows us to side-step the problem of Academic skepticism. 
Van Fraassen (2002: 46–48) argues that epistemic policies are not the same kind 
of thing as beliefs.9 Since epistemic policies are to some extent values, they are 
supposed to be immune from their own epistemic effects: they are not subject to 
falsification. Values are not candidates for truth and falsity. In short, by 
incorporating unfalsifiable attitudes into epistemic judgements, we insulate those 
judgements from epistemic scrutiny. This means that we can deny the possibility 
of knowledge, for example, without thereby denying that that position may itself 
be guided by attitudes, values and norms. The inclusion of non-propositional 
content saves Academic skepticism from self-contradiction, but the price is 
an analytically less tractable epistemology. 
1.2.2 Epistemic policy range: The case of academia 
So, everyone has multiple epistemic policies at their disposal for different 
purposes. In principle, these policies can be very divergent and cover a wide 
swath of the typological space. In the case of academic disciplines, epistemic 
policies are routinely made explicit in order to bolster one’s knowledge claims, 
and, indeed, so as to be seen to be making a legitimate knowledge claim at all. 
Epistemic policies, when made explicit, can be more easily interrogated and 
9 van Fraassen’s (2002) work The Empirical Stance gave a seminal account of belief-forming 
practices, but I use Teller’s (2004) term epistemic policy instead of the more perspicuous and 
philosophically usual term stance because I will also be using the sociolinguistic notion of stance 
throughout this thesis. Both disciplines use the term stance to connote a position or point of view, 
although sociolinguists are especially concerned with the linguistic materialization (and 
reproduction) of stance (see Chapter 2). van Fraassen’s conception of stance is somewhat 
idiosyncratic in philosophy, in that he supposes that a stance is not subject to rational interrogation 
or defence. This makes it potentially closer to the sociolinguistic notion of stance as a more 
fleeting, intersubjective and mutable position-in-interaction. 
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challenged. Part of becoming socialized into an academic discipline is becoming 
attuned to the epistemic policies that have survived such challenge and are thus 
deemed to be acceptable according to that discipline’s consensus practice (Kitcher 
1993). For example, externalism about justification is a difficult position to 
maintain; it is generally only ratified in the academy as an informal guide to 
thinking (e.g. following a “hunch”). Sometimes it is possible in a research context 
to assert that things are self-evident, but reference to a reliable justification is 
normatively held to be preferable. Socialization into a discipline, then, requires a 
narrowing of one’s epistemic policy range (EPR), i.e. it requires one to set aside 
epistemic policies that one’s discipline does not ratify. 
Which epistemic policies are ratified by which disciplines? To approach 
this question, I next review Becher and Trowler’s (2001) synthetic account of 
several typologies of academic disciplines, and then go on to argue that 
disciplinary consensus practice for the acquisition or manufacture of knowledge 
may be characterized using the system of epistemic policies so far described. I 
also argue that these epistemological foundations constrain and partly define 
research methodologies available to a particular discipline. 
Becher and Trowler (2001: 23–36) develop a typology of disciplinary 
epistemology by first considering Pantin’s (1968) distinction between restricted 
and the unrestricted sciences. The examples elaborated by Pantin are, respectively 
‘the physical sciences’ and ‘the biologies’, the former of whose investigators ‘are 
restricted in the field of phenomena to which they are devoted’, while the latter 
‘must be prepared to follow their problems into any other science whatsoever’ 
(quoted in Becher and Trowler 2001: 32). Pantin explains that the restriction of 
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physical sciences to a relatively small class of phenomena and variables accounts 
for the relatively greater power to generalize of physical sciences compared to 
biological sciences. A first dimension of difference across academia then, is the 
tendency to generalize. Pantin argues that this tendency is embedded in 
disciplinary (methodological) practice as the tendency for a subject to isolate itself 
from inter-disciplinary elaboration: 
general-restricted specific-unrestricted 
Kuhn (1962) developed the idea that knowledge, especially in the sciences, 
proceeds by “saltatory evolution” from one period of relative stability, called a 
paradigm, via a critical accumulation of evidence that the paradigm is not correct, 
to an abrupt transition to a new paradigm. Kuhn varies in how he applied the term 
paradigm, but we can think of it as a discipline’s “grand narrative” or “unifying 
theory”. Kuhn thus challenged the idealized account of science as dispassionately 
abandoning theories that no longer seem to fit the data, instead arguing (following 
Planck 1949) that disciplines hang on to moribund theoretical constructs more or 
less until the death of the generation of theoreticians that champion them. Kuhn 
argues that while this picture of disciplinary science as relying heavily on the 
personalities of its practitioners explodes the high ideals of science, there is 
nonetheless a general progression from pre-paradigmatic disciplines towards 
paradigmatic disciplines in the academy. In other words, even though paradigms 
are normally ultimately abandoned, there is still a tendency for new disciplines to 
move towards theoretical coherence. Once a paradigm is established, disciplines 
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may then enter progressive rounds of paradigm shifts. This yields a second 
dimension of difference across academia: 
pre-paradigmatic paradigmatic 
It should be noted that paradigm shifts may or may not include revision of 
epistemic policies: that would probably be better characterized as the emergence 
of a new discipline, or as a break from academia all together. Hyland (2006: 25–
26) suggests that the use of citations in research articles can indicate the stability
of a paradigm. He argues that ‘scientists participate in relatively discrete areas of 
study and their research proceeds along well defined paths, so they can 
presuppose a certain amount of theoretical, background, procedural expertise and 
technical lexis’. In other words, a well-established paradigm that is widely known 
does not have to be explicitly justified in every research article: it can simply be 
tacitly assumed. 
Becher and Trowler (2001) note that both the above dimensions arise from 
observation of how disciplines function as social groups, and they go on to 
contrast this with two typologies that arise from consideration of differences in 
subject matter across academia. Biglan (1973) used survey data of around 200 
faculty members at two universities, and Kolb (1981) used a psychometric test 
(Kolb Learning Style Inventory) of 800 practitioners and students of management. 
Becher and Trowler (2001: 35) bring the analyses of these data together into a 
two-dimensional (Kolb-Biglan) typology: 
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pure 
(abstract) 
hard soft 
(scientific) (artistic) 
applied 
(concrete) 
Figure 1.2 Kolb-Biglan typology of academic disciplines 
The four quadrants are labelled with Kolb’s terminology. I will adopt this 
classification, but will retain Biglan’s terminology after Becher (1994) who 
argues in Becher and Trowler (2001) that Biglan’s terminology is more 
transparent. Examples of disciplines are given in Table 1.1 below in quadrants 
labelled with Biglan’s terms, and elaborated with example characteristics of 
knowledge (adapted from Becher 1994).  
abstract-active 
abstract-reflective 
concrete-active 
concrete-reflective 
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Table 1.1 Knowledge in academic disciplines 
Hard-Pure Soft-Pure 
Pure sciences, e.g. physics Humanities, e.g. history and pure social 
sciences (e.g. anthropology) 
• cumulative
• atomistic
• concerned with universals,
quantities, simplification
(‘reduction’)
• impersonal, value-free
• clear criteria for K
verification/obsolescence
• consensus over questions to address
• results in discovery/explanation
• reiterative
• holistic
• concerned with particulars, qualities,
complication (‘problematization’)
• personal, value-laden
• disputed criteria for K
verification/obsolescence
• no consensus over questions to
address
• results in
understanding/interpretation
Hard-Applied Soft-Applied 
Technologies, e.g. mechanical 
engineering, clinical medicine 
Applied social science, e.g. education, 
law, social administration 
• purposive
• pragmatic (know-how via hard K)
• concerned with mastery of physical
environment
• applied heuristic approaches
• uses both qualitative and
quantitative approaches
• criteria for judgement are
purposive/functional
• results in products/techniques
• functional
• utilitarian (know-how via soft K)
• concerned with enhancement of
practice
• uses case studies and case law
• results in protocols/procedures
Becher and Trowler (2001) note that this typology is a generalization, and I note 
that its utility in predicting and explaining linguistic phenomena depends on the 
extent to which the informants used subscribe to its validity10. It remains to be 
seen how forthcoming participants will (or can) be with their epistemic policies. 
For example, Schwarz (2004) analyzed the views of a group of scientists and 
found a rather vague general agreement that certainty “trumps” uncertainty, but no 
consensus on the exact meaning of, or mechanism of transition between, scientific 
hypotheses, theories and laws. 
10 This will be investigated in interview (see Chapter 5). 
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Table 1.1 is suggestive of the range of epistemic policies ratified by different 
disciplines. There are several points of contact with the epistemic policy typology 
developed above. The lower half of the table represents disciplines that are more 
concerned with know-how, and these are not the focus of the present work. 
‘Concerned with universals’ and ‘cumulative’ versus ‘concerned with particulars’ 
and ‘reiterative’ relates to the T criterion. Universals correspond to realism about 
truth, while particulars suggest a non-realist conception of truth. The idea that 
hard-pure subjects are ‘value-free’ stands at odds with the notion of epistemic 
policy developed in this chapter. Academics in those fields may believe that their 
research is value-free, but I argue that it is not. Rather, values, attitudes and norms 
shape the way that academics see facts. ‘Clear criteria for K’ implies a narrow 
epistemic policy range (EPR) for the hard-pure subjects, and ‘disputed criteria for 
K’ implies a wide EPR. 
I argued above that it is possible for an individual to adopt one epistemic 
policy for one purpose, and then to switch to a different one for another purpose. 
For example, suspending one’s disbelief is appropriate while watching a film, but 
not while driving a car. The same phenomenon or situation can be viewed by 
different individuals through the lens of different epistemic policies. An academic 
example is that critical theory can be applied to natural phenomena via the 
postmodern notion of “nature as text”, while natural phenomena can also be 
approached “naturalistically” as in “normal science”. The field of science and 
technology studies (STS) focuses on the discourses of science, i.e. the ideological 
and institutional constraints on language which shape scientific theories (see e.g. 
Latour and Woolgar 1986; Ross 1996). Scientists typically reject the idea that 
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such discursive processes can have any substantive effect on their theories (see 
e.g. Gross et al. 1996; Gross and Levitt 1998; Sokal 2008). 
From within the framework of epistemic policy, neither of these 
approaches is “more correct” than the other because they are differentiated in 
terms of their values, including what they are trying to achieve.11 If one rejects the 
epistemic policy construct, and instead holds that epistemological positions reduce 
to analyses of knowledge, then one might rather argue that one or other analysis is 
better than the other because values do not come into it. 
These differing positions on the influence of discursive/linguistic 
processes on the content of theories highlight a further epistemic policy 
distinction, which relates to the researcher’s own position with respect to their 
object of study. Are they trying to view it dispassionately, in isolation from social 
and political factors, or are they “involved with” their research object? In short, is 
their relationship to their research one of objectivism or subjectivism? I will call 
these opposing positions investigative policies, I-policies, and symbolize them as 
Iobj and Isubj. 
Postmodernism, and critical theory in general, have not penetrated the 
popular consciousness to the same extent that “science” has. It is fairly safe to say 
that there are some people in the world who never approach a natural phenomenon 
“as a text” even when marvelling at the beauty of a mountain range. Some 
epistemic policies are not widely available, whether because they entail ways of 
seeing that are innovative and hence not widely known, or because they are 
widely known and widely dismissed (as in the driving example above). This 
11 Sam Harris’s (2010) book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values is 
the most successful recent popularization of the thesis that values are a type of fact. Mainstream 
philosophy was not persuaded. 
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means that some people have a more extensive range of epistemic policies at their 
disposal than others, and I refer to them as having a wide epistemic policy range 
(EPR). 
Institutions can have wide or narrow EPRs too. The National Institute of 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK has made its EPR explicit in the form of 
hierarchies of evidence (NICE 2007). For example, the poorest form of evidence 
for studies of the accuracy of diagnosis is ‘Consensus, expert committee reports or 
opinions and/or clinical experience without explicit critical appraisal; or based on 
physiology, bench research or ‘first principles’’, while the best form of evidence 
is ‘Systematic review (with homogeneity) of level-1 studies’ (NICE 2007: 47). 
Interpreting the patient as text does not feature in this hierarchy, and NICE would 
in fact regard it as an unacceptable epistemic policy for diagnosis. 
 Regarding an epistemic policy as unacceptable is itself an epistemic 
policy. An obvious response to the paragraph above is “Of course NICE does not 
want a postmodern critique of signs and symptoms: it wants to ensure that people 
get diagnosed and treated quickly and safely, and postmodern criticism cannot do 
that”. But this explanation is in terms of what NICE wants, which is to say that the 
diagnosis and treatment of patients are value-laden aims. In the case of acute life-
threatening illness, most people might share those values, but in the case of e.g. 
non-acute psychiatric conditions, the degree of consensus is likely to be 
considerably lower. Psychiatry, and especially the closely allied discipline of 
clinical psychology, do not find postmodern epistemic policies unacceptable. 
Individual psychologists may be highly skeptical of the utility of textual 
approaches to counselling, but the discipline as a whole is a “broad church” with a 
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wide EPR, containing individual members with both wide and narrow EPRs (see 
e.g. Gergen 2001). 
An academic discipline is another type of institution that has a consensus 
on the epistemic policies that it deems appropriate for generating its knowledge. 
This disciplinary policy range is reflected and constituted by the practice of its 
individual members who as a group adopt a set of epistemic policies. For 
example, the policy adopted in the discipline of physics for the purpose of doing 
an experiment may include the following elements: 
 
〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 
 
In other words, the epistemic policy adopted for a physics experiment may 
assume that knowledge can be acquired, that knowledge is JTB, that justification 
has to be internal, that truth is “out there in the world” to be discovered, and that a 
stance of objectivity is the best way to go about finding out what that truth is. This 
could be materialized linguistically in an utterance of the following type: 
 
First, observe that a reasonable observer considering implicational 
concepts must pick some upper limit of the degree K of concepts to be 
considered—simply because including the maximum of K = D - 1 
provides complete expressive power and hence zero inductive power 
(see discussion of the bias-variance tradeoff above). 
 
(Feldman 2006: 362)12 
 
The author instructs the reader to ‘observe’, assuming that the observation 
available to the reader is the same as the observation available to the author. This 
12 This is actually a paper from the Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 
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suggests an I-policy of objectivity. He does however require that an observer be 
‘reasonable’, suggesting that observation is interpretive, but also suggesting that 
there is one particular outcome that would be the right one (T-policy of realism). 
The force of the epistemic modal verb must derives from a logical deduction, the 
premise of which linearly follows the conclusion in this quote. This suggests an 
affiliation with rationalism, and by association, classical epistemology (i.e. an S-
policy of epistemism, and K-policy of KJTB). Since a justification is being made 
explicitly in this excerpt, it seems likely that the author requires that justification 
be made explicit in order to adequately communicate the knowledge itself (i.e. J-
policy of internalism). 
I will illustrate an apparently contrasting epistemic policy in this quote 
from Lyotard’s (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge: 
Rather than painting a picture that would inevitably remain 
incomplete, I will take as my point of departure a single feature, one 
that immediately defines our object of study. Scientific knowledge is a 
kind of discourse. And it is fair to say that for the last forty years the 
“leading” sciences and technologies have had to do with language: 
phonology and theories of linguistics, problems of communication and 
cybernetics, modern theories of algebra and informatics, computers 
and their languages... 
(Lyotard 1984: 3–4) 
The first clause suggests that our knowledge (in this case our knowledge of 
historical context) is always partial, since it is inevitable that any mental (or 
linguistic) representation of it is incomplete. This suggests a more skeptical S-
policy than the Science example above, perhaps Academic skepticism 〈S–〉, at 
least with respect to historical knowledge. The scare-quoted “leading” is 
somewhat derisory, suggesting that Lyotard views scientific inquiry as 
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hegemonic, i.e. dominant for political or ideological reasons rather than because 
of its epistemic merits. On the other hand, the author uses the word ‘inevitably’ 
which suggests certainty about the following proposition, implying an S-policy of 
〈S+〉. This may then imply an S-policy of 〈So〉, i.e. of not committing definitively 
either way about whether knowledge is possible or not. 
Lyotard goes on to say that ‘Scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse.’ 
(1984: 3), which resonates with the dialectic and hence intersubjective, suggesting 
an I-stance of subjectivity. This analysis is supported by the author’s use of the 
first person pronoun I, through which the author situates his message relative to 
himself. 〈Isubj〉 seems to suggest 〈Tnon〉, that is, an investigative policy element of 
subjectivity seems to require a T-policy element of non-realism. 
If knowledge is a discourse, then it is unlikely to have a universal and 
unchanging character, so Lyotard’s K-policy is either that KJTB, or KJB. I include 
the final partial sentence since it may indicate something about the kind of 
justification that Lyotard accepts for knowledge. No doubt it is fair to say is a 
reasonably common form of words that has been somewhat semantically 
bleached, however it seems to offer a justification on the basis of intuition rather 
than explicit logical argumentation. This suggests that his J-policy is not one of 
(explicit) internalism, i.e. not relative to an explicit chain of reasoning. 
Already it is clear that the task of diagnosing someone’s epistemic policies 
from their utterances is going to be difficult. Disciplines may make their epistemic 
policies explicit, and so too may individuals, but it is likely that epistemic policies 
will not normally be clear from the form of a stance. I therefore approach the 
relationship between epistemological variation and linguistic variation in an 
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iterative manner. I propose a model of epistemological difference in academic 
disciplines next; then, I propose some possible linguistic correlates of these 
epistemological differences in Section 1.3. In Chapter 2 I approach this 
correlation from the linguistic side to reach a more refined model of the 
relationship between epistemological variation and linguistic variation. I then test 
this model empirically in Chapter 3, and then refine and re-test in Chapters 4 and 
5.  
 I suggested above in the discussion of Lyotard’s epistemic policy that 
certain forms of epistemic policy elements seem to be incompatible with others. 
For example, an investigative policy element of objectivity 〈Iobj〉 seems to imply 
realism about truth 〈Treal〉. This means that this pair of policy elements can 
combine in 4 different ways: 〈Isubj, Treal〉, 〈Isubj, Tnon〉, 〈Iobj, Treal〉, 〈Iobj, Tnon〉.13 Now, 
what would it mean to have a policy of 〈Iobj, Tnon〉? To be treat reality as mind-
independent such that one can approach it objectively, but also to hold that truth 
itself is not out there waiting to be observed, but somehow constituted in the act of 
observation? This seems to be contradictory. This policy may be defendable in the 
case of e.g. quantum mechanical phenomena. It seems to require para-consistent 
logic, e.g. the possibility that a proposition p and its negation ¬p could be 
simultaneously true. This is a rather exotic position which is not directly relevant 
to the present early research into the relationship between epistemological and 
linguistic variation. Thinkers (and laypeople) have historically been very reluctant 
to abandon the law of non-contradiction, as illustrated by this quote from Ibn Sina 
(Avicenna): 
13 Let us assume that, while it is possible to dispense with the T-criterion in one’s K-policy and 
hold that knowledge is JB, one still has to have a position on what truth is. 
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Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and 
burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be 
beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned. 
(Ibn Sina, Metaphysics I.8, 53.13–15)14 
 
This is of course itself an epistemic policy. Avicenna evaluates violations of non-
contradiction negatively. I suggest that this evaluation is normative in academia, 
such that internally inconsistent epistemic policies tend to be untenable in 
research. 
 A similar situation arises with the other policy elements. I propose that 
there are just two stable co-ordinations of the epistemic policy elements so far 
described: 
Science 〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 
and 
Arts  〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 
 
These are two the archetypal epistemic policy bundles in academia, somewhat 
tendentiously labelled here as Science and Arts, following C. P. Snow’s (1959) 
Two Cultures. These clusters of policy elements are constrained by the pervasive, 
and some would argue, hegemonic, commitment to non-contradiction. Diversions 
from these archetypes are possible, and within the Arts or Sciences a range of 
policies is still possible (e.g. the “hunch” policy of Jext described earlier). But, 
when it comes to writing research articles, academia requires explicit justification 
via the Science bundle for scientists, and the Arts bundle for artists and humanists. 
14 See e.g. Michael Marmura’s translation (Avicenna 2005). 
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Finally, I suggest that Science does not permit scientists to stray very far from the 
Science bundle. In other words, science disciplines like physics and biology do 
not recognize qua science an epistemic policy bundle including 〈S–〉, 〈KJB〉, 〈Tnon〉 
or 〈Isubj〉. On the other hand, the Arts are more permissive. Many more policy 
bundles are possible in the Arts, even if ultimately those are generally abandoned 
for the normative Arts bundle when interrogated at the interface with the 
hegemonic academy. The characteristics of this epistemologically principled 
“Two Cultures 2.0” are summarized below: 
 
 Science 〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 Narrow EPR 
 Arts  〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 Wide EPR 
 
 
1.3 Epistemology and language: Methodological considerations 
 
In this section I foreshadow how the epistemological theory developed so far joins 
up to the linguistic theory to be reviewed in Chapter 2, and to the empirical 
analyses of the rest of the thesis. First I discuss the relationship between epistemic 
policy and the interactional sociolinguistic notion of stance. I then compare and 
contrast this pair of concepts with Goffman’s (e.g. 1974, 1981) notions of frame 
and footing. I argue that, though related, epistemic policy and epistemic stance are 
importantly different from Goffman’s terms. Following this, I suggest some 
possible links between epistemic policy components and linguistic forms. I then 
discuss some methodological insights from the nascent field of experimental 
philosophy that will be of use in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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1.3.1 Epistemic policy and epistemic Stance (cf. frame and footing) 
 
Goffman’s notions of frame and footing have been variously defined in terms of 
each other,15 notably by Goffman (1981: 128): ‘A change in our footing is another 
way of talking about a change in our frame for events.’ I suggest that the 
distinction between epistemic policy and epistemic stance parallels that between 
Goffman’s terms, but that the two pairs of terms are not synonymous. 
 A frame is a way of viewing or interpreting events, including 
communicative events. Goffman (1974: 48) suggests that members of a society 
share ideas about frames e.g. make-believe, contests and ceremonies. Framing a 
fist fight as make-believe, as a boxing match, or as an initiation rite involves 
seeing the same activity in different ways, and changing the rules and obligations 
that it connotes. Epistemic policies are similar to frames in that they are 
perspectives that one can take with respect to an object. Given the description of 
epistemic policy and policy range above, however, some points of difference 
become apparent. 
 Analytically, epistemic policies are composed from low-level objects that 
are unlikely to have popular currency. Frames on the other hand are high-level 
objects that are recognized as conventional ways of seeing things. A single 
epistemic policy bundle makes a range of frames possible. One could see the fight 
above in all the various ways while keeping one’s epistemic policy fixed. 
Conversely, one could view the fight as make-believe while varying one’s 
epistemic policy, e.g. as either an internalist or an externalist about justification. 
15 See e.g. Ribeiro (2006) or Hale (2011) for an overview. 
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Goffman’s (e.g. 1981) notion of footing seems closer to epistemic stance (see 
Chapter 2). Footing involves alignment with one’s interlocutors, as well as 
positioning oneself relative to objects of discussion and ways of framing them. 
Footing is the position one takes up within a frame. The way one then signals that 
position to others is via the keying effect of the linguistic form of the footing. For 
example, a shift back to “serious” talk from a joke could be achieved by a 
discourse marker such as anyway… The epistemological parallel is that an 
epistemic policy (or policy range) associates with the taking of particular 
epistemic stances (positions about the knowledge status of propositions). An 
epistemic stance then “points to” or indexes (see Chapter 2) the epistemic policy 
of the speaker via the choice of linguistic items that are linked to stance elements, 
or possibly by their combined effect. Goffman would perhaps not claim that 
frames and footings are mutually constraining, but merely that keying a change in 
footing can cause a change in frame. I suggest that a change in epistemic stance is 
constitutive of epistemic policy, i.e. that linguistic practice creates and maintains 
epistemic policy. In the next section I foreshadow some of the details of this 
linguistic construction of epistemological difference. 
 
1.3.2 Possible linguistic correlates of epistemic policy 
 
Below is my initial characterization of epistemological difference in academia, 
and the possible linguistic correlates of each epistemic policy variant. 
 
Science 〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 Narrow EPR 
 Arts  〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 Wide EPR 
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Table 1.2 Possible linguistic correlates of epistemic policy elements 
Epistemic policy 
element 
variant Context of use 
(Arts / Science) 
possible linguistic correlates 
Knowledge JTB Both favour weak epistemic 
modals: may, possibly 
(JB) Arts? favour strong epistemic 
modals: must, certainly 
(B) untenable? ? 
Skepticism S+ Both favour weak epistemic verbs: 
suspect, support 
(S–) untenable? disfavour epistemic verbs 
So Arts favour strong epistemic verbs: 
know, prove 
Justification Jint Both (“hunches”) because, since, in view of… 
Jext Both (Research 
articles) 
? 
Investigative Iobj Science disfavour 1st person pronoun; 
favour alethic verbs: show, 
prove, indicate 
Isubj Arts favour 1st person pronoun; 
favour epistemic verbs: 
believe, argue 
Truth Treal Both favour singular nouns (e.g. 
truth, reality) 
Tnon Arts favour plural nouns (e.g. 
truths, realities) 
In Table 1.2 above I have tentatively linked the various forms of the 5 epistemic 
policy elements to some possible linguistic correlates. This is to give an 
impression of what is to follow in subsequent chapters, and a more complete list 
of linguistic variables with epistemic character is given in Chapter 2. 
Under the knowledge policy element K-policy, I have contrasted KJTB with 
KJB. KB is likely to be an untenable position in academic research. KJTB is a more 
exacting standard of knowledge than KJB since it contains the additional T-
criterion. This means that an epistemic policy including a K-policy of KJTB will 
permit epistemic stances of certainty less often than will epistemic policies with 
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less stringent definitions of K, e.g. KJB or KB, where the modals of necessity or 
certainty may be applied in situations that are not necessary or certain from a 
classical (JTB) perspective. This could lead to the counter-intuitive situation 
where disciplines that may be stereotypically viewed as “woolly” or uncertain 
take seemingly certain epistemic stances to propositions more often than do 
stereotypically ‘rigorous’ disciplines. 
In terms of S-policy, it seems logical that denying the possibility of 
knowledge would negate the possibility of using words such as know, although it 
is possible that semantically bleached uses (e.g. the discourse marker, you know) 
would be impervious to this. However, by the same reasoning as that for K-policy, 
an Academic skeptical S-policy 〈S–〉 should effectively loosen the criteria for 
when epistemic verbs of certainty (e.g. know, prove, determine) may be used—
they just would not mean quite the same thing. An epistemist S-policy 〈S+〉 
however would admit the possibility of knowledge, and, since epistemism is 
commonly associated with a K-policy JTB, it would reduce the number of 
propositions to which epistemic verbs of certainty may be applied. 
J-policy may associate with differential use of conjunctions like because 
and since which are used to used to explain one piece of discourse by reference to 
another. Given a policy of internalism about justification 〈Jint〉, it would be more 
likely for someone to use such conjunctions than if they had a policy of 〈Jext〉. 
I-policy, the policy about placement of the speaker relative to the object of 
inquiry, seems to semantically overlap the choice of pronoun. The use of 
pronouns is salient, e.g. when comparing science and arts research articles, and 
also given received ideas of e.g. how to write up a science experiment (see 
62 
Chapter 2). The analogous verbal distinction could be termed alethic versus 
epistemic: alethic verbs refer directly to matters of fact, independent of the mind 
that apprehends them (e.g. show, prove), while epistemic verbs refer to 
specifically cognitive relations to matters of fact, i.e. propositional attitudes such 
as believe and know. 
Non-realism about truth, i.e. a T-policy of 〈Tnon〉 means that epistemic 
words such as truth may be pluralized, while realism about truth would seem to 
prohibit this. Thus to a non-realist, questions such as “True for whom?” and 
“According to whose science?” are legitimate, while to a realist about truth, they 
are nonsensical. Apart from linking truth to social groups, variation in T-policy 
should manifest linguistically as the singular versus plural distinction for a limited 
number of lexical items. Epistemological vocabulary seems like a good place to 
start for candidate loci of variation, e.g. epistemology/epistemologies, but opposed 
pairs of theoretical objects in general are another possibility, such as 
masculinity/masculinities or subjectivity/subjectivities. 
1.3.3 Measuring epistemic policy: Insights from experimental philosophy 
I mentioned above that experimental philosophers have found that people’s 
intuitions about justificatory internalism and externalism vary (e.g. Weinberg et 
al. 2001). The position that this variation is “a feature not a bug” has been adopted 
by work under the rubric of experimental philosophy in the past decade. People’s 
intuitions about epistemological and ethical scenarios have been found to vary 
according to “irrelevant” factors. For example, according to the order in which a 
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series of scenarios is presented (for reviews see Knobe and Nichols 2008; Ángel 
Pinillos 2011; Buckwalter 2012). 
Experimental philosophy has proceeded by presenting participants with 
scenarios like the Gettier cases above, and asking for their judgements. These 
scenarios are couched in the natural language tradition which assumes that 
Standard English is being spoken and understood in the same way by all 
participants. As such, experimental philosophy measures variability in 
epistemology in a way that is not as valid as it would be if it took account of 
linguistic variability. This thesis offers a step towards understanding how to do 
this. 
In Table 1.1 above we saw that academics’ beliefs and intuitions about the 
nature of their disciplines can be quite different from what seems to be the case 
typologically/theoretically in terms of epistemic policy. Academics do not 
generally conceive of their thinking in terms of an epistemic policy typology, but 
rather in reference to methodological and practical considerations. This means that 
one cannot simply ask someone what their epistemic policies are. For this reason, 
I will make use of experimental philosophical scenarios in categorizing interview 
participants, although I will also supplement these tools with judgements about 
the participant based on what they say about matters of epistemological character 
(see Chapter 4). 
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1.4 Summary 
In this thesis, I investigate the relationship between epistemological variation and 
sociolinguistic variation. In this chapter, I have reviewed the epistemological 
concepts necessary to characterize epistemological variation. The model of 
epistemic policy developed is summarized as follows. An epistemic policy is a 
bundle of policy elements (as discussed in Section 1.2.1): 
1. K-policy. This is an analysis of knowledge e.g. JTB 
2. J-policy. Internalism or externalism about justification 
3. T-policy. Realism or non-realism about truth 
4. S-policy. This is a position about skepticism e.g. S+ 
5. I-policy. An investigative position of objectivity or subjectivity 
6. Methods. Ways of finding things out e.g. experiment, introspection. 
7. Values. Evaluations and behaviours. 
8. Attitudes. Beliefs, doubts, desires. 
9. Norms. Constraints from outside the individual. 
An individual will adopt different policies for different purposes. Their epistemic 
policy range (EPR) may be narrow or wide. I propose that academia only tolerates 
two basic archetypal epistemic policy bundles for research articles, Arts and 
Science, and these “Two Cultures” may be classed as having respectively wide 
and narrow EPR based on how much variability there is among their members.16 
In the next chapter, I review the sociolinguistic research on style and 
stance, as well as linguistic anthropological work on ideology and indexicality, in 
16 The idea that only a subset of possible policy bundles is stable in academia arose during 
discussion with the Queen Mary Linguistics department at a postgraduate seminar where I 
presented an earlier version of these ideas. I have generalized that idea here to the narrow/wide 
distinction, and identified it with the Science/Arts archetypes. 
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order to understand how the epistemological distinctions described above are 
materialized linguistically. 
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Chapter 2. The Language of Epistemological Difference 
As noted in Chapter 1, several distinct research traditions have laid the 
groundwork for understanding the relationship between epistemological variation 
and linguistic variation. Having developed a typology of epistemological variation 
there, I now turn in the present chapter to the linguistic side of this relationship. In 
Section 2.1, I review two distinct approaches to researching language in society: 
variationist sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology. While these schools of 
thought have not developed in isolation from one another, they are both associated 
with distinct epistemological assumptions which shape how they theorize and 
investigate the variable use of language in different social contexts. Both schools 
develop explanations of stylistic variation that presuppose that speakers have 
beliefs about their own identity, beliefs about the structure of society, and beliefs 
about the social effect of linguistic variables. I argue that since beliefs play such 
an important explanatory role in their theories, it is incumbent on researchers in 
both subdisciplines to incorporate the role of variable epistemology in their 
models of linguistic behaviour. 
In Section 2.2, I explore how linguistic styles can acquire social meaning 
through the linguistic anthropological notion of indexicality. Styles are ways of 
speaking that have become “noticeable”. They are abstractions made by speakers 
and analysts, but they are also socially situated objects: they are materialized 
linguistically through the activities we engage in, and through the stances we take 
to perform those activities. A stance is a position with respect to an object, e.g. an 
attitude or judgement about it, which can then be expressed linguistically (e.g. I 
hate the government). An epistemic stance is a position that you can take towards 
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the knowledge status of what you are saying, e.g. to convey whether you are 
certain or doubtful of it, or how you came by the information (e.g. I thought I saw 
a pussy cat). Social groups and communities have characteristic sets of stances, 
and this means that a stance, linguistically materialized, can be perceived as 
“sounding like” a community. I argue here that epistemic stance-taking is partly 
constrained by—and also reproduces—epistemological difference, and that 
certain forms of epistemic language can therefore come to index a speaker’s 
epistemic policies.17 
In Section 2.3, I explore how variable epistemology and variable linguistic 
behaviour interact in the case of Academic English (AE). I use academia as a test 
population because epistemic commitments there are diverse, and they are also the 
topic of overt comment. It is an empirical question to what extent the 
epistemological heterogeneity of academia is typical of other populations, and this 
will be the subject of future research. I review the research on the inter-
disciplinary variation in AE in respect of the variables investigated in the 
remainder of this thesis. In Section 2.4, I summarize the main arguments of the 
chapter, and I outline how they will be evaluated empirically in the remainder of 
the thesis. 
17 Recall from Chapter 1 that an epistemic policy is set of attitudes and beliefs that constitute a 
way of forming knowledge. 
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2.1 Style and belief 
 
‘‘Style’ refers to a way of doing something.’ (Coupland 2007: 1). By analogy with 
e.g. styles of architecture (Coupland 2007), or styles of dress (Irvine 2001), 
sociolinguists use the term style to refer to ways of speaking. In this section I 
review the development of the sociolinguistic notion of style, and I explore the 
relevance of speakers’ beliefs to the various theoretical formulations of style. 
In Section 2.1.1, I review the variationist sociolinguistic research on 
stylistic variation. I show that explanations of stylistic variation in terms of 
formality, accommodation, audience design, and so on, all presuppose that 
speakers have beliefs about their own identity, beliefs about the structure of 
society, and beliefs about the social effect of linguistic variables. I argue that this 
central role of beliefs compels sociolinguists to take an epistemologically 
principled approach to style research. 
The linguistic anthropological treatment of style is in contrast already 
explicitly related to speakers’ beliefs, as discussed in Section 2.1.2. I argue that, in 
both variationist and linguistic anthropological research, the explanatory role of 
variable beliefs makes a compelling case for incorporating variable epistemology 
into accounts of stylistic variation. 
 Stylistics emerged as the linguistic study of style in the first half of the 
twentieth century; and Sebeok (1960) generalized the study of style from the 
literary criticism of written texts to include speech (Coupland 2007: 10). Although 
the emphasis in sociolinguistics since then has been on style as a property of 
speech, I use the general term text throughout this section to include both speech 
and writing. Both literary criticism and linguistics were at the time undergoing a 
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self-consciously positivistic turn. By ‘bracketing off’ the content (i.e. referential 
meaning) of texts and instead focusing analytically on their form and structure, 
stylistics began to gain momentum as a ‘properly scientific’ enterprise (see e.g. 
Eagleton 1996: 79–109). 
Roman Jakobson was a key theorist and exponent of this linguistic 
structuralism. Prefiguring what would become the field of stylistics, he argued, as 
Coupland (2007: 10) explains, that ‘poetics (aesthetic response to language and 
text)… is properly a sub-branch of linguistics’ because it is a general property of 
all language use, ‘not restricted to poetry and other literary texts’. In other words, 
Jakobson argued that all texts have an aesthetic dimension (and several more 
dimensions besides), and that linguistics should therefore be able to account for it. 
Jakobson’s poetic function of a text operates simultaneously with its referential 
function. This means that any text, over and above communicating some 
referential meaning in virtue of the definitions of its words, also carries an 
aesthetic or stylistic load: why pick these words and not those? 
Coupland (2007: 11) calls Jakobson’s model ‘classically structuralist’ not 
just for its focus on the formal properties of text, but also due to Jakobson’s 
exegesis which excessively privileges the interpretive role of the analyst. For 
Jakobson, the poetic function of a text is fully determined by its linguistic form, 
and it is therefore unproblematically legible to the sufficiently skilled analyst. 
This structural determinism was informed Fischer’s (1958) and Labov’s (1966) 
pioneering quantitative analyses of linguistic variation. Labov’s seminal work is 
today placed under the classical variationist rubric of responsive style-shifting 
whereby texts are shaped by the social contexts of their production, such as whom 
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they are being produced for and why (see Section 2.1.1). Rickford and Eckert 
(2001: 5) contrast this conception of  style with that of initiative style-shifting 
whereby texts are viewed as ‘part of a process of construction of identities and 
social meaning’. Levon (2009: 30) summarizes this process as ‘one through which 
speakers can constitute and portray personae, identities and various 
understandings of self.’ In other words, the initiative conception of style-shifting 
makes room for speaker agency in shaping the form of the texts they produce. 
This latter approach is heavily influenced by the linguistic anthropological 
research reviewed in Section 2.1.2. 
 
2.1.1 Classical variationist research on style 
 
Styles—ways of speaking—can be distinguished by the relative frequencies of 
particular variants of sociolinguistic variables. The idea that speakers change their 
linguistic style in response to their social context is first articulated in 
sociolinguistic analysis in Labov’s (1966) work on speech in New York City. In 
this section I review the subsequent developments in the sociolinguistic analysis 
of style-shifting as a responsive phenomenon. 
Labov (e.g. 1966, 1972) demonstrated that phonetic variables display 
‘orderly heterogeneity’.18 For example, he showed that variable (th)—the initial 
sound in words like thunder and thorough—was pronounced as [t] or [θ] not in a 
random manner, but, rather, in a way that correlates with the socioeconomic class 
of the speaker. In particular, lower class speakers made more frequent use of the 
non-standard [t] variant than did speakers of higher social class. Furthermore, he 
18 This term first appears in Weinreich, Labov and Herzog (1968). 
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found that this phonetic variation correlated not just with social class, but also 
with what Labov called the degree of attention paid to speech. By asking 
interviewees to read a list of words or a passage of text, he elicited a more 
“careful”, self-conscious style of speech characterized by less frequent use of non-
standard [t]. In contrast, by asking interviewees about their childhood or times 
when their life was in danger, he elicited a more “natural”, uninhibited style of 
speech characterized by more frequent use of non-standard [t]. In other words, by 
drawing speakers’ attention to their own speech, Labov encouraged them to shift 
to a more standard or “formal” speech style; and by drawing their attention away 
from their own speech, he could elicit a more “casual” style. 
Individual speakers, then, had been shown to have a range of linguistic 
styles at their disposal, characterized by different frequencies of phonetic variants. 
Labov (e.g. 1972, 2001b) showed that an individual’s stylistic repertoire can be 
ordered on a dimension of attention paid to speech. The most self-conscious 
speech situations produce the lowest frequencies of non-standard phonetic 
variants, corresponding to the most formal speech style. 
Labov (2001b: 87) points out that his notion of attention paid to speech 
was intended more as an analytic tool than as an explanation for style-shifting. 
However, the fact that the same linguistic variables that exhibit social 
stratification had been found to also exhibit stylistic variation was remarkable. It 
was as if every speaker had a mental model of the class structure of society, 
including how members of each class are supposed to sound, and was then 
adjusting their own use of linguistic variables “up or down the class system” to 
sound more or less formal as the situation required. As Labov summarized it, 
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‘each group models its formal style on the speech behaviour of those groups one 
or two steps above it on the social scale’ (Labov 1969: 23–24). This explanation 
requires that speakers hold a number of beliefs: 
 
1. Society is divided into n classes. 
2. I am of social class x. 
3. The frequency of linguistic variants [a], [b], [c], etc., increases from 
social class 1 up to social class n. 
4. Reading a list of words from a page is a very formal situation. 
5. More formal situations require me to sound more formal. 
6. To sound more formal, I should adjust my frequency of use of 
linguistic variants [a], [b], [c], etc. towards that of social class x+1 or 
x+2. 
(Analysis based on Labov 1969) 
 
Beliefs 1 and 2 are likely to be declarative beliefs for many people: things they 
will explicitly state from time to time (though see e.g. Milroy 1980; Rickford 
1986 for criticisms of this assumption). Beliefs 3 to 6 are more likely to be 
implicit or procedural beliefs, which is to say that speakers are in general unlikely 
or unable to formulate them explicitly. Belief 4 is specific to Labov’s 
methodology in which he operationalizes formality as attention paid to speech 
(which he varies by manipulating the type of speech event).19 Belief 5 is specific 
to models of style-shifting which are responsive (although they may link that 
response to elements of the context other than its formality). Belief 6 contains the 
link between the formality dimension (formal—informal) and the social class 
19 Belief 4 could be couched in more general (and more Labovian) terms as ‘Formality tracks 
attention paid to speech.’ 
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dimension (upper—lower) of linguistic variation. This link is directional: socially 
stratified linguistic variation is “borrowed” to “do formality”; it is not Labov’s 
contention that linguistic variation by class emerges from linguistic variation by 
formality. 
 Beliefs, then, whether declarative or procedural, are a necessary 
component of Labov’s account of responsive style-shifting. But not everyone 
holds the same beliefs. Labov (1972) observed that lower middle class (LMC) 
speakers “overshoot” the upper middle class (UMC) level of the standard variant 
of (r) when reading word lists: LMC speakers were sounding more upper class 
than UMC speakers. This phenomenon of hypercorrection suggests that the LMC 
speakers differ from all other speakers (at least quantitatively, and perhaps 
qualitatively) in respect of 1 of the 6 beliefs listed above, and potentially all of 
them. 
 Labov’s work was seminal in the sociolinguistic study of style-shifting. I 
now review its theoretical germinations within the structuralist sociolinguistic 
conception of responsive style-shifting. As Coupland (2007: 58) points out, a 
notable omission in Labov’s model is the notion of recipiency. Texts are produced 
for someone—and subsequent theories of style-shifting incorporated this 
collaborative dimension of style-shifting. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974: 
727) introduced the term recipient design to refer to ‘a multitude of respects in 
which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways 
which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the 
co-participants’. Those authors construe this process to operate at the level of 
word choice, and also at higher levels of text such as topic selection and the 
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organization of turn-taking. Recipient design need not be a conscious process, but 
the effect of it is to produce texts which appear designed or suited to their 
recipient by virtue of the linguistic variants they feature. This explanation of 
responsive style-shifting requires that speakers hold a greatly expanded set of 
beliefs compared to those required in Labov’s model. Three additional classes of 
belief are required:20 beliefs about how to ‘display... orientation and sensitivity’, 
beliefs about what effect different linguistic variables have in interaction (not just 
phonetic variables, but at variables at various linguistic levels), and beliefs about 
which ‘particular other(s)’ one is talking to. 
The recipient design model allows for even greater variability among 
speakers than the attention-paid-to-speech model in terms of the beliefs that they 
rely on to shape their responsive style-shifting. The picture is further complicated 
by the notion of accommodation (Giles 1973; Giles and Powesland 1975) 
whereby speakers converge towards or diverge from the speech style of their 
listener. The explanations for convergent and divergent accommodation derive 
from the origins of these notions in the discipline of social psychology. 
Convergent accommodation is used by speakers aiming to ‘win approval’ 
(Schilling-Estes 2002: 383) or ‘seeking social attractiveness’ (Coupland 2007: 
62), while divergent accommodation is used to create or maintain ‘psychological 
distance’ (Schilling-Estes) or ‘reduce intimacy’ (Coupland). The role of speakers’ 
beliefs is even more obvious in this social psychological model of style-shifting. 
Giles (2001: 211) refers to ‘ways in which individuals define situations in their 
minds’ eye’, and he regards perceived formality as just one among many 
20 I say ‘additional’ because the recipient design model of responsive style-shifting is compatible 
with the attention-paid-to-speech model: both could simultaneously contribute to the production of 
a style. 
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dimensions along which ‘speaker-hearers carve up contexts psychologically and 
subjectively’. How these dimensions are conceived of, and responded to, in 
interaction depends importantly on what one believes about oneself, one’s 
interlocutors, society, and the role of language in orienting to and positioning 
oneself with respect to these constructs. 
Bell’s (1984) audience design framework is a standard reference point in 
the sociolinguistics of style which integrates quantitative variationist research 
findings with a more elaborated model of recipient design, and makes a number of 
programmatic hypotheses. Bell reviews a range of sociolinguistic data on style-
shifting to support the strong claim that, whereas linguistic variation between 
speakers is due to their variable demographic characteristics (sex, age, class, etc), 
stylistic variation within the speech of a single speaker is due to the influence of 
their audience. Bell’s definition of audience includes not just the addressee, but 
also the third persons whose influence on speaker style depends on their salience 
for the speaker. The addressee has the most salience, being often physically 
closest, known to be present, “ratified” and directly addressed. Other audience 
members are of lesser salience: auditors are known and ratified, but not directly 
addressed; and overhearers are known but not ratified. Eavesdroppers have no 
salience for the speaker because they are unknown, and hence cannot affect 
speaker style. 
Bell also introduces the notion of the referee which, like the eavesdropper, 
is a person not physically present, but who ‘hold[s] an umpiring role in the 
speaker’s consciousness’ (1984: 161). In other words, Bell argues that style-
shifting occurs in response to an audience some members of which may not even 
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be known to be there, but which the speaker orients towards as ‘an ideal or absent 
reference group’ (1984: 172). Furthermore, he argues that style-shifting in 
response to topic and setting derive from audience-designed shift. ‘That is, 
speakers associate classes of topics or settings with classes of persons. They 
therefore shift style when talking on those topics or in those settings as if they 
were talking to addressees whom they associate with the topic or setting.’ (1984: 
181). 
Bell’s notions of audience and referee design further expand the set of 
beliefs required of speakers in order to instantiate his more articulated model. 
Furthermore, Bell’s style axiom makes explicit what is implicit in theories of 
responsive style-shifting from Labov onwards: 
 
Variation on the style dimension within the speech of a single speaker 
derives from and echoes the variation which exists between speakers 
on the “social” dimension. 
(Bell 1984: 151)  
 
In other words, Bell’s style axiom asserts that speakers draw their stylistic 
repertoire from the demographically stratified linguistic variation in society. He 
argues that this accounts for the repeated empirical finding that speakers style-
shift to a degree that is smaller than the range of variability in society.21 Drawing 
on Labov’s categories of variables, he argues that style-shifting requires social 
21 Bell notes two exceptions to his axiom (1984: 156–58). First, hypercorrection, in which a 
speaker overshoots their target, can lead to an individual shifting to a degree larger than the 
“normal” variability across all social classes. Secondly, hyperstyle, in which the shift from free 
speech to reading produces a very dramatic style shift, results from the role of literacy and oracy in 
particular communities: ‘In [these societies…] reading is a separate dimension of language 
behaviour from free speech. The result is a radical switch rather than a gradient style shift.’ (1984: 
156). 
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stratification, whereas social stratification does not require style-shifting. Labov’s 
(1972: 314) indicators are linguistic variables that are stratified by social 
categories, but which are not subject to evaluation. Markers on the other hand are 
stratified socially and are also subject to unconscious evaluative reactions (e.g. 
hearers will judge speech less favourably if it contains more low-prestige 
markers). It is evaluation by speakers, Bell argues, that allows markers to become 
available as stylistic variables: their social use—and users—are judged, and that is 
what gives them their meaning-in-style. 
 
2.1.2 Linguistic anthropological research on style 
 
Styles are ways of speaking or writing. There are no language uses that are free of 
style. Styles are distinguished from one another by their particular ensemble of 
linguistic features. ‘Reading the meaning of a style is inherently a contrastive 
exercise.’ (Coupland 2007: 1). Irvine (2001) goes so far as to reduce style to this 
most basic structuralist opposition in her essay entitled ‘“Style” as distinctiveness’ 
(my emphasis). Section 2.1.1 reviewed the development of the study of style 
within variationist sociolinguistics, where that structural basis, though 
foundational, was regarded as unproblematic. Variationist studies presupposed 
that linguistic variables exists, and that they come in more than one flavour 
(variant), and that different variants carry information about social class or other 
social variables. The linguistic anthropological approach is to ask how this can be 
so: why and how do variants acquire their social meaning? 
Bell (1984: 182–86) introduces the notion of initiative style-shifting, 
whereby a speaker ‘takes the initiative and redefines the situation through speech’, 
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however he argues that initiative style-shifting is ‘still responding to the 
audience’, albeit responding in a manner that ‘[redefines…] the relationship 
between speaker and addressee’. He cites an example from Coupland (1980) of a 
travel assistant who accommodates towards a customer to appear more helpful, 
but then diverges from them to appear authoritative. For Bell (1984, though cf. 
2001) the travel assistant is still mechanistically responding to the presence, both 
real and imagined, of other people. In this section I review a research tradition that 
emerged concurrently with Bell’s (1984) paper, but which conceives of style-
shifting in a radically different way. This approach may be called linguistic 
constructionism because it is a “language first” model of variation whereby our 
social world and its categories are constituted by our use of language. The 
implication of this is, contra Bell’s style axiom, that stylistic variation within 
speakers gives rise to sociolinguistic variation between speakers. In fact these two 
oppositely directed explanatory models—one deriving individual linguistic 
variation from socially stratified linguistic variation, and one deriving the social 
stratification from the aggregate of individual behaviours—are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Recent work in the sociolinguistics of style has self-
consciously moved from an “either/or” to a “both/and” model (Rickford and 
Eckert 2001; Levon 2009), thanks in large part to the input of linguistic 
anthropology. In the rest of this section I review the linguistic anthropological 
theories of social semiosis22 that have informed these recent developments in 
22 This is a very broad term which is used with different emphases in diverse fields including 
information science, sociobiology, ethology, ethnology, sociology, literary criticism, and 
philosophy of language. Semiosis refers to the study of signs, i.e. symbolic forms that carry 
meaning by ‘standing for’ some referent. Social semiosis refers to the processes by which signs are 
made and used in social processes such as in interactions between conversants, or within 
institutions or cultures. 
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variationist sociolinguistics. I show that, as was the case for the structuralist-
variationist accounts of style reviewed in Section 2.1.1, the role of beliefs, and 
hence of epistemology, is of central importance to linguistic anthropological 
theories of semiosis, and therefore of central importance to the recent 
sociolinguistic theories of style which incorporate them. Hence I argue for an 
approach to the sociolinguistics of style which is grounded in a systematic 
approach to epistemological variation as outlined in Section 2.2. 
 The linguistic constructionist turn in the sociolinguistic study of style is 
often linked to Le Page and Tabouret-Keller’s (1985) seminal Acts of identity.23 
This model of stylistic variation ‘emphasizes the role of the individual as a 
creative agent’ (Rickford 2011: 254). Rather than framing style-shifting as a 
mechanistic response to situational variables, Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) 
suggest that 
 
The individual creates for himself the patterns of his linguistic 
behaviour so as to resemble those of the group or groups with which 
from time to time he wishes to be identified, or so as to be unlike 
those from whom he wishes to be distinguished. 
 
(Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985: 181)  
 
Rather than having static identities that are fixed by demographic category 
membership, then, speakers construct their identities dynamically in on-going 
talk. Identity as a linguistic construct is thus a radically destabilized identity in 
stark contrast to the assumed near-permanence of sociodemographic group 
membership. Many theorists—and people in general—find this a troubling 
23 Developed from Le Page et al. (1974). 
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conception since it appears to undermine the use of social categories altogether. 
One resolution is to carry on using categories “strategically” in sociolinguistic 
analysis, but to avoid reifying them by making overly-strong ontological claims 
about social reality. For example, we can use the categories of upper middle class 
and middle middle class in order to describe differentiation in linguistic 
behaviour, but we cannot then infer the existence of those class divisions from this 
as a matter of social fact. Of course, this notion of strategic essentialism (Spivak 
1988: 205) is available not just to researchers, but to all social actors, as will be 
explored further below. Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) did not adopt 
strategic essentialism in their analysis, and Le Page elsewhere explicitly argues 
against assuming categories, as discussed by Rickford:  
 
The idea was “to cluster the children according to similarities in their 
[linguistic] behavior,” and THEN look for significant correlations 
between the linguistic clusters and “various cultural and 
socioeconomic indices” of the children and their families (McEntegart 
and Le Page 1982: 106). The authors’ decision to approach the 
analysis in this way, rather than beginning with the social categories 
was explicitly justified as follows: 
 
The decision to avoid the procedure followed by Labov 
(1966, 1972[a]) Trudgill (1974b) and G. Sankoff (1974) of 
dividing the population according to pre-established socio-
economic categories and then sampling each category, was 
taken for several reasons. In the first place, such a 
procedure precludes discovering anything about the 
emergent social structure other than in terms of these 
‘imported’ and pre-set categories; in the second place, we 
did not feel we knew enough about the cultural and 
economic and ethnic stratification of the two societies to 
arrange our sample in this way; in the third place, it was 
part of our aim to discover what social mechanisms were 
at work, what groups were emerging according to the 
linguistic symptoms, rather than vice versa. 
 
(Rickford 2011: 255) 
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The idea that social categories are mutable, and that we are free to perform our 
way into and out of membership of them seems to offer a mechanism of totally 
levelling society by making all social categories equally available to all speakers. 
However, Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985: 182) suggest some limits on the 
performative potential of speakers: 
 
We can only behave according to the behavioral patterns of groups we 
find it desirable to identify with to the extent that: 
i. we can identify the groups 
ii. we have both adequate access to the groups and ability to 
analyze their behavioral patterns 
iii. the motivation to join the groups is sufficiently powerful, and 
is either reinforced or reversed by feedback from the groups 
iv. we have the ability to modify our behavior. 
 
(Le Page and Tabouret-Keller 1985: 182)  
 
These processes all presuppose beliefs of the same kind as those required in 
Labov’s model of style-shifting, and they also supplement them with social 
psychological details about the limits of perception, experience and performance. 
Eckert (2000) reformulates social categories in terms of social practice: 
what do people do that causes them to be perceived as a group? This provided a 
more valid form of strategic essentialism, since the analytic categories are “locally 
salient”, i.e. they are referred to by the speakers themselves. Eckert’s notion of a 
community of practice developed from that of Lave and Wenger (1991) and 
Wenger (1998), and it is explained on her website via a composite of definitions 
from her independent work (2000) and in collaboration (Eckert and McConnell-
Ginet 1992, 2003): 
82 
 
 
A community of practice is an aggregate of people who come together 
around mutual engagement in some common endeavor. Ways of doing 
things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations - in short, 
practices - emerge in the course of their joint activity around that 
endeavor. A community of practice is different as a social construct 
from the traditional notion of community, primarily because it is 
defined simultaneously by its membership and by the practice in 
which that membership engages. And this practice involves the 
construction of a shared orientation to the world around them - a tacit 
definition of themselves in relation to each other, and in relation to 
other communities of practice. The individual constructs an identity - 
a sense of place in the social world - through participation in a variety 
of communities of practice, and in forms of participation in each of 
those communities. And key to this entire process of construction is 
stylistic practice. 
 
(Eckert [n.d.]) 
 
Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) referred to ‘groups’ that speakers pick out 
and whose characteristics they emulate. Eckert’s (2000) argument, then, is that 
these groups are locally salient communities of practice. She says that 
communities of practice have a ‘shared orientation to the world’, by which she 
means that their members have a consensual understanding of their group in 
relation to others (Eckert [n.d.]). The communities of practice model thus builds 
in a number of ways on the presupposed beliefs about self and social position 
common to all models of style-shifting. First, Eckert emphasizes that these beliefs 
are a matter of consensus, and that it is that very consensus which defines group 
membership. Not only do group members share beliefs, but their ‘shared 
orientation to the world’ (Eckert [n.d.]) also sounds very much like the notion of 
epistemic policy discussed in Chapter 1. In other words, it is possible to read this 
‘orientation to the world’ as comprising not only beliefs about what social 
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structures exist and where one fits in among them, bus also beliefs—or policies—
about how to evaluate one’s experience of social groups and their characteristic 
forms of talk. 
 An individual participates in various communities of practice and 
commands the language styles associated with the activities of those communities. 
Then, by selectively deploying stylistic features emblematic of communities of 
practice, an individual constructs an identity. This process of bricolage (Hebdige 
1979: 102–06; originally from Lévi-Strauss 1966) may be above or below the 
conscious awareness of the speaker. Coupland (2001) uses the term stylization for 
the self-conscious use of stylistic features for effect. Stylization may involve 
extrapolating linguistic variants beyond what is present in society (cf. hyperstyle 
and hypercorrection discussed above). Stylization has a greater potential than 
“unconscious” style-shifting to be construed as parody; the “conscious” 
appropriation and/or exaggeration of linguistic forms therefore also raises 
questions of authenticity (see e.g. Rampton 2005). In other words, the potential 
for a style-shift to be construed as somehow deliberate makes the speaker culpable 
should they overreach their “natural” identity boundaries, e.g. by taking on the 
accent of a different ethnic group. On the other hand, Schilling-Estes (2004: 164) 
views identity itself as emergent-in-interaction via ‘the interplay between reified 
structures and speaker agency’. This means that, while “natural” boundaries of 
identity are a result of linguistic performances being circumscribed by 
individuals’ beliefs about what social categories exist and which ones they belong 
to, crossing (Rampton 2005) into incongruous stylistic territory reconfigures one’s 
identity through an expanded stylistic repertoire, rendering the notions of 
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authenticity and appropriation far less transparently applicable analytically, if not 
for the speakers themselves. 
 A discourse community, as defined by Swales (1990) is a larger social unit 
that has been used to characterize academic disciplines. Swales gives the 
following criteria for identifying a discourse community: 
 
1. has a broadly agreed set of common public goals 
2. has mechanisms of intercommunication among its members 
3. uses its participatory mechanisms primarily to provide information and feedback 
4. utilizes... one or more genres in the communicative furtherance of its aims 
5. has acquired some specific lexis. 
6. has a threshold level of members with a suitable degree of relevant content and 
discoursal expertise 
(Swales 1990: 24–27) 
 
Given these criteria, one could interpret the notion of community of practice as a 
special case of a discourse community where members come together in mutual 
engagement. Discourse communities on the other hand can be spatially and 
temporally diffuse, and their communicative channels are therefore more likely to 
be textual, such as academic journals and email. Some academic genres, such as 
lectures, conference presentations and department meetings do involve mutual 
engagement by co-present individuals. I suggest, therefore, that while an 
academic discipline in its broadest construal may be described as a discourse 
community, it is also a composite of multiple communities of practice. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the ‘common endeavour’ and ‘shared orientation’ of 
the community of practice are more homogeneous within a single community of 
practice than are the ‘broadly agreed’ ‘common public goals’ of the discourse 
community. 
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What are these common endeavours, orientations and goals? I suggest that they 
are epistemic policies. Rather than treating disciplines as qualitatively different, 
then, the concept of epistemic policy, and in particular epistemic policy range 
(EPR), offers a description of academia as a single discursive universe within 
which regions differentiate themselves by selecting particular epistemic policies 
from a common pool of epistemological elements. Disciplines can therefore be 
placed on a continuum from narrow to wide EPR, depending on how diverse their 
component communities of practice are. These epistemic policies are performed 
linguistically: mainly through talk at the level of community of practice, and 
through text at the level of discourse community. In this thesis, I explore those 
more diffuse commonalities in academic practice that are captured by the notion 
of discourse community. Future work is required at the level of the discourse 
community to look quantitatively at the intersubjective dimensions of epistemic 
stance construction. 
 
2.2 Indexicality, style and stance 
 
We saw in Section 2.1 that styles are distinguished by the relative frequencies of 
particular variants of sociolinguistic variables. Since Labov’s classification of 
styles in terms of formality, sociolinguists have asked how much explanatory 
power the level of attention paid to speech can have with respect to style-shifting, 
and, finding it wanting, they have proposed several alternative explanations in 
terms of recipiency, identity and participation. What these explanations all have in 
common is that they claim that style-shifting depends on what speakers believe 
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about themselves and about who hears them. This theoretical shift has been 
associated with a move away from more positivistic, deterministic, individualistic 
models towards more constructionist, agentive, intersubjective models. In the 
terms of these latter trends, when speakers shift their style of speech, they display 
an “adjusted” version of themselves that “sounds like” some imagined persona 
that they wish, whether consciously or not, to project. By performing a persona in 
this way, and hence sounding more (or less) similar to others, speakers are able to 
position themselves relative to their interlocutors (whether real or imagined) and 
relative to social structures generally.  
 This treatment of style-shifting assumes that the ‘orderly heterogeneity’ 
(Weinreich et al. 1968) of sociolinguistic variables is not static, i.e. that it is not 
the case that social categories such as gender or ethnicity determine the 
probability of using one variant over another. Rather, patterns of linguistic 
variation reflect dynamic equilibria24 characterized by, as Bucholtz puts it, 
‘subtler and more fleeting interactional moves through which speakers take 
stances, create alignments, and construct personas’ (2009: 146). In other words, 
speakers actively deploy linguistic variants to perform social actions. But this is 
only possible because linguistic variants have social meanings with a greater 
degree of stability than the identities which they are deployed to construct: 
without some stability in social meaning, it would not be possible to interpret a 
performed persona. On the other hand, it is the very property of 
24 The metaphor of the dynamic equilibrium comes from chemistry. It describes a situation where 
the macroscopic properties of a system (e.g. the relative concentrations of two compounds in a 
solution) are stable, while at the molecular level, that stability is constantly being undermined and 
reinforced by chemical reactions (e.g. by the interconversion of two compounds). 
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underdetermination in social meaning which allows for the agentive construction 
of novel personae: 
 
whenever speakers (or writers) say anything, they encode their point 
of view towards it […] The expression of such speakers’ attitudes is 
pervasive in all uses of language. All sentences encode such a point of 
view, […] and the description of the markers of such points of view 
and their meanings should therefore be a central topic for linguistics. 
 
(Stubbs 1986: 1) 
 
Stubbs refers here to sentences as speech acts (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). All 
utterances can be interpreted as performing speech acts such as promising, 
conjecturing or asserting, even if not made explicit e.g. with performative verbs as 
in I promise..., I hereby bequeath…, etc. (see e.g. Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 
1–12). However, it is also possible to read Stubbs’ quote from a structuralist 
perspective such that all sentences stand in relation to sentences that have gone 
before and to alternative potential sentences that were not in fact, or have yet to 
be, realized. Resonances are thus set up that imbue each newly uttered sentence 
with additional layers of meaning (cf. Bakhtin 1981; Vološinov 1986). Jaffe 
(2009: 3) notes the consequence of this that ‘there is no such thing as a completely 
neutral position vis-à-vis one’s linguistic productions, because neutrality is itself a 
stance.’. 
This idea that meaning is “always already” partly determined is usually 
attributed to Heidegger (e.g. 1971), and this phrase is now a widespread trope in 
post-structuralist research. Post-structuralism is widely credited with challenging 
binary oppositions in general for their hegemonic nature, and Derrida (1976) 
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applies this challenge to the central tenet of structural linguistics: difference as the 
source of linguistic value. However, the idea that (linguistic) styles have social 
significance only in opposition to other styles relies crucially on precisely this 
notion of structural binarity, even though its theoretical proponents are normally 
highly critical of socio-political binarity. While there is a potential for strategic 
essentialism in analysis to reify—or at least to (appear to) ratify—categories that 
perpetuate hegemonic power structures beyond academia, a theory of social 
semiosis based on difference/distinction need only suggest that speakers conceive 
of styles in opposition to other styles; doing so analytically is then a descriptive 
rather than a normative position.25  
Peirce’s (1906: see Peirce 1958) analytic opposition between token and 
type is also widely used to distinguish between instances of linguistic signs on the 
one hand, and the varieties of sign on the other. For example, in the last sentence, 
there were three prepositional tokens (one occurrence of between, and two of on); 
but there were only two separate types of preposition (between and on). The type-
token distinction is very widely used in linguistics, but it too has been criticised 
by post-structuralists among others (cf. also Halliday’s 2003 cline of 
instantiation).26 In the rest of this section, I first explore how ways of speaking 
may become (gradualistically) reified into social categories via the repeated taking 
of stance (Section 2.2.1). In Section 2.2.2, I discuss the distinction between 
epistemic and affective stances. I then discuss how stances point to or index social 
categories in Section 2.2.3. 
 
25 This raises the possibility of speakers who are such committed post-structuralists that they fail to 
notice stylistic variation, or at least refuse to attribute stylistic variation to social categories. 
26 The third element of Peirce’s trichotomy—the tone—has not gone into widespread use. 
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2.2.1 Style and stance 
 
In the discussion of theories of style above, I highlighted some common 
assumptions. First, speakers need to become aware of groups. This could mean 
demographic categories such as classes or genders, or local communities of 
practice. Next, speakers need to associate these groups to styles of speech. Both 
these steps require that speakers perceive differentness, i.e. that they distinguish 
between themselves and others in both social and linguistic dimensions. In this 
section, I discuss the nature of this association between the social and the 
linguistic. Ochs (1992) argues that this association is not direct, but mediated by 
stance. But what is a stance?27 
Biber and Finegan (1989: 92) provide a broad definition of stance as ‘the 
lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or 
commitment concerning the propositional content of a message’. The focus on 
how stance is linguistically instantiated is particular to linguistics. The 
philosophical conception of stance as discussed in Chapter 1 is more like the 
second half of Biber and Finegan’s definition: just the state of having the 
attitudes, feelings, judgements or commitment to propositions.28 The linguistic 
study of stance associates an often implicit, intuitive version of the philosophical 
notion of stance within various linguistic phenomena such as the use of modal 
verbs or evaluative language, and refers to that linguistic instantiation as stance. 
27 Ochs (1992: 342f) also discusses acts and activities as mediators of socio-linguistic linkage. 
These notions are more relevant to a rich ethnographic description of academia, rather than to the 
more abstract treatment of epistemological commitments in academia that I attempt here. 
28 Propositions are those components of sentences that can take a truth value. It’s hot today and Is 
it hot today? both contain the same propositional content that it is hot today. Roughly speaking, 
the propositional content of a message is what the message is about. Propositions are discussed 
more fully in Chapter 4 where they form the basis of my segmentation of textual data into tokens. 
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From the linguistic constructionist perspectives discussed above in the present 
chapter (Section 2.1.2), it is possible to conceive of stances not as attitudes etc. 
that individuals “have”, but rather as attitudes etc. that speakers construct or 
perform through talk-in-interaction. In short, stance not only conveys attitudes etc. 
about the propositions contained in their message, but also about the recipient of 
the message. Furthermore, stances are partly shaped by recipients. This 
intersubjective dimension of stance-taking is spelled out in Du Bois’s definition: 
‘Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt 
communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects 
(self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient 
dimension of the sociocultural field.’ (2007: 163). In other words, we co-construct 
positions in respect of our utterances through linguistic interaction; and those 
positions not only indicate how we evaluate what we say, but they also indicate 
how we think our position fits into various social institutions and demographic 
categories.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 Du Bois summarizes his ‘stance triangle’ as ‘I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, 
and thereby align with you.’ (2007: 163). 
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2.2.2 Epistemic stance 
 
Gray and Biber (2012) review the diverse conceptions of stance in linguistic 
research, and they find that ‘the expression of stance varies along two major 
parameters: 
 
(1) meaning of the assessment:  personal feeling/attitude ↔ status of 
knowledge 
(2) linguistic level used for assessment: lexical ↔ grammatical’ 
 
(Gray and Biber 2012: 15) 
 
Gray and Biber (2012) do not consider the intersubjective nature of stance. Their 
first parameter distinguishes between affective and epistemic stance, a division 
which Ochs (1996) summarizes as follows: 
 
Affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling and disposition, as 
well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern 
(Ochs & Schieffelin 1984, Labov 1984, Levy 1984);  
 
Epistemic stance refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of 
concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of 
commitment to truth of propositions, and sources of knowledge, 
among other epistemic qualities (Chafe & Nichols 1986). 
 
(Ochs 1996: 410) 
 
Gray and Biber’s representation of the meaning parameter with a double-headed 
arrow hints at the possibility that these two categories are not distinct, and that 
stance may in general convey epistemic and affective information. This reading is 
consistent with the linguistic constructionist perspective of stance: even a neutral 
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stance is “doing neutrality”. There is also cross-linguistic support for functional 
overlap in these categories (see e.g. Cook 2011: 297). The present thesis is 
focused towards the epistemic end of the spectrum, i.e. linguistic phenomena that 
explicitly refer to epistemic matters of the type discussed in the last chapter, such 
as what type of knowledge is being expressed, how it was found out, and how 
certain the speaker is of it. 
Gray and Biber’s second parameter of linguistic level is also symbolized 
with a double-headed arrow, which again can be interpreted to mean that explicit 
linguistic expression at one level (e.g. lexical) simultaneously implies expression 
at another (e.g. modal).  
 
(2) a. Are you joking? 
 b. You’re joking. 
 c. You must be joking. 
 d. I can tell you’re joking. 
 e. Clearly you’re joking. 
 
All these examples express the same main proposition p (that you’re joking) but 
they differ in several respects. In terms of speech acts, Example (2a) is a question 
and the others are declaratives. Examples (2a) and (2b) differ syntagmatically, i.e. 
in their word order, and probably also prosodically (e.g. with rising intonation for 
the question). Examples (2a–b) all vary paradigmatically, i.e. in the substitution 
of certain elements for others (∅~must~I can tell~clearly), although Example (2c) 
includes the modal verb must, which also causes the matrix verb to be realized as 
be rather than is. Examples (2c–e) all convey a heightened sense of certainty 
compared with Example (2b). Example (2d) subordinates the matrix clause 
(containing p) to another clause containing (albeit rather vague) information about 
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how the speaker came to know the propositional content (I can tell). Example (2e) 
does the same job with the adverbial clearly. All these examples are in structural 
opposition to the others (and all possible others). Examples like (2b) are 
sometimes called “bald” expressions since they are minimal in the relevant sense, 
but, as we saw in the earlier discussion of stance, neutrality (or baldness) is itself a 
stance. Choices at one linguistic level, then, always evoke their potential 
alternatives at that same level. The presence of one item may make the presence 
of a second more or less likely, e.g. Clearly you must be joking could be read as a 
comment on the apparentness of the inferential basis of the inference that p, rather 
than a comment on the apparentness of p itself as in Examples (2c) and (2e). 
Furthermore, linguistic choices at one level always occur in concert with other 
levels. Given appropriate prosody, and an appropriate interactional context, 
Examples (2a–e) could sound dismissive or convivial, sarcastic or sincere, 
confident or anxious. The present thesis examines a range of lexico-grammatical 
variables in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 The term evidentiality was popularized by Chafe and Nichols (1986: 271), 
who used it in two senses. In the narrow sense, it is the linguistic marking of the 
source of knowledge, while in the broad sense it marks the speaker’s ‘attitudes 
towards knowledge’ in a number of dimensions: 
 
1. Reliability of knowledge. 
2. Source of knowledge. 
3. Manner in which knowledge was acquired (justification). 
4. Appropriateness: match between language and evidential meaning, 
and match with reader/hearer expectation. 
 
(Adapted from Gray and Biber 2012: 16) 
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Clift (2006: 570) notes that the above notion of linguistic stance emerged from the 
study of narrow evidentiality: the obligatory marking of information source—
‘whether seen, heard or inferred’ (Boas 1938: 133). Although widespread in the 
world’s languages, English lacks such an obligatory morphological system, 
relying instead on optional and morphosyntactically diverse evidential marking 
(see e.g. Aikenvald 2004 for a typological review of evidentiality in the narrow 
sense). Peterson, Déchaine and Sauerland (2010) illustrate obligatory evidentiality 
using the nearest equivalents from English: adverbs (such as reportedly, actually), 
modals (such as must which can imply inference) and verbs (e.g. It looks like…, 
or I hear that…).  
 Aikenvald (2004: 4–5) makes the provocative claim that narrow 
evidentiality is related to (very) narrow epistemology, and that any attempt to 
relate it to the kind of socialized epistemology discussed in Chapter 1 ‘[results] in 
conceptual and terminological confusion’: 
 
Linguistic evidentiality has nothing to do with providing proof in 
court or in argument, or indicating what is true and what is not, or 
indicating one’s belief. All evidentiality does is supply the information 
source. 
 
(Aikenvald 2004: 5) 
 
It is clear however that supplying the information source requires one to believe, 
and indicate, at least one thing about the information source, namely, what it is. 
Aikenvald notes in the same volume that, where multiple sources of information 
are present, one has to choose which one to encode in one’s speech, perhaps 
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according to some hierarchy of preference.30 ‘Alternatively, a particular narrative 
genre may require a certain evidential. An unconventional and unexpected 
evidential is likely to produce an unusual effect’ (2004: 305, 310–24). The idea 
that there could be conventional means of indicating the source of knowledge is a 
social epistemological commitment. Aikenvald says that choosing an evidential 
marker that departs from convention will be odd in some way. This indeed points 
to an intimate relationship between social epistemology and evidentiality in the 
narrow sense. I argue here that the same kind of relationship obtains for 
evidentiality in the wide sense, including for example, (after Biber et al. 1999: 
972) epistemic modality (must, may), actuality (actually, in fact), (im)precision 
(kind of, like) and generalization (typically, generally). 31 
Also not addressed in the narrow conception of evidentiality is the 
linguistic constructionist notion that its meaning is underdetermined, and that its 
meaning-in-interaction is dependent on its intersubjective use in the construction 
of stance. Agha (2007: 86) makes a similar distinction between the denotation of 
expressions (i.e. their dictionary meaning) and acts of referring: ‘communicative 
events anchored to participation frameworks, namely to configurations of persons 
in roles such as sender and receiver of message.’ 
30 A language like Central Pomo has a five-way distinction in verbal suffixes for marking 
information source including information acquired by visual or inferential means, but also general 
knowledge (Aikenvald 2004: 61). Part of learning how to speak Central Pomo would seem to 
consist in acquiring the cultural norms about what propositional content can be assumed to be 
general knowledge, and what requires a more explicit justificatory history. 
31 Mushin (2001: 58–79) makes a similar argument that various stances (she suggests e.g. 
experiential, inferential, reportative, factual and imaginative) are universally available (‘speakers 
of all languages have the ability to represent them as part of their construal of states of affairs’), 
but that the ‘contexts in which these stances are actually adopted is predicted to vary significantly 
cross-linguistically.’ I would change ‘cross-linguistically’ to ‘cross-culturally’ or ‘depending on 
epistemic policy’. 
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Kärkkäinen (2003: 23–24) notes this issue with regard to stance adverbials in her 
review of Biber and Finegan’s research: ‘They point out (1988: 1, 30) that the 
discourse functions of stance adverbials often differ considerably from their literal 
meanings, and also observe (1989: 110) that in conversation certainty and doubt 
are sometimes expressed side by side, which they take to indicate that the focus is 
on involved interaction rather than precise semantic expression.’  
Some authors talk about epistemic stance, and others about 
epistemological stance. Mushin construes epistemic stance broadly, and calls it 
epistemological stance: 
 
When verbally representing a piece of knowledge, speakers 
necessarily take a stand on how they acquired the information, how 
they know it. This stand is their epistemological stance towards the 
information. Epistemological stance is thus a part of the construal of 
information, operating in conjunction with other necessary parts […] 
As a conceptual structure, epistemological stance is independent of 
linguistic form and may be expressed by any of grammatical, lexical 
or paraphrastic means. 
 
(Mushin 2001: 52–53) 
 
By emphasizing the independence of broad epistemic stance and linguistic form, 
Mushin takes a strong position against the linguistic construction of epistemic 
stance. For her, epistemic stance exists first, and its expression in language is a 
matter of choice. 
Barton (1993: 746) defines epistemological stance as ‘the underlying 
perspective on knowledge represented in a text’. This definition is different from 
that of Mushin, and it equates to the idea of epistemic policy developed in Chapter 
1 as represented in a text. Similarly, Duranti equates epistemological stance to the 
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theoretical orientation towards a research object (in this case a constructionist 
approach to language) in his discussion of Hymes’ (1972: 277–78) criticism of 
Chomsky’s conception of competence: ‘This means that speaking is seen above 
all as a social activity involving always more than linguistic expressions. This 
epistemological stance […]’ (Duranti 1997: 20). 
 Having now clarified stance, and its particularly epistemologically 
coloured variant epistemic stance, I now examine the claim by Ochs (1992) that 
stance is the locus of association between social categories and linguistic forms. 
In brief, the linguistic means that a person uses to construct a stance become 
linked to that person’s social categories. This linkage is referred to in linguistic 
anthropological literature as indexicality. 
 
2.2.3 Indexicality 
 
The repeated use of a particular variant in the construction of a particular stance 
comes to afford that variant meaning beyond its referential content: it comes to 
“stand for” or “point to” a stance. This link between linguistic form and social 
function is referred to by Ochs (1992) as direct indexicality.32 For example, the 
use of swear words can index a stance of dismissiveness, aggression or jocularity. 
The fact that the interpretation of what is being indexed requires further context is 
evidence that the indexical meaning is not part of the semantic content of swear 
words: their use in the expression of particular stances is what gives them this 
additional social meaning. Not all possible stances are equally available to all 
people. For example, it would be incongruous for a three year-old child to adopt 
32 See also Silverstein (e.g. 2003) and Agha (e.g. 2007). 
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an aggressive stance by deploying swear words. For this reason, swear words do 
not immediately make one think of young children. Rather, linguistic forms come 
to indirectly index the social categories of people who stereotypically adopt the 
stances they directly index. If men are stereotypically more aggressive than 
women, and if swearing is a way to “do aggression”, then swearing will come to 
indirectly index maleness.  
Ochs (1996) stresses the structuralist dependence of this indexical linkage 
between linguistic form and stance on other elements of the socially situated 
linguistic construction of stance: 
 
It is also important to note before going on that assignment of 
indexical meaning involves more than perception of a single linguistic 
form alone. Rather, the situational interpretation of any one linguistic 
form is an outcome of its relation to co-occurring linguistic forms in 
the prior and present discourse structure, to subjective understandings 
of the propositional content of the utterances thus far and of the 
activity those utterances are constituting as well as subjective 
understandings of gestures and other dimensions of the non-vocal 
setting (see Brown & Levinson 1979, Ochs 1988, 1990, 1992, 
Silverstein 1987). 
 
(Ochs 1996: 414) 
 
Ochs highlights that linguistic signs only become noticeable in contrast to other 
signs, i.e. that linguistic variants can only index stances because they are different 
from other variants. This structuralist notion of distinction pervades the linguistic 
anthropological conception of indexicality. Linguistic styles are aggregates of 
such linguistic distinctions which “hang together” by being habitually used 
together in the construction of stance (and that stance itself also has to be 
distinctive from other stances). But Ochs points out that noticing difference is a 
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subjective matter, i.e. it depends on individuals’ understandings of the 
propositional and contextual content of talk-in-interaction. The logical gaps from 
linguistic forms to the social categories they index are finessed by ideology. In 
other words, our ideological commitments influence what distinctions we 
recognize in the socio-cultural field, and they provide “paths of least resistance” in 
interpreting what social distinction is indexed by what linguistic distinction. Irvine 
and Gal (2000) identify three processes by which ideology and social meaning 
interact: iconization, recursivity and erasure, and I discuss these next. 
Iconization describes how linguistic differences are interpreted as being 
inherent to the social categories they index. To continue with the above example, 
this would mean that swearing actually seems to sound masculine, i.e. the 
linguistic form is perceived to resemble the category it indexes.33 Irvine (2001: 
33) suggests that iconization works by individuals’ picking out ‘qualities 
supposedly shared’ by the linguistic form and the category it has come to index; 
‘their connection thus appears to be necessary, perhaps even “natural,” because of 
the supposedly shared qualities’. For example, “swearing sounds aggressive”, and 
“men are aggressive”, therefore “swearing is manly”. 
Recursivity describes how large-scale social and linguistic structures are 
reproduced on smaller scales. Irvine (2001: 33) couches this in terms of 
oppositions, or patterns of difference, that obtain between groups being 
recapitulated within groups. Men swear a lot, and women swear a little, but within 
either group, that opposition is recreated such that men who swear relatively little 
might “sound female”, while men who swear a great deal might sound “very 
33 Both the terms icon and index derive from C.S. Peirce’s (see e.g. Peirce 1958) ontology of signs. 
Irvine and Gal note that, in Peirce’s terms, the ‘perceived icon’ is called a rheme, and Gal (2005) 
suggests that the process of iconization should perhaps more properly be called rhematization. 
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male”. Irvine notes that this microcosmic resemblance of a smaller group to a 
larger counterpart is another example of iconicity. 
Erasure is the ‘process in which an ideology simplifies the sociolinguistic 
field’ (Irvine 2001: 33). In order to believe that swearing is masculine, it is 
necessary to ignore the fact that some men hardly swear and some women swear a 
lot. Individuals in those categories are anomalous, and they are erased by the 
ideology of stereotypical gender roles: they are not spoken about. Individuals who 
are habitually erased or ignored due to the pervasive effect of hegemonic 
ideologies can become disenfranchised or oppressed. This effect is noticeable in 
recent mainstream media discourses about feminism which are dominated by 
“privileged” journalists, i.e. writers who lie at the intersection of multiple 
hegemonic categories (they are predominantly heterosexual, wealthy, white, 
cissexual and so on). In writing about what feminism should be or what feminism 
needs, these writers often dismiss marginalized groups as irrelevant.34 
Ochs (1996: 415–24) suggests some general properties and principles of 
indexicality which illustrate how that concept fits in with the rest of this thesis. 
The first is the social constructionist property of constitutiveness whereby the use 
of indexical forms constitutes social distinctions, e.g. between distinctive 
identities and communities, by materializing them linguistically. Next is the 
34 This has been prominently played out on the social media website Twitter where marginalized 
groups have the facility to directly address these hegemonic self-appointed gatekeepers of 
Feminism. Oft-repeated responses include Caitlin Moran tweeting that she ‘literally couldn’t give 
a shit’ about black people, apparently claiming to be ‘colour-blind’, which is itself a position of 
hegemonic erasure since it ignores the unequal power distributions with respect to race by 
professing to treat blacks and whites equally. Similarly, the transsexual community has been 
repeatedly denigrated as having no legitimate claim on feminism. The immediacy of feedback on 
Twitter has led to hegemonic writers closing ranks by satirizing the shorthand call to “check your 
privilege”, and via a defensive strategy of conflation of the legitimate criticisms of their unthinking 
reinforcement of hegemonic ideologies and concomitant erasure of already marginalized groups on 
the one hand, with online bullying in the form of “trolling”, “stalking”, and threats of assault, rape 
and murder on the other. 
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structuralist notion that stances resonate with past, present and future stances, and 
thus are ‘temporally transcendent’ (Erez Levon, p.c.). This transcendence of 
stances into more enduring identities (see e.g. Kiesling 2001) has been called 
stance accretion (e.g. Du Bois 2002; Rauniomaa 2003; Eckert 2012). In research 
focusing on the linguistic varieties that emerge through stance accretion, 
(discussed in Section 2.3 below), this notion has been called enregisterment 
(Agha 2003, 2005, 2007). Ochs (1996) regards these processes as human 
universals (the universal culture principle). Their culturally-specific dimension by 
contrast lies in the idea that indexes are interpreted depending on ideology, and 
upon the local culture into which one is socialized (the local culture principle). In 
this thesis I investigate this very proposal. I focus on the interpretive difference 
between diverse ideologies of especially epistemological character that have 
become institutionalized into social groups called academic disciplines. If Ochs is 
right, then members of different academic disciplines would be expected to 
interpret evidential language differently. This suggests that members of different 
disciplines would regard a token of the same evidential item (e.g. the modal verb 
must) as indexing different stances (e.g. a stance of personal authoritativeness 
versus as stance of objective logical deduction). This may be reflected in 
differential use of the same evidential items across disciplines. In the next section, 
I give an overview of the linguistic forms implicated in the construction of 
epistemic stance (these variables are reviewed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4), and I 
also review the existing research into the variable behaviour of these linguistic 
forms across academic disciplines. Not only is epistemic policy a matter of 
frequent explicit comment in academia, the range of possible epistemic policies is 
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particularly diverse there. If the theoretical model described above bears 
predictive fruit anywhere, it will be there.  
2.3 The case of Academic English 
The empirical focus of this thesis is on the language of academia, and in particular 
in the relationship between variable epistemic policy (beliefs and attitudes about 
what knowledge is, and how to get it) and the linguistic construction of 
disciplinary difference. I adopt the linguistic constructionist conception of 
indexicality as constitutive of epistemological difference (Ochs 1992, 1996; 
Silverstein 2003; Agha 2003, 2005, 2007), and I investigate the evidential 
variables used to do this via the epistemic stances they materialize. I focus on the 
de facto lingua franca of academia: English. 
Research on English for Academic Purposes (EAP) is concerned with 
those characteristics of English particular to different academic disciplines35. It is 
a practice-oriented field which aims to produce research findings with immediate 
pedagogical value, such as the characteristics of research articles in physics or 
medicine. EAP research has accumulated a wealth of data, mostly on written 
rather than spoken Academic English (AE). Epistemological diversity is widely 
understood by EAP researchers to be an important element of the academic 
ecosystem, and epistemological reasons are often given as partial explanations for 
the linguistic phenomena they describe. The role of epistemology is, however, 
invariably subordinated to the contingent communicative purposes of the text or 
35 EAP can also be more broadly understood to encompass all institutional registers found in 
universities (see e.g. Biber 2006).  
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talk under analysis; research articles, conference presentations and lectures are 
conceived of as genres that have largely decoupled from disciplinarity to develop 
a “life of their own”, particularly in the spoken registers (see Section 2.3.1). 
 
2.3.1 Genre, register and style 
 
Genre, register and style all refer to ways of speaking, but they are associated 
with different research areas, and they are not all synonymous. Style was 
discussed at length in the first part of this chapter, and it is latterly conceived of 
by sociolinguists as ways of speaking in particular interactional settings. Labov’s 
antecedent conception of style as attention-paid-to-speech relied on the notion of 
formality, i.e. the idea that certain styles are more appropriate in certain types of 
situation. Today, this conception of style is closer to what is understood by 
sociolinguists to constitute a register. By these definitions, styles are more local, 
fleeting, and intersubjective than registers. Registers may be associated with 
particular stereotypical social roles such as professions (see e.g. Agha 2007: 80): 
lawyers write contracts in legalese; UK Members of Parliament are required not 
to use “unparliamentary language” such as swearing or accusing each other of 
lying.36 The way in which registers are shaped by institutional practice is 
described lucidly by Agha (2007): 
 
36 Michael Gove MP (Conservative), who is the UK Education Secretary at the time of writing, has 
inspired such widespread resentment among teachers, students, and auxiliary staff that Labour MP 
Tom Watson was moved to call him a miserable pipsqueak. Pipsqueak was immediately judged by 
the Speaker of the House to be “unparliamentary language’”, and that word was henceforth 
consigned to the same set of forbidden words as blackguard, git, guttersnipe, stoolpigeon, tart and 
sod. 
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Processes of register socialization continue throughout adult life as 
well. One cannot become a doctor or a lawyer, for example, without 
acquiring the forms of speech appropriate to the practices of medicine 
or law, or without an understanding of the values – both cognitive and 
interactional ones – linked to their use. In these cases the process of 
language socialization typically includes extended affiliation with 
educational institutions, such as law school or medical school, through 
which individuals acquire the ability to use profession-specific 
registers of the language. Overt prescription plays a role in these 
settings but other types of more implicit metalinguistic activity occur 
routinely as well (Mertz 1998). Once acquired, proficiency in the 
register functions as a tacit emblem of group membership throughout 
adult life and, in cases such as law or medicine, is readily treated as an 
index of achieved professional identity. 
 
(Agha 2007: 156) 
 
Agha (2007) uses the term ‘enregisterment, or recognized existence’ (Agha 2007: 
61 my emphasis) to describe ‘the processes and practices whereby performable 
signs become recognized (and regrouped) as belonging to distinct, differentially 
valorized semiotic registers by a population’ (2007: 80–81). In other words, 
registers and styles both rely on the structural concept of distinctiveness. Registers 
are enduring styles. 
 The third closely related term in the title of this subsection is genre. 
Swales (1990: 58) defines genre as ‘a class of communicative events, the 
members of which share some set of communicative purposes’. Martin and Rose 
(2003: 7) refer to a ‘staged, goal-oriented social process’. In other words, genre is 
conceived of in EAP research as the language used for a particular type of (often 
named) communicative activity, such as The Academic Lecture or The Research 
Article. The communicative purpose of a research article is often supposed to be 
to persuade the reader of an interpretation of data. What kind of data is considered 
(e.g. a literary text, or the emission spectrum of a star) and what kind of 
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interpretive and persuasive strategies are appropriate will vary from discipline to 
discipline. This means that the idea of comparing one genre across several 
disciplines is somewhat problematic. On the one hand, genres may be recognized 
in several disciplines, share the same name, and be involved in many of the same 
practices. On the other hand, the range of different research objects and different 
epistemic policies across academia means that genres may be less generic than 
they at first appear. 
 Genre and register are overlapping terms for the comparison of ways of 
speaking associated with stereotypical situations and institutions. This is close to 
the early Labovian conception of style (related to societal class structure). A genre 
is a type of text or talk, e.g. a lecture, or a Gothic novel (see e.g. Swales 1990; 
Biber and Conrad 2009). Genre, then, may be defined in terms of the linguistic 
product of a specialized activity. A register is the specialized language associated 
with that activity (see e.g. Biber and Conrad 2009). Since activities are distributed 
throughout society in a stratified manner, genres and registers are socially situated 
constructs (not everyone gets to participate in a lecture or read or write a novel). 
Likewise, styles are socially embedded varieties. Styles, genres and registers have 
areas of difference too, perhaps most obviously in their relative transience or 
endurance, which is related to the relative transience or endurance of the 
‘institutions’ within which they are (re)produced, including physical institutions 
like universities, prisons and governments, but also intangible institutions like 
contracts, habits and legible personae. More recent sociolinguistic treatments of 
style allow for individuals to draw on genre and register in a more fine-grained 
way since these forms of language may associate with local categories that 
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emerge in interaction. Agentive treatments of style would conceive of speakers as 
constructing their identities through selection or rejection of linguistic resources 
perceived to index the social categories and practices to which the registers and 
genres attach. This process of linguistically materialized identity construction then 
serves to produce and reproduce more enduring communities and other 
institutional structures. 
 
2.3.2 Linguistic variables in the construction of disciplinary difference 
 
In this section I review the EAP research on evidential variables. First I give an 
overview of the variables implicated in the construction of epistemic stance. Then 
I look at research that has investigated these variables in the language of 
academia. Relatively little cross-disciplinary comparison has been done on 
evidential variables in EAP, with almost all work looking at the behaviour of 
these variables within genres of single disciplines; almost no research in other 
areas of linguistics has looked at variation by discipline. This means that there is 
currently very little empirical evidence that can illuminate the relationship 
between epistemological variation and linguistic variation; this thesis provides a 
comprehensive theory of, and experimental examination of, this relationship. 
Studies of evidential variables across disciplines are reviewed in Section 2.3.3. 
 
Considering the goals of academic registers helps to explain why 
stance is centrally important in these registers. A crucial aspect of 
liberal education is the ability to assess the status of information, 
being able to discriminate among a host of epistemic distinctions, 
from ‘speculation’ to ‘fact’. These distinctions reflect the reliability of 
a statement, as well as the possibility that statements are offered from 
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a particular perspective. In addition, instructors and authors take 
advantage of their positions of power to convey their own opinions 
and attitudes. Thus, in addition to simply conveying propositional 
information, teachers shape the ways that students approach 
knowledge, helping them to assess how statements are to be 
interpreted (e.g., whether they should be adopted as fact, criticized, or 
understood from a particular perspective). 
Biber (2006: 87) 
 
Biber (2006: 92–93) gives a comprehensive list of linguistic features that could be 
used in the construction of stance (reproduced in Table 2.1 below). 
 
Table 2.1 Common lexico-grammatical features used for stance analyses37 
1. Modal and semi-modal verbs (see LGSWE, pp. 483ff.) 
Possibility/ permission/ ability can, could, may, might 
Necessity/ obligation must, should, (had) better, have to, got to, ought to 
Prediction/ volition will, would, shall, be going to 
2. Stance adverbs (see LGSWE, pp. 557–58; 853–74) 
Epistemic 
certainty 
actually, always, certainly, definitely, indeed, inevitably, in fact, never, 
of course, obviously, really, undoubtedly, without doubt, no doubt 
Epistemic 
likelihood 
apparently, evidently, kind of, in most cases/instances, perhaps, 
possibly, predictably, probably, roughly, sort of, maybe 
Attitude amazingly, astonishingly, conveniently, curiously, hopefully, even 
worse, fortunately, importantly, ironically, rightly, sadly, surprisingly, 
unfortunately 
Style according to, confidentially, frankly, generally, honestly, mainly, 
technically, truthfully, typically, reportedly, primarily, usually 
3.1a. Stance complement clauses controlled by stance verb + that-clause (see 
LGSWE, pp. 661–70 
Epistemic 
certainty  
conclude, demonstrate, determine, discover, find, know, learn, mean, 
notice, observe, prove, realize, recognize, remember, see, show, 
understand 
Epistemic 
likelihood  
assume, believe, doubt, gather, guess, hypothesize, imagine, predict, 
presuppose, presume, reckon, seem, speculate, suppose, suspect, think 
Attitude verbs agree, anticipate, complain, concede, ensure, expect, fear, feel, forget, 
hope, mind, prefer, pretend, require, wish, worry 
Speech act/ 
communication 
announce, argue, assert, claim, contend, declare, emphasize, explain, 
imply, insist, mention, promise, propose, recommend, remark, 
respond, say, state, suggest, tell 
3.1b. Stance complement clauses controlled by stance verb + to-clause (see LGSWE, 
pp. 693–715) 
Probability 
(likelihood) 
appear, happen, seem, tend 
37 Biber’s (2006) summary table reproduced here is based on Biber et al. (1999) which he 
abbreviates as LGSWE 
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Cognition/ 
perception 
(likelihood) 
assume, believe, consider, expect, find, forget, imagine, judge, know, 
learn, presume, pretend, remember, suppose 
Desire/intention
/decision 
agree, choose, decide, hate, hesitate, hope, intend, like, love, mean, 
need, plan, prefer, prepare, refuse, want, wish 
Causation/ 
modality/effort 
allow, attempt, enable, encourage, fail, help, instruct, manage, oblige, 
order, permit, persuade, prompt, require, seek, try 
Speech act/ 
communication 
ask, claim, invite, promise, remind, request, be said, show, teach, tell, 
urge, warn 
3.2a. Stance complement clauses controlled by stance adjective + that-clause (see 
LGSWE, pp. 671–674) 
Epistemic 
certainty 
apparent, certain, clear, confident, convinced, correct, evident, false, 
impossible, inevitable, obvious, positive, right, sure, true, well-known 
Epistemic 
likelihood 
doubtful, likely, possible, probably, unlikely 
Attitude/ 
emotion 
afraid, amazed, aware, concerned, disappointed, encouraged, glad, 
happy, hopeful, pleased, shocked, surprised, worried 
Evaluation amazing, appropriate, conceivable, crucial, essential, fortunate, 
imperative, inconceivable, incredible, interesting, luck, necessary, 
nice, noteworthy, odd, ridiculous, strange, surprising, unacceptable, 
unfortunate 
3.2a. Stance complement clauses controlled by stance adjective + to-clause (see 
LGSWE, pp. 716–21) 
Epistemic apt, certain, due, guaranteed, liable, likely, prone, unlikely, sure 
Attitude/ 
emotion 
afraid, ashamed, disappointed, embarrassed, glad, happy, pleased, 
proud, puzzled, relieved, sorry, surprised, worried 
Evaluation (in)appropriate, bad/worse, good/better/best, convenient, essential, 
important, interesting, necessary, nice, reasonable, silly, smart, stupid, 
surprising, useful, useless, unreasonably, wise, wrong 
Ability/ 
willingness 
(un)able, anxious, careful, determined, eager, eligible, hesitant, 
inclined, obliged, prepared, ready, reluctant, (un)willing 
Ease/difficulty difficult, easier, easy, hard, (im)possible, tough 
3.3a. Stance complement clauses controlled by stance noun + that-clause (see 
LGSWE, pp. 648–51) 
Epistemic 
certainty 
assertion, conclusion, conviction, discovery, doubt, fact, knowledge, 
observation, principle, realization, result, statement 
Epistemic 
likelihood 
assumption, belief, claim, contention, feeling, hypothesis, idea, 
implication, impression, notion, opinion, possibility, presumption, 
suggestion 
Attitude/ 
perspective 
grounds, hope, reason, view, thought 
Non-factive 
commication 
comment, news, proposal, proposition, remark, report, requirment 
3.3b. Stance complement clauses controlled by stance noun + to-clause (see LGSWE, 
pp. 652–53) 
 agreement, decision, desire, failure, inclination, intention, obligation, 
opportunity, plan, promise, proposal, reluctance, responsibility, right, 
tendency, threat, wish, willingness 
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It is beyond the scope of a single thesis to review the research on all of the items 
listed in Table 2.1—even if limited to the EAP subdiscipline. Gray and Biber 
(2012: 19) make the strong claim that ‘epistemic stance meanings are 
considerably more important in research writing than the attitudinal meanings’, 
which is suggestive that many of the variables listed above are less important for 
the present study. However, I argued above that the boundary between epistemic 
and affective is fuzzy, and a glance at Table 2.1 shows that analytic judgements 
can at times appear anomalous to fresh eyes (e.g. in Section 3.2a of Table 2.1, the 
adverbs possible and impossible are put into a separate category from the other 
epistemic adverbs such as likely and certain). 
Table 2.1 highlights that several different parts of speech can contribute to 
the linguistic construction of stance: modal verbs and adverbs; and 
complementizing nouns, adjectives and adverbs. A problem for the quantitative 
investigation of these variables, then, is that it is not immediately obvious how to 
group them into variables and variants: what exactly is varying? 
Variationist sociolinguistics is sometimes equated with sociophonetics, i.e. 
the investigation of social patterns in the way people pronounce things. These 
“things” are linguistic items that are assumed to be capable of varying: linguistic 
variables. A linguistic variable is a set of linguistic forms (variants) that alternate 
in language use. For example, variable (ing) may be realized in the Standard 
English manner as [ɪŋ], or it may be realized in a non-standard manner as [ɪn] 
(which is popularly referred to as “g-dropping”, due to the imagined orthographic 
representation of this variant as in). Three questions arise for the analysis of this 
variable. First, are these two forms really variants of the same thing, or are they 
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better analysed as two different things? This question might be called the problem 
of equivalence. Secondly, are there any other variant forms that this variable can 
take, i.e. is the set of variants exhaustive? The methodological desideratum of 
identifying an exhaustive list of variants is called the principle of accountability 
(Labov 1966: 49). Thirdly, can every occurrence of (ing) vary in this way, or is 
there some restriction on which ings are actually variable? This question aims to 
identify the envelope of variation (Milroy and Gordon 2003:180), i.e. to 
circumscribe the context within which the variable varies. 
 These three questions arise for any linguistic variable, and it has been 
assumed (e.g. by Labov 1982:87) that it is easier to answer them for phonological 
variables than for variables at other linguistic levels such as morphosyntactic, 
pragmatic or discourse-level variables. The (ing) variants above are supposed to 
be fairly straightforwardly semantically equivalent in that alternating between 
them does not change the denotation (the dictionary meaning) of the word in 
which they occur. A subset of all possible ings should also be identified which is 
structurally equivalent. For phonological variables like (ing), this would for 
example require that they always be word-final, or that they are part of the tense 
and aspect verb morphology rather than part of the spelling of a lexical item (i.e. 
only the second ing in singing). This kind of stipulation serves to circumscribe the 
variable context, i.e. it identifies the envelope of variation. 
Identifying an exhaustive list of variants involves some arbitrary 
operationalization. The variants identified above for (ing) are likely to be 
“canonical” cases that represent a cluster of more or less phonologically similar 
realizations, and it is for the analyst to determine how to render this continuum 
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discrete—usually with reference to the community that evaluates the variation, i.e. 
via an emic understanding of the etic forms (Pike 1954). It is typically the case, 
too, that a variable includes a null variant, i.e. the optional absence of phonetic 
realization, which is only rendered noticeable and therefore countable once the 
envelope of variation has been identified. 
The notion of the sociolinguistic variable has gradually expanded to 
include morphosyntactic variation, e.g. the variable production of was and were 
(e.g. Cheshire 1982; Cheshire et al. 2008); variable negative concord (e.g. Moore 
2004); quotatives such as said and be like (e.g. Buchstaller 2013) and discourse 
markers such as like and innit (e.g. Andersen 2001; Schleef 2008, 2009). All of 
these studies have needed to address the issue of substitutability of the variants of 
their putative variables: are the variants alternative ways of saying the same thing? 
Many have argued that they are not. There are two responses to this. First, 
sociolinguistics can be reduced to sociophonetics. Secondly, what counts as a 
variable can be extended to include variation at the level of lexical or 
morphosyntactic choice, or of discourse-level structures. The latter option appears 
to be the de facto resolution of this issue in the field of sociolinguistics (see e.g. 
Pichler 2010), and that is the approach I adopt here, including several linguistic 
levels (e.g. modal verbs, lexical verbs, adverbs) under the discourse-level 
phenomenon of variable epistemic stance. I next discuss the reasons for doing so. 
Given the structuralist commitments of classical linguistics, it is not 
tenable that phonetic variants are ways of saying the same thing in terms of 
connotation.38 If one variant is the “standard” and another is “non-standard”, then 
38 Denotation may be viewed as an abstraction over a variable semantic content distributed in a 
community. If there is then no single denotation, but rather a set of family resemblances 
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using different variants does indeed change the meaning of the utterance. 
Furthermore, I am interested in whether and how academics in different 
disciplines vary in their stance construction, so I am comparing the stances they 
take. The expectation is that differing epistemological commitments will associate 
with different epistemic stances, i.e. that the semantic content of the stances will 
vary. In short, I am less interested in how disciplines say the same thing in 
different ways, and more interested in the extent to which they use a shared pool 
of linguistic resources to say different things. The possibility of a sociosemantics 
is premised, by definition, on the assumption that meaning is not constant among 
variants of the same variable. This also requires that the sociolinguistic variable 
be construed as a higher-level linguistic unit than a single phoneme. The issue of 
the envelope of variation will be side-stepped in Chapter 3 by looking at ratios of 
linguistic forms rather than comparing absolute numbers or frequencies. In 
Chapters 4 and 5 I operationalize stance at the level of the clause, and I 
approximate an exhaustive coding rubric including, for example, linguistic forms 
of the type in Table 2.1 above. 
Lavandera argues that the requirement of semantic equivalence be relaxed 
for non-phonological variants, proposing instead ‘a condition of functional 
comparability’ (Lavandera 1978: 181). Dines makes a similar point, suggesting 
that ‘discourse variables may be defined on the basis of common discourse 
function.’ (Dines 1980: 13). Much of the analysis in this thesis, then, rests on the 
assumption of functional relatedness of the variants under discussion. Indeed, 
rather than identifying functional equivalents, I identify items that I argue lie on 
(Wittgenstein 1953), then it could be argued that connotation is a more valid conception of 
meaning as applied to a sociolinguistic variable—particularly a semantic one. 
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related functional dimensions. In other words, I argue that modal verbs such as 
must and may, adverbs such as possibly and probably, etc, are functionally 
commensurate. In short, I make a somewhat novel expansion of the notion of the 
linguistic variable both in terms of the treatment of semantic relatedness of the 
variants, and in terms of the envelope of variation. The optionality and 
morphological diversity of the variants means that variable stance is characterized 
by large numbers of null tokens, and a large number of low-frequency variants. 
This contrasts with typical sociolinguistic variables which are more clearly 
semantically equivalent, and which have a relatively small number of variants in 
alternation, of which the null variant is relatively rare. 
A second challenge to the variationist analysis of stance construction is 
that many variants are prohibitively rare. Statistical analysis of the variability in 
stance construction by discipline (or any social category) is only possible if the 
variants occur in sufficiently high token numbers. I therefore confine this review 
to the most common epistemic stance markers identified in the EAP literature, and 
I explore additional variables in subsequent chapters. 
Biber (2006: 95–114) notes that the variables listed in Table 2.1 are more 
common in spoken than written registers. Modal verbs are the most common 
overall. Epistemic adverbs are the most common type of adverb (certainty more 
common than likelihood). Stance verbs with that-complements follow the same 
patterns, while those with to-complements are equally frequent in spoken and 
written, with verbs of desire being the most frequent type. Noun-governed that- 
and to-clauses are relatively rare, and mainly confined to written registers. 
114 
 
Lyons defines epistemic modality in a broad manner appropriate for the 
sociolinguistic analysis of high-level variation: 
 
Any utterance in which the speaker explicitly qualifies his 
commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence 
he utters, whether this qualification is made explicit in the verbal 
component […] or in the prosodic or paralinguistic component, is an 
epistemically modal, or modalized, utterance. 
 
(Lyons 1977: 797) 
 
Epistemic modality thus expresses the commitment component of an epistemic 
stance: how committed a speaker is to (the truth of) the proposition they are 
modalizing. This modalization can be done with modal verbs, adverbs, adjectives 
or nouns listed in Table 2.1 above. Also, a speaker’s commitment to a proposition 
can be marked using epistemic verbs such as know or think. The justification 
component of an epistemic stance is the information source, expressed by 
evidential verbs.39 This category cuts across several used by Biber (2006) to again 
include verbs, adverbs, adjectives and nouns that refer to the manner in which a 
knowledge claim was reached (e.g. argue, deduce, demonstrate). Epistemic stance 
is thus here used to mean the linguistic expression of the speaker’s attitude to 
what they are saying qua knowledge, including the justification and commitment 
components.40 I argue that stance can be operationalized by attending to these two 
dimensions.41 In the next section I review the research that has focused on cross-
39 This is similar to Aikenvald’s (2004) narrow evidentiality. For Aikenvald, evidentiality is a 
system of obligatory grammatical marking of information source. I am expanding that definition 
here to include all the non-obligatory ways of indicating the source of a knowledge claim. 
40 This thesis focuses on variation at the level of discourse and lexicon. It does not examine 
phonetic or prosodic phenomena, or communication via non-linguistic channels such as gesture. 
41 I use this distinction between dimensions loosely as, once again, these categories are fuzzy. 
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disciplinary variation in these two dimensions. In Chapters 3 and 4 I discuss 
research on the variables from a non-variationist approach, and I used that 
research to inform how I operationalize epistemic stance variables, and also my 
coding distinctions for those variables. 
2.3.3 Linguistic variation across disciplines 
The English for specific purposes (EAP) research programme has focused more 
on written than spoken Academic English, and has also generally preferred small-
scale analysis at the level of genres (Swales 1990) within single disciplines (or a 
few closely-related disciplines) rather than the kind of cross-disciplinary 
comparison I am presenting here. A small amount of work has been done on 
spoken Academic English, and it is a matter of debate in the EAP literature to 
what extent written and spoken EAP are comparable. Importantly for the present 
research however, the theory that inter-disciplinary linguistic variation arises in 
large part from (and reproduces) inter-disciplinary epistemological variation has 
not been thoroughly explored. 
I now review the limited cross-disciplinary comparisons of the 
commitment and justification components of stance present in the EAP literature. 
Commitment is materialized as modality, including hedges and boosters and 
modal verbs. Justification is materialized via evidential verbs. 
Hyland (2006: 22–36) finds that hedges and boosters are used with 
differing frequencies across disciplines in research articles. Hedges reduce the 
speaker’s commitment to a proposition e.g. by using weak modality (e.g. might or 
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possibly), while boosters increase commitment by using strong modality (e.g. 
must or necessarily) (see e.g. Holmes 1984). Hyland is concerned with the overall 
levels of stance vocabulary (e.g. finding that philosophy uses more stance features 
than any other disciplines),42 but a re-analysis of his data from 240 research 
articles in 8 disciplines shows that all disciplines use more hedges than boosters. 
This is particularly marked in social sciences where the ratio of hedges to boosters 
is 94:6. Applied linguistics, marketing, biology and electrical engineering all have 
a ratio of around 75:25, while physics, mechanical engineering and philosophy 
have the most even ratio at around 65:35. This is suggestive of a gradual 
progression in general level of epistemic commitment from social sciences 
through to physics, but the placement of biology and philosophy require some 
careful consideration.  
Hyland (2009: 13) says that ‘the less frequent use of hedges is one way of 
minimising the researcher’s role, and so is the preference for modals over 
cognitive verbs.’ This means that hedges can be used to mitigate the 
authorial/authoritarian voice of a research article, and that avoiding cognitive 
verbs (such as think and know) in favour of modals also achieves this. While the 
equivalency of cognitive and modal verbs agrees with my grouping of them under 
the truth component of stance above, the point that Hyland (2009) makes about 
hedging does not appear to concord with the relative placements of physics and 
marketing in his earlier (2006) data. 
42 This finding is of limited use since it does not adhere to Labov’s principle of accountability (see 
e.g. Labov 1972). This is not an isolated occurrence of the problem within EAP research. 
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Poos and Simpson (2002) investigated the cross-disciplinary frequency of the 
hedges sort of and kind of in spoken data from the MICASE43 corpus, finding 
them more common in the arts and humanities and social sciences than in the 
biological and physical sciences (see also Simpson-Vlach 2006; Schleef 2009). 
Schleef (2008, 2009) examines these discourse markers across disciplines in 
MICASE lectures. His findings agree with Poos and Simpson (2002), and he also 
finds that disciplinary affiliation is a more powerful predictor of discourse marker 
use than age and gender (2008) and (German versus US) nationality (2009). 
Rowley-Jolivet and Carter-Thomas (2005) also find that discourse marker use 
(including however, well, now, so, and their French equivalents) by 
British/American and French academics presenting physics and medicine research 
at conferences is better predicted by disciplinary affiliation than by native 
language, even in epistemologically quite closely related disciplines. 
Explanations for the cross-disciplinary variation in discourse marker use 
have usually been couched in terms of the hard sciences being more densely 
technical, and therefore requiring more frequent checks that the audience is 
following what is being said.44 A quick glance at a Judith Butler or Michael 
Silverstein text renders this explanation deeply unsatisfying, and I suggest that 
discourse markers such as those listed above are, in addition to breaking up and 
organizing talk, functioning to “bring the audience on board”. In other words, they 
subsume the audience into the speaker’s understanding of the object of discussion 
(right?). I argue that this is more likely to happen in the “hard” disciplines 
43 Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English (Simpson et al. 2002). 
44 Cf. Schachter et al. (1991) who analyse the frequency of filled pauses (um and ah) across 
disciplines, and, finding them more common in the ‘soft’ disciplines, relate them to the amount of 
choice/ open-endedness of discipline, i.e. the fact that “hard” disciplines are “exact” sciences. 
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because they have a narrower range of epistemic policies available. They have 
fewer and less divergent ratified ways of seeing the data. This means there is less 
chance that an audience member will reject the interpretation being offered, and 
also that there is less chance of the speaker expecting their explanation to be 
rejected. This dual function of discourse markers as text-milestones and as 
“epistemological totalizers” is problematic in the arts and humanities where 
epistemological pluralism is de riguer. However, in the sciences, the 
epistemological function of discourse markers is inapplicable, so speakers are 
freer to punctuate their discourse with discourse markers. 
With regard to modal verbs, Salager-Meyer (1992) analyses 84 medical 
abstracts divided into three types (research, case studies, review) and four sub-
disciplinary areas (clinical, basic, epidemiological, operative). She found that 
‘Modality is significantly more frequent in review articles, which means that the 
more universal the pretension of the claim, the more hedged the discourse.’ 
(Salager-Meyer 1992). This seems to contradict the finding reported in the 
following sentence however: ‘Medical text types do have a direct bearing on the 
use of tenses and modality whereas research types do not.’ One assumes that 
‘basic’ medical research pretends to more universal claims than operative or 
clinical research, even if this was not reflected in modal verb use in the data 
examined. 
Stotesbury (2003) analyses the abstracts of 300 research articles in 
humanities, social sciences and natural sciences. She found that should was as 
common as all other markers of strong modality (need, necessary, must, etc) in the 
humanities (8 versus 9 tokens), while the balance was more skewed in social 
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sciences (6 versus 8) and even more so in natural sciences (3 versus 10).45 Sieller 
(1982: 63) found that spoken scientific and engineering discourse makes use of a 
more expanded set of modal verbs than written discourse; in her data the latter 
rely on may and must. 
Piqué-Agordans, Posteguillo and Andreu-Besó (2002) compared the 
frequency of modal verbs in three corpora of research articles. They classified 
modal verbs according to modal flavour (epistemic versus deontic), which is a 
popular classification in formal linguistics since the seminal work by Kratzer 
(1977). I argue in Chapter 3 that this classification system is not appropriate for 
the present work. I reanalysed their data to compare the relative proportion of 
strong (must, should, will, etc.) to weak modal verbs (may, might, can, etc.) and 
found that the proportion in medicine is 20:80 (strong:weak), while this levels out 
to 28:72 in biology and 46:54 in literary criticism.46 Varttala (2001: 207) analysed 
modal verbs in economics, medicine and technology writing. A re-analysis of his 
data shows that the ratio of strong to weak modals is 9:91 in medicine, and 15:85 
in economics and technology.47 
There are some suggestive data, and interpretations, in the EAP literature. 
Modal verbs occur in reasonably low total numbers, so a large sample of text will 
be required. The balance of stong/weak modal verbs does appear to vary across 
disciplines (Piqué-Angordans et al. 2002). This single result, in light of the 
plausibility of Salager-Myer’s first claim above, points to the need for more 
45 These differences, while suggestive, are not statistically significant. 
46 These ratios are normalized as percentages. Original token number ratios are: medicine 61:244 
(20:80); biology 112:289 (28:72); and literary criticism 164:193 (46:54). See Table 2 in Piqué-
Angordans et al. (2002: 53). 
47 These ratios are normalized to percentages. Original per mil frequency ratios are: medicine 
0.60:6.05 (9:91); economics 0.65:3.72 (15:85); and technology 0.61:3.47 (15:85). 
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research on the variable use of modal verbs across disciplines in Academic 
English. 
I now turn to the justification component of epistemic stance. Vold (2006b) 
distinguishes between more subjective and more objective epistemic modality 
markers: 
Although all epistemic modality markers pragmatically presuppose an 
evaluating agent […] Assume, seem and appear are all quite 
‘subjective’, in the sense that they, by their semantics, presuppose a 
modalizing agent. […] Could, may, might and possible on the other 
hand, refer to the notion of possibility and can be taken simply to state 
an eventuality without presupposing a specific modalizing agent. 
(Vold 2006b: 234) 
Vold (2006b) identifies her subjective epistemic markers with ‘mental state 
predicates’ (Nuyts 2001). Vold (2006a) examines 120 research articles in 
linguistics and medicine in three languages (French, Norwegian and English) and 
finds that subjective verbs are more frequent than objective modal words in 
linguistics texts, while this pattern is reversed in medical texts. She finds that this 
difference is small compared to the difference between languages. 
Hyland (2009: 11) finds differences in the distribution of ‘reporting verbs’ 
across disciplines. In his research article data, the most frequent reporting verbs in 
“soft” disciplines are say, suggest, argue and claim, while in the “hard” 
disciplines they are describe, find, report, and show. The “soft” disciplines 
(philosophy, sociology, applied lingusitics and marketing) seem to rely more on 
discursive processes of knowledge construction, while the “hard” disciplines 
(biology, electrical and mechanical engineering and physics) rely more on 
referring to pre-existing data or arguments. Fløttum, Kinn and Dahl (2006: 208–
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09) compare 150 economics, medicine and linguistics articles, finding some
common ground with Hyland’s results (argue and suggest in linguistics; find and 
show in economics; and show in medicine). Medicine articles also favour 
examine, observe, and demonstrate; economists estimate and assume; while 
linguists assume, suggest and know. What these findings and interpretations point 
to is a class of evidential verbs including mental state predicates and reporting 
verbs which can be divided into objective and subjective verbs depending on the 
process of justification being adduced for the knowledge claim. The terms 
objective and subjective are quite loaded, and a more refined classification will be 
attempted in subsequent chapters. 
2.4 Summary 
Having reviewed the relevant concepts from social epistemology, linguistic 
anthropology, and EAP, I now clarify the general research questions of this thesis. 
The most basic question I address in the present research is: What is the 
relationship between epistemological variation and linguistic variation? This 
question can be addressed from a more linguistic and a more social perspective by 
reframing it as two interrelated questions: What linguistic forms are used in 
epistemic stance construction? and Do those forms index epistemic policies and 
EPR? Both questions are difficult to address directly, and I will approach them by 
combining research methods in the next three chapters. In Chapter 3 I perform a 
corpus analysis of research articles. I test whether three linguistic forms 
previously implicated in the linguistic expression of epistemic stance demonstrate 
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variability between and within academic disciplines. In Chapters 4 and 5 I analyse 
data collected from interviews I performed with 34 academics in a range of 
disciplines. I explore the evidence for the indexical nature of the relationship 
between language and epistemology by looking for evidence of iconization, 
recursivity and erasure, and I evaluate the level of salience of the linguistic 
correlates of EPR by analysing participant’s interview talk. 
 Using these investigative methods, I interrogate the nature of 
disciplinarity. I have argued that a discipline represents a more or less 
heterogeneous, wide or narrow epistemic policy range (EPR). This ideological 
differentiation lays the foundation for the indexical processes whereby linguistic 
forms come to acquire social meaning. I will therefore be looking not only for 
evidence of those indexical processes, but also directly for evidence that 
disciplines are “decoupled” from epistemic policies. In other words, I evaluate 
whether attending to epistemic policy reveals more structure, more orderly 
heterogeneity, than is apparent when attending to disciplinary categories. The 
implications of this could be important for developing an explanatory framework 
for the abundant empirical findings in EAP research. 
 In Chapters 4 I develop a way of quantifying epistemic stance via an 
epistemic stance index (ESI). This allows me to perform the first variationist 
investigation of epistemic stance, and to interrogate its status as a sociolinguistic 
variable. The ESI also offers the potential to develop a quantitative science of 
social epistemology by facilitating a “sociolinguistic turn” in what is presently a 
highly theoretical field with some classic examples of rich ethnographies (e.g. 
Latour and Woolgar 1986), but whose generalizability remains uncertain. 
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Chapter 3. Corpus study: Methods and Results 
In this thesis, I investigate the relationship between epistemological variation and 
linguistic variation. In Chapters 1 and 2, I reviewed the epistemological and 
sociolinguistic concepts relevant to the present investigation, and I developed a 
model of the linguistic construction of epistemological difference. In the next 
three chapters I explore the empirical evidence for this model, focusing on the 
case of academia, where epistemological difference is particularly salient. I first 
look in the present chapter at the distribution of a small number of evidential 
variables in written academic discourse. I then examine a wider set of variables in 
interview speech in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The present chapter aims to evaluate whether the putative relationship 
between language and epistemology is amenable to quantitative sociolinguistic 
analysis by answering the following questions: are there general patterns of 
linguistic variation across academic disciplines? In other words, if one looks at 
two academic disciplines, will similar linguistic differentiation obtain within both 
those disciplines? If so, does this differentiation resemble that at the largest scales 
within academia, i.e. that between Science and Arts? 
To answer these questions, I examine the distribution of three forms of 
evidential language (epistemic adverbs, modal verbs, and evidential verbs) within 
three corpora of research articles. Modality and evidentiality are fundamental 
categories in epistemic stance (and they correspond to two elements of classical 
knowledge analysis: level of commitment, and justification, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. I suggest that the journals from which the articles are taken are 
representative of the range of epistemic policies (belief-forming practices) found 
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both within and between academic disciplines (see Section 3.1 below). In other 
words, the journals reflect the diversity of beliefs, values, attitudes and norms 
about knowledge that characterize academic disciplines. I have argued earlier in 
this thesis that such epistemological differentiation produces, and is produced by, 
the variable use of evidential language. I now examine the extent to which this 
model explains the distributions of the variables examined in these corpora of 
written Academic English. 
The three corpora used here are structurally related. One corpus consists of 
articles drawn from journals that I suggest are representative48 of the maximal 
epistemological difference between academic disciplines, broadly analogous to 
the popular stereotype of the Two Cultures (i.e. the Arts and Science disciplines 
discussed in Chapter 1). Two further corpora consist of journals that I argue span 
the epistemological range within two sub/disciplines, namely psychology and 
sociolinguistics, chosen for their epistemological heterogeneity. By comparing the 
observed patterns of inter- and intra-disciplinary linguistic variation, I am able to 
evaluate the extent to which written academic discourse instantiates indexical 
recursivity (Irvine and Gal 2000; Irvine 2001; reviewed in Section 2.3). In other 
words, I investigate the extent to which patterns of linguistic differentiation found 
at large scales are recapitulated at small scales. 
As discussed in the Chapter 1, it is a considerable simplification to 
contrast Arts with Science, both across academia as a whole, and as a recursively 
instantiated binary division within each discipline. I proposed that these 
epistemological archetypes are indicative of sets of epistemic policies which may 
48 See Section 3.1 below for a more detailed discussion of corpus structure. 
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be differentially adopted by individuals for various purposes. I suggested that the 
archetypal epistemic policies contain the following “stable” bundles of policy 
elements: 
Science 〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 
and 
Arts 〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 
This formalism was discussed in detail in Chapter 1, but it can be glossed as 
shown in Table 3.1 (K stands for knowledge). 
Table 3.1 Stable epistemic policy bundle element variants in Arts and Science 
Science Arts 
S-policy 
possibility of K 
〈S+〉 
epistemism 
K is possible 
〈So〉 
Pyrrhonic skepticism 
withhold judgement 
K-policy 
analysis of K 
〈KJTB〉 
classical 
justified true belief 
〈KJB〉 
anti-classical 
justified belief 
J-policy 
justification 
〈Jint〉 
internalism about justification 
requires introspective access to justification 
T-policy 
truth 
〈Treal〉 
realism about truth 
truth is ‘out there’ 
〈Tnon〉
non-realism 
truth is theory-relative 
I-policy 
investigative 
position 
〈Iobj〉 
objective 
mind-independent research 
objects 
〈Isubj〉 
subjective 
mind-dependent research 
objects 
I will use the labels Science and Arts respectively as placeholders for these 
bundles of epistemic policy elements when comparing inter- and intra-disciplinary 
epistemological variation. These archetypes represent epistemological “polar 
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tendencies” at different levels of social organization, not a monolithic 
classification of all members of that discipline or subdiscipline. For example, 
within a discipline such as linguistics, we find formal linguists who adopt the 
Science policy bundle for writing research articles, but who may at times follow 
“hunches” in the absence of an explicit justificatory account of their knowledge 
claims 〈Jext〉. When publishing their results in research articles, however, they 
must justify their knowledge claims 〈Jint〉. Also within the discipline of linguistics, 
we find sociolinguists who adopt Science policy while gathering and analysing 
quantitative data, but then may apply Arts policy to interpret the results. 
Linguistic anthropologists might make even more restricted use of Science policy. 
I suggest, then, that epistemological difference patterns recursively. This 
means that any particular academic discipline instantiates within it the same kind 
of epistemological polarization that obtains in wider academia taken as a whole. 
The epistemological difference between Arts and Science found at the largest 
scale of academia, say between physics and literary criticism, is also recapitulated 
within a single discipline. “Hub disciplines” such as psychology, linguistics or 
geography, whose members collaborate with those of several other disciplines, 
contain quite clear Arts and Science sub-disciplinary areas. I argue that this 
recursive epistemological differentiation produces, and is produced by, the taking 
of epistemic stance. Epistemic stance is a position about the status of a proposition 
as knowledge. It is materialized by drawing on linguistic resources already 
imbued with evidential meaning, either in virtue of their semantic content, or 
because they index the epistemic practices of others. By taking a stance, then, a 
speaker reproduces the indexical links between evidential language and epistemic 
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policy (see Chapter 2). In this chapter I explore the linguistic evidence for 
recursive epistemological differentiation in the academy. 
In the next section I detail the structure of my corpora, and I explain how 
they were categorized in terms of their epistemic policies. In Section 3.2 I 
describe the variables investigated in this chapter. I then present and analyse the 
results of these corpus experiments in Section 3.3. 
3.1 Corpus structure 
Three corpora of written Academic English were formed from research 
articles which were chosen as representative of the epistemological diversity at 
different levels of social organization in academia. The largest level is 
represented in the “Two Cultures” corpus (TCC), which contains articles from 
the journals Science and Nature on the one hand, and Tamara Journal for 
Critical Organization Inquiry (formerly Tamara Journal of Postmodern Critical 
Organization Science) and New Left Review (NLR) on the other. I argue 
below that the TCC is representative of the Arts and Science epistemological 
archetypes. Science and Nature place a strong emphasis on innovation, and 
they publish papers from a very wide range of disciplines, albeit ones that are 
epistemologically compatible within their narrow EPR. These journals are also 
international. In short, they are narrow in epistemology, but wide in reach. In 
contrast, the NLR and Tamara are wide in epistemology, but narrow in reach. 
Although in principle both journals accept international contributions from a 
range of disciplines, in practice, the number of submissions and the 
readership is very small compared to that of 
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Science and Nature. I suggest that these differences, rather than being 
confounding factors, are features of the social organization of narrow and wide 
EPR. 
A smaller, disciplinary level of organization was represented by four 
psychology journals in the psychology corpus (PsyC), and a sub-disciplinary level 
was represented in a similar manner in the sociolinguistic corpus (SLC). I argue 
below that these two corpora also instantiate the same kind of epistemological 
differentiation as the TCC. In the rest of this section I provide further details about 
the composition of each of the three corpora, and I describe how the 
epistemological character of these journals was assessed. 
10 research articles published in 2009-10 were downloaded in PDF format 
from the on-line archives of each journal. Additional articles were included if total 
word counts were low, or to ensure a better representation of topics within that 
group. These articles were converted to TXT format using Microsoft Wordpad so 
as to be readable by the concordancing software used (AntConc 3.2.1w). The 
mission statement or equivalent for each journal is given below in this section, 
taken from the journals’ websites (all accessed March 2014, although no 
substantive changes to mission statements had occurred in the elapsed time). The 
structure of the TCC is shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Structure of the Two Cultures corpus (TCC) 
Epistemological 
archetype 
Journal Articles Words 
Science Science 13 42771 
Nature 10 64551 
Arts New Left Review 10 58513 
Tamara 14 87451 
TOTAL  47 253286 
 
 
I argue that these four journals are representative of the epistemological 
archetypes Arts and Science. The journal Science is concerned with papers that 
‘significantly advance scientific understanding’ through ‘novel and broadly 
important data’, as demonstrated in its mission statement: 
 
Science's Mission: Science seeks to publish those papers that are most 
influential in their fields or across fields and that will significantly 
advance scientific understanding. Selected papers should present 
novel and broadly important data, syntheses, or concepts. They should 
merit the recognition by the scientific community and general public 
provided by publication in Science, beyond that provided by specialty 
journals. 
We welcome submissions from all fields of science and from any 
source. We are committed to the prompt evaluation and publication of 
submitted papers. Science is published weekly; selected papers are 
published online ahead of print.49 
 
The journal Nature seeks ‘to serve scientists’ by publishing ‘significant 
advances’. 
Nature's mission statement 
First, to serve scientists through prompt publication of significant 
advances in any branch of science, and to provide a forum for the 
reporting and discussion of news and issues concerning science. 
Second, to ensure that the results of science are rapidly disseminated 
to the public throughout the world, in a fashion that conveys their 
significance for knowledge, culture and daily life.50 
 
49 http://www.sciencemag.org/site/feature/contribinfo/prep/gen_info.xhtml  
50 http://www.nature.com/nature/about/index.html 
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Both journals thus set themselves up as bastions of Science, seeking to maintain a 
common base of important knowledge among scientists. Both journals also aim to 
project this common knowledge base to the public. Both journals appear to 
assume that Science, ‘scientific understanding’ and ‘scientific community’ are 
unproblematic monolithic concepts. They assume that knowledge is possible 〈S+〉, 
consensual, and generally transmissible, implying realism about truth 〈Treal〉. In 
addition to the repeated references to Science, the epistemic policy elements 
suggested by the content of the mission statements make this pair of journals 
strong candidates for representing the Science epistemic archetype. 
I argue that the next pair of journals are equally strong candidates for the 
Arts archetype. The mission statement of Tamara Journal for Critical 
Organization Inquiry makes frequent references to branches of critical theory: 
 
Tamara Journal draws on Critical Management 
Theory and Postmodern Organization Science and is based 
in story/narrative and other qualitative study. It combines critical 
theory as well as postmodern theory and postcolonial theory and 
critical pedagogy with praxis. And one that seeks a higher ethics of 
global production and consumption.51 
 
 
Critical theory is a diverse set of approaches to research which aims at 
emancipation of humanity from enslavement (Bohman 2013). This includes 
enslavement by prevailing ideologies, including e.g. the classical analysis of 
knowledge (see e.g. Foucault 1972). Given the range of critical positions 
mentioned in the mission statement, a position of non-realism about truth seems 
likely 〈Tnon〉. Elsewhere on Tamara’s website, the following text supports this 
51 http://crow.kozminski.edu.pl/journal/index.php/tamara/about 
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analysis in its description of how the picture at the top of the website illustrates 
the mission of the journal. 
 
Our website design 
The symbolics of our design emphasizes being on the side of the 
oppressed. 
 
By using the famous picture of Albert Einstein showing his tongue, 
we claim our academic ambitions, while challenging the established 
norms. Trotsky symbolizes our critical component. Andromeda in 
shackles by Tamara Lempicka is an allegory of sympathizing with the 
underprivileged and feminism, while referring to the name of the 
journal (more on Tamara Lempicka below).  It depicts Andromeda 
and represents social oppresion (after all, Andromeda, powerful as she 
is, has been sacrificed to a sea monster). The painting is a classic/icon 
in feminist art and is one of the first pieces emphasizing women 
power. Using a graffitti painting by Banksy underlines the creative 
anarchy we work in, but also pacifism.52 
 
 
Both Tamara and New Left Review (NLR) distance themselves from the 
hegemonic epistemology of the academy, suggesting that epistemic policies other 
than the two archetypes might be possible in their articles. (Recall from Chapter 1 
that I proposed that the prevailing academic norm of providing explicit 
justification in research 〈Jint〉 reduces the number of possible combinations of 
policy elements to the two “stable” archetypes). Tamara says ‘we claim our 
academic ambitions, while challenging the established norms’, while NLR makes 
an even stronger statement that it is ‘not an academic publication’. However, this 
is clearly meant in the anti-establishment rather than the anti-intellectual sense 
since it routinely publishes the essays of critical theorists, and the ‘prose models’ 
it offers are noted anti-classical thinkers: 
52 http://crow.kozminski.edu.pl/journal/index.php/tamara/about/editorialPolicies# 
sectionPolicies 
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New Left Review welcomes the submission of articles, comments and 
book reviews on all the major issues facing us today. Authors should 
bear in mind that NLR is a journal of ideas, not an academic 
publication: lively, intelligent and thoughtful writing is highly 
valued—prose models would be Benjamin, Bloch or Marx rather than 
the average conference paper—and articles should be submitted with 
an educated and discerning general readership in mind.53 
 
 
These four journals, then, seem to be representative of the two epistemological 
archetypes introduced in Chapter 1 and reviewed above. Tamara and NLR profess 
to set themselves apart from the academy, and therefore suggest that their articles 
may be able to instantiate ‘unstable’ combinations of epistemic policy elements 
(e.g. by violating the law of non-contradiction). 
 In both of the remaining corpora, one journal represents each 
epistemological archetype, and two journals represent a “mixed” position that 
seems to tolerate both archetypal positions to some extent. The structure of the 
psychology corpus is shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3 Structure of the psychology corpus (PsyC) 
Epistemological 
archetype 
Journal Articles Words 
Science Experimental Psychology 10 71547 
Mixed British Journal of Psychology 10 88680 
British Journal of Social 
Psychology 
10 131198 
Arts Feminism and Psychology 10 94797 
TOTAL  40 386222 
 
 
Experimental Psychology states on its website that its scope is ‘defined by the 
experimental method’. This method implies that knowledge is possible 〈S+〉, and 
53 http://newleftreview.org/submission_guidelines 
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it also implies an investigative policy of objectivism 〈Iobj〉. Furthermore, like 
Science and Nature, this journal refers to an unproblematic ‘exchange of 
information’, suggesting realism about truth 〈Treal〉. 
 
 
The Aims and Scope 
As its name implies, Experimental Psychology (ISSN 1618-3169) 
publishes innovative, original, high-quality experimental research in 
psychology —quickly! It aims to provide a particularly fast outlet for 
such research, relying heavily on electronic exchange of information 
which begins with the electronic submission of manuscripts, and 
continues throughout the entire review and production process. The 
scope of the journal is defined by the experimental method, and so 
papers based on experiments from all areas of psychology are 
published. In addition to research articles, Experimental Psychology 
includes occasional theoretical and review articles.54 
 
 
The next two journals also publish research in a wider variety of specialisms in 
psychology, but without the proviso of experimental methods. The British Journal 
of Psychology (BJP) makes repeated reference to its preference for research that 
transcends disciplinary boundaries, including taking ‘contrasting methodological 
or theoretical approaches to a single topic’. This seems to state that a range of 
epistemic policies is tolerated in principle. Furthermore, BJP publishes articles on 
the history of psychology as well as empirical studies. It is not clear what is meant 
by the ‘critical’ in ‘critical reviews of the literature’, but, in the absence of any 
reference to critical theory per se, the overall outlook of BJP appears to align 
more towards the Science archetype than the Arts. 
 
 
54 http://www.hogrefe.com/periodicals/experimental-psychology/about-the-journal-the-
editors/ 
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3.1.1.1 Aims and Scope 
The British Journal of Psychology (BJP) publishes original research on 
all aspects of general psychology including cognition; health and clinical 
psychology; developmental, social and occupational psychology.  
We attract a large number of international submissions each year which 
make major contributions across the range of psychology, particularly 
where the work has the following characteristics: 
• articles or groups of articles dealing with topics which are of interest to
researchers from more than one specialism; 
• section of psychology or which address topics or issues at the interface
between different specialisms or sections of psychology; 
• articles or groups of articles which take different or contrasting
methodological or theoretical approaches to a single topic; 
• articles or groups of articles dealing with novel areas, theories or
methodologies; 
• integrative reviews, particularly where the review offers new analysis
(e.g. meta-analysis), new theory or new implications for practice; 
• articles or groups of articles dealing with the history of psychology;
• inter-disciplinary work, where the contribution from, or to,
psychological theory or practice is clear. 
It enjoys a wide international readership and features reports of empirical 
studies, critical reviews of the literature and theoretical contributions 
which aim to further our understanding of psychology. 
The journal additionally publishes a small number of invited articles by 
people who lead their field on a topic that provokes discussion. These 
articles include a short peer commentary.55 
The British Journal of Social Psychology (BJSP) also caters to a wide variety of 
specialisms, including ‘language and discourse’, welcoming ‘both qualitative and 
quantitative methods’. Like BJP, BJSP wants research that is ‘relevant to a wide 
range’ of researchers in that discipline, which points to realism about truth 〈Treal〉. 
This pair of journals appear to depart somewhat from the Science archetype in 
their scope, e.g. by the explicit mention of ‘discourse’ as a research object, which 
can suggest skepticism about knowledge and non-realism about truth 〈So, Tnon〉, 
although both journals are quite muted about the Arts side (cf. e.g. the mission 
statement of Tamara above). 
55 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)2044-8295/homepage/ 
ProductInformation.html 
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3.1.1.2 Author Guidelines 
The British Journal of Social Psychology publishes original papers in all 
areas of social psychology. Topics covered include social cognition, 
attitudes, group processes, social influence, intergroup relations, self and 
identity, nonverbal communication, and social psychological aspects of 
personality, affect and emotion, and language and discourse. Submissions 
addressing these topics from a variety of approaches and methods, both 
quantitative and qualitative are welcomed.56 
 
3.1.1.3 Aims and Scope 
We publish papers of the following kinds: 
• empirical papers that address theoretical issues; 
• theoretical papers, including analyses of existing social psychological 
theories and presentations of theoretical innovations, extensions, or 
integrations; 
• review papers that provide an evaluation of work within a given area of 
social psychology and that present proposals for further research in that 
area; 
• methodological papers concerning issues that are particularly relevant 
to a wide range of social psychologists; 
• brief reports that can include research studies or theoretical 
contributions; 
• an invited agenda article as the first article in the first part of every 
volume.57 
 
 
The final psychology journal is Feminism & Psychology (F&P) which concerns 
itself with feminist theory ‘in and beyond psychology’. It intends its published 
articles to cross the ‘academic/applied ‘divide’’, which is a similar integrative 
intent to the two Mixed psychology journals. However, psychology is 
subordinated to feminist theory in the mission statement of this journal, and there 
is also an expression of an emancipatory aim to represent ‘a range of feminist 
voices including those under-represented in psychology journals’. The suggestion 
of this aim is that those voices will contribute unique perspectives in virtue of 
56 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%292044-8309/
homepage/ForAuthors.html 
 
57 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)2044-8309/homepage/
ProductInformation.html 
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their social characteristics, their lived experiences, their subjectivities. This points 
to non-realism about truth 〈Tnon〉, and a subjective investigative perspective 〈Isubj〉. 
F&P thus appears to align with the Arts epistemological archetype. 
 
Feminism & Psychology is an international peer reviewed journal that 
provides a forum for debate at the interface between feminism and 
psychology. The journal's principal aim is to foster the development of 
feminist theory and practice in and beyond psychology. It publishes high-
quality original research, theoretical articles, and commentaries.58 
 
Feminism and Psychology offers an intellectually and politically 
charged archive of historic and contemporary lines of analysis within 
feminism and psychology, across continents. 
“I can’t imagine writing an article – or teaching a course -- within 
psychology, or feminism, without immersing myself in the F & P index 
for the most provocative thinking on the topic. F & P is the perfect 
graduation gift for young feminist scholars who are beginning – or 
completing – doctoral work; it offers, at once, an orientation to our 
delicious conversations about theory, method and politics, and a textual 
pajama party among transnational feminists engaged in psychological 
work. Whether I am teaching a course on the history of psychology, 
gender, sexuality or methods, F& P is where I turn first to search for 
articles and to track contemporary lines of argument, analysis and 
feminist vision. It’s my guide, my conscience and my 
intellectual/political ‘stimulant’.” Michelle Fine 
Feminism & Psychology fosters the development of feminist theory and 
practice in psychology and represents the concerns of women in a wide 
range of contexts across the academic/applied ‘divide’. 
Cutting-Edge Feminist Research and Debate 
Feminism & Psychology has established itself as the leading 
international forum for cutting-edge feminist research and debate in - and 
beyond - psychology. The journal fosters the development of feminist 
theory and practice in psychology by publishing: 
• A range of high-quality theoretical and empirical papers 
• Dialogue, debate and commentary at the interface of feminism and 
psychology 
• Articles integrating research, practice and broader social concerns 
• Papers spanning the academic-practitioner 'divide' and representing a 
range of feminist voices including those under-represented in psychology 
journals59 
 
 
58 http://www.sagepub.com/journals/Journal200868/manuscriptSubmission#
tabview=manuscriptSubmission 
59 http://www.sagepub.com/journals/Journal200868/manuscriptSubmission#tabview=title 
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The last of the three corpora is the sociolinguistics corpus, whose structure 
is shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Structure of the sociolinguistics corpus (SLC) 
Epistemological archetype Journal Articles Words 
Science Language Variation and Change 15 119323 
Mixed Journal of Sociolinguistics 10 110673 
Language in Society 10 121478 
Arts Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 10 123864 
TOTAL  45 475338 
 
 
Language Variation and Change (LVC) focuses ‘exclusively’ on variationist 
sociolinguistics, which it defines in terms of the impact of culture and society on 
‘the structures and processes of traditional linguistics’. The research object is 
‘linguistic structure’, which resonates with formal linguistics, but the context is 
‘actual speech production and processing’. The word ‘actual’ is suggestive of 
realism about truth 〈Treal〉. LVC is edited by William Labov, who, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, was a pioneer of classical variationism, i.e. positivistic, structuralist 
sociolinguistics. All this points towards a Science epistemological archetype: 
 
 
Language Variation and Change is the only journal dedicated 
exclusively to the study of linguistic variation and the capacity to deal 
with systematic and inherent variation in synchronic and diachronic 
linguistics. Sociolinguistics involves analysing the interaction of 
language, culture and society; the more specific study of variation is 
concerned with the impact of this interaction on the structures and 
processes of traditional linguistics. Language Variation and Change 
concentrates on the details of linguistic structure in actual speech 
production and processing (or writing), including contemporary or 
historical sources.60 
 
60 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=LVC 
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The Journal of Sociolinguistics (JSocio) has a wider scope than LVC, aiming to be 
both ‘thoroughly linguistic and thoroughly social-scientific’. In its mission 
statement, JSocio also describes itself as a ‘multidisciplinary’ forum, where 
language can be approached as formal features, abstract discourses or situated 
talk. In the review of the sociolinguistics of style in Chapter 2, we saw that 
concern with the situated character of talk is associated more with linguistic 
anthropological research than with classical variationism. JSocio thus appears to 
represent both Science and Arts epistemological archetypes. 
 
 
3.1.1.4 Overview 
Now publishing 5 issues per volume, Journal of Sociolinguistics has 
established itself as an international forum for multidisciplinary 
research on language and society. 
Journal of Sociolinguistics promotes sociolinguistics as a thoroughly 
linguistic and thoroughly social-scientific endeavour. The journal is 
concerned with language in all its dimensions, macro and micro, as 
formal features or abstract discourses, as situated talk or written text. 
Data in published articles represent a wide range of languages, regions 
and situations - from Alune to Xhosa, from Cameroun to Canada, 
from bulletin boards to dating ads. 
 
 
3.1.1.5 Aims and Scope 
• The journal publishes occasional thematic issues on new topics of 
wide relevance to sociolinguistics, such as ‘Styling the Other’ (1999, 
edited by Ben Rampton) and ‘Non-standard orthography and non-
standard speech’ (2000, edited by Alexandra Jaffe). 
• We publish and encourage articles that build or critique sociolinguistic 
theory, and the application of recent social theory to language data and 
issues. 
• The journal's Dialogue section carries opinion pieces and exchanges 
between scholars on topical issues, including Jan Blommaert, Tove 
Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson on sociolinguistics and 
linguistic human rights.61 
 
 
61 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9841/homepage/
ProductInformation.html 
                                                     
139 
 
Language in Society (LiS) explicitly mentions both sociolinguistics and linguistic 
anthropology as part of its remit. LiS aims to strengthen ‘inter-disciplinary 
conversation’, but also to transmit information ‘of general interest’. This suggests 
both that knowledge may be being viewed as both linguistically constructed 
interaction, and as universal, apparently representing both Science and Arts 
epistemological archetypes as did JSocio. 
 
Language in Society is an international journal of sociolinguistics 
concerned with language and discourse as aspects of social life. The 
journal publishes empirical articles of general theoretical, comparative 
or methodological interest to students and scholars in sociolinguistics, 
linguistic anthropology, and related fields. Language in Society aims 
to strengthen international scholarship and inter-disciplinary 
conversation and cooperation among researchers interested in 
language and society by publishing work of high quality which speaks 
to a wide audience. In addition to original articles, the journal 
publishes reviews and notices of the latest important books in the field 
as well as occasional theme and discussion sections.62 
 
 
The Journal of Linguistic Anthropology (JLA) represents a plurality of 
linguistic constructionist approaches to the study of language, and I suggest 
therefore that it aligns with the Arts epistemological archetype. 
 
 
3.1.1.6 Overview 
The Journal of Linguistic Anthropology explores the many ways in 
which language shapes social life. Published in the journal’s pages are 
articles on the anthropological study of language, including analysis of 
discourse, language in society, language and cognition, and language 
acquisition and socialization. The Journal of Linguistic 
Anthropology is published three times per year. 
 
 
I have argued in this section that the three corpora of research articles together 
represent the recursive epistemological structure of academia. The TCC contains 
articles from two journals representing the Arts, and two journals representing 
62 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=LSY 
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Science. Within both the sociolinguistics (SLC) and psychology (PsyC) corpora, 
this distinction is recapitulated with two journals representing the epistemological 
archetypes, and two journals of intermediate character. In other words, the 
epistemological difference found at larger scales resembles that at smaller scales. 
This parallelism is represented in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 Summary of the epistemological character of journals 
 Arts 
〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 
Science 
〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 
TCC Tamara, NLR Science, Nature 
PsyC F&P BJSP, BJP ExP 
SLC JLA LiS, JSocio LVC 
 
If epistemological difference is indexed by linguistic difference as argued here 
(after Irvine and Gal 2000), and if the same linguistic features are used to index 
the epistemological position at inter- and intra-disciplinary levels, then whatever 
patterns of linguistic differentiation are observed in TCC should recur in PsyC and 
SLC. This and subsequent predictions are summarized before the results section, 
below. 
In the next section I explain which variables I have considered that could 
potentially account for variation, and I will describe the linguistic variables 
investigated in the present chapter. 
 
3.2 Variables 
 
I said at the start of this chapter that I aim here to evaluate whether the 
relationship between language and epistemology is amenable to quantitative 
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sociolinguistic analysis by answering the question: is there in fact quantitative 
evidence of linguistic variation according to epistemological commitments? I now 
clarify the variables to be examined in this exploratory study. 
 
3.2.1 Epistemic policy 
 
I have used the terms Science and Arts to stand for epistemological archetypes. 
These are the clusters of epistemic policy elements that I argue are stable in the 
context of academia where norms of e.g. non-contradiction, and explicit 
justification of knowledge claims, tend to make certain epistemic policy element 
combinations untenable (see Chapter 1). While individuals will have access to a 
range of epistemic policies which they apply to different situations, when it comes 
to presenting that research in a peer-reviewed journal, I claim that the Science and 
Arts policy bundles are the only options in the academy. We saw above that NLR 
and Tamara distanced themselves from the academy, and I argue that this makes 
their writers more likely to adopt policy clusters that would be unstable within the 
academic system. Thus we have a two-fold distinction between Arts and Science. 
One is that some of their epistemic policy elements take different forms: 
 
Science 〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 
and 
Arts  〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 
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The second point of difference is that Arts disciplines may, to a greater or lesser 
extent, “hold the academy at arm’s length”. In other words, scholars who use the 
Arts epistemic policy bundle, being aware of the institutional pressures on those 
epistemological commitments, partially reject that institution, while also still 
engaging with it by having departments in universities, publishing research 
articles etc. These Arts scholars are therefore more able to access a wider range of 
epistemic policies than if they fully subscribed to institutional norms in the 
academy. In contrast, scholars who use the Science policy bundle either lack this 
reflexive sensibility, or they do not allow it to question their epistemic 
commitments in this radical way. Rather, they tend to access a relatively narrow 
range of epistemic policies (epistemic policy range is abbreviated to EPR): 
 
 Science 〈S+, KJTB, Jint, Treal, Iobj〉 Narrow EPR 
 Arts  〈So, KJB, Jint, Tnon, Isubj〉 Wide EPR 
 
In this thesis I describe epistemological variation in terms of epistemic policy and 
EPR. In this chapter, I operationalize the archetypal epistemic policies as journal 
of publication (see Table 3.5 above), and then I look at the related linguistic 
variation. I am thus examining variation at the inter-disciplinary (TCC) and intra-
disciplinary levels (PsyC, SLC). 
 
3.2.2 Other external variables 
 
Sociodemographic variables such as sex, nation (of institutional affiliation) and 
age of author were not examined since the low number of authors (10 per 
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journal), combined with the distorting effect of editing and peer review, would 
render inferences about these variables in general highly problematic. There was 
some indication that the number of authors had a small effect on modal verb use, 
but this variable was eliminated from this analysis so as to be more fully explored 
in future work via a study better suited to capturing intersubjective stance 
construction. 
Article subsection (e.g. abstract, conclusion, etc) was not considered as a 
variable here. Swales (1990) argues that article subsections are different enough 
from one another in their communicative purpose to constitute separate genres. 
This suggests that, in a whole-article comparison, the discipline-specific patterns 
under investigation here would be obscured by the stylistic variation between 
article sections common to all disciplines. However, Swales also notes that it is 
not clear that the various subsections of articles (e.g. abstract, discussion) 
constitute the same genres in different disciplines (e.g. a lecture on physics has 
quite different expectations and communicative purposes from a lecture on 
literary criticism). Furthermore, an article in e.g. LVC has well-delimited sections 
with titles such as “variables” and “results”, which are not found in journals such 
as Tamara or NLR. Even in the small number of cases where a common structural 
element can be identified, then, such as “introduction”, a comparison across 
epistemologically disparate journals would challenge the validity of this category. 
I therefore compare whole articles. While this is a coarse-grained approach, I 
suggest that it is analytically no less valid than a section-by-section comparison 
for comparisons across very divergent disciplines.  
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A further consideration is the size of the audience of the journal. A wide 
readership, such as that of Science or Nature, could encourage a style of writing 
that promotes the disciplinary ideals to a more self-conscious (or editorially 
engineered) degree than some of the more esoteric journals of smaller readership. 
A smaller readership might lend itself to practices of “preaching to the choir”, i.e. 
a drift of style towards a looser or more radical epistemological standpoint than 
would be admissible to mainstream disciplinary standards. Conversely, an explicit 
statement of epistemological commitments might be less necessary in a journal of 
smaller readership since such commitments may already be understood through 
other channels. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, discourse communities of 
different sizes have qualitatively different mechanisms for critical interaction 
among themselves (Swales 1990). Science is a relatively homogeneous and 
populous discourse community, whereas Arts is a composite of heterogeneous and 
smaller discourse communities. The difference in size of audience, then, rather 
than being a variable to be controlled or examined separately, may be considered 
as a feature of relative epistemological homogeneity, rather than a variable which 
is orthogonal to epistemological commitments. 
Though the variables discussed in this section are of interest and 
importance to sociolinguistic and AE research, they are of limited validity in the 
context of the present study which looks at relatively small numbers of texts 
across a spectrum of genres edited by relatively few people. The articles 
considered will however be able to address the research questions at hand. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of vast numbers of predictor variables risks 
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invalidating the results of statistical analysis, even where a cross-tabulation could 
be adequately populated by including more tokens.  
 
3.2.3 Dependent variables 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, modality is of central importance in the linguistic 
materialization of epistemic stance, because modal language conveys how certain 
you are about what you are saying. For this reason, I look at modal verbs and 
modal adverbs in this chapter. I also look at a class of verbs that seems 
particularly pertinent in the construction of epistemological difference: evidential 
verbs. Evidential verbs (e.g. demonstrate, prove, argue, claim) convey how you 
conceive of, and justify, the knowledge claim you are making. Is it the claim 
about a situation “out there” in the world for all to see, or is it a discursively 
constructed object whose “reality” is mind-dependent? In this section I explain 
how these verbs are analysed as linguistic variables whose variants are predicted 
to depend on epistemic policy. 
I focus in the present chapter on the linguistic materialization of three 
epistemic policy elements: S-policy, K-policy and I-policy. J-policy is likely to be 
difficult to analyse via corpus analysis since it would likely require carefully 
contrived questioning as seen in the discussion of ‘Truetemp cases’ in Chapter 1. 
Furthermore, externalism about justification 〈Jext〉 is likely to be strongly 
disfavoured in research articles, as discussed above. It is possible that T-policy 
would correlate with plural marking, e.g. the acceptance of non-realism about 
about truth 〈Tnon〉 implies the existence of multiple truths, while a realist would 
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only refer to the truth. However, such plural use is likely to be too infrequent for 
quantitative analysis. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that K-policy relates to one’s analysis of 
knowledge. I argued that academics in general assume that believing a proposition 
is a necessary criterion for knowing that proposition. They generally also require 
some form of justification for their claims to be considered as knowledge claims, 
although the acceptable forms of justification vary among the disciplines. 
Whether they believe that their claims have to be true in order to count as 
knowledge is a matter of dispute because the nature of truth is contested, leading 
to K-policies of 〈KJTB〉 or 〈KJB〉. While many academics might be too 
epistemically modest to claim to be discovering truths, the discursive treatment of 
truth in Science disciplines is quite different from Arts. In the former, discussion 
about the nature of truth is rare or absent, while in the Arts it is not uncommon to 
reflect on the nature of truth, whether implicitly or explicitly, for example via the 
Foucauldian notion of truth regimes. S-policy relates to skepticism, e.g. perhaps 
most relevantly here, epistemism 〈S+〉, the position that knowledge is possible, 
versus Pyrrhonian skepticism 〈So〉, the position of non-committal to either the 
possibility or impossibility of knowledge. I-policy relates to the position of an 
investigator with respect to the object of their inquiry, i.e. whether objectivity is 
assumed 〈Iobj〉, or whether the research findings are considered to be necessarily 
relative to the investigator’s subjectivity 〈Isubj〉. 
As reviewed above, although the various knowledge polices could in 
principle give rise to many combinations of policy bundles, in practice, some 
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combinations are difficult to maintain under sustained interrogation of the sort 
that is routine in academia. The stable variants relevant in this section are: 
 
Science  〈S+, KJTB, Iobj〉 
and 
Arts   〈So, KJB, Isubj〉 
 
Below I explore some potential linguistic correlates of these variants of S-policy, 
K-policy and I-policy. A major focus here is on modality since this relates to the 
expression of certainty, which is central to the notion of epistemology. I suggest 
that one’s beliefs about the possibility of certain knowledge (S-policy and K-
policy) influence whether and when one expresses certainty about knowledge. 
Modal logic makes use of two primitive forms of modality, and I adopt this binary 
distinction since it is the most conservative modal classification (Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002; though cf. Holmes 1990; Kärkkäinen 2003): 
 
□p it is necessary that p  “strong modality” 
◊p it is possible that p  “weak modality” 
 
These two modal strengths can be applied to different semantic frames in order to 
capture more of the modal variation found in English, for example, the epistemic 
frame concerns the status of propositions as knowledge (i.e. propositions which 
must or may be true, given what is known), while the deontic frame concerns 
propositions as obligations or duties (i.e. propositions which must or may be 
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required by rules to be enacted). Although well established in the semantics 
literature (see e.g. Portner 2009: 11–24), frames such as epistemic and deontic 
rather depend on one’s understanding of rules and obligations, and this is subject 
to variation depending on one’s individual epistemology. For example, a 
syllogism is a logical argument of the following form: 
 
Major premise  All men are mortal. 
Minor premise Socrates is a man. 
Conclusion  Socrates is mortal. 
 
Syllogisms are examples of deductive reasoning where, if the premises are true, 
the conclusion must be true. However, the interpretation of must as epistemic or 
deontic is relative to one’s beliefs about the validity of deductive reasoning. The 
classical (KJTB) interpretation of this definition of deductive reasoning would be 
that must here serves as a nomic modal, i.e. that it means that the truth of the 
conclusion is necessary given the laws of logic. One of the laws of logic is the law 
of non-contradiction. We saw earlier that this law is subject to dispute, although it 
is strongly preferred in the academy. An anti-classical interpretation, dispensing 
with the requirement of the absolute truth of knowledge, could reject the validity 
of deductive reasoning, and rather maintain that the word must here is a deontic 
modal, i.e. that the necessity of the truth of the conclusion is dependent on the 
assumptions of classical logic, which is not an absolute nomic requirement. In this 
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case then, must uses an arbitrary system of rules as its modal base63, which are no 
more necessary than the social conventions or laws that, in other situations, give 
must a deontic interpretation to the classicist. 
I have argued that what is classically known as epistemic modality is only distinct 
from other forms of modality within a classical epistemology. Since I am also 
examining epistemological positions that diverge from the classical, I argue that 
this distinction is not analytically valid across the epistemological range 
represented by my corpora. Even if it were valid, epistemic modality is likely to 
be the majority classical classification in academic writing: Piqué-Agordans et al. 
(2002) found that the proportions in their corpus of journals of literary criticism, 
biology and medicine were 88.33% epistemic and 11.67% deontic. I will not 
adopt an analytic distinction between modal flavours in this thesis; I return to this 
argument in Chapter 6. 
My choice of which specific modal verbs to examine builds on Piqué-
Agordans et al., who chose the following modal verbs based on work by Quirk, 
Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik (1985) and Downing and Locke (2002): can, 
could, dare, may, might, must, need, ought, shall, should, will, and would. I 
restrict my choice to the most common variants among these. I omit dare, ought, 
and shall, which were entirely absent from one or more of my corpora; and need 
which is conjugable and may thus not pattern with canonical modal verbs. I 
eliminate could and can too since they change their meanings asymmetrically 
when combined with not. What I mean by this is that, while must not and will not 
63 The modal base (Kratzer 1977) is the thing in view of which a modalized proposition is 
interpreted. For example, epistemic modality is interpreted in view of what is known, while deontic 
modality is interpreted in view of the rules. 
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are still strong modals, cannot and could not are scopally ambiguous between the 
following two readings: 
 
not(can) ¬◊a = □¬a 
 
i.e. “it is not possible that a” is the same as “necessarily not a”, which is strong 
rather than weak. Contrast this with: 
 
can(not)  ◊¬a = ¬□a 
 
i.e. “a is possibly not true” is the same as “it is not the case that a must be true”, in 
other words, a is only possibly true, which is still weak. I suggest that both 
readings are generally available for cannot and could not, although one or other 
may be more contextually likely in any particular case. However, the judgement 
of which one is the most likely intended reading depends not merely on contextual 
facts. It also depends on which facts are seen as relevant, i.e it depends on the 
epistemic policy of the reader (and writer). May not also only receives a strong 
reading if it is taken in terms of permission, i.e. as a deontic modal, which I am 
assuming is a minority case (given Piqué-Angordans et al. 2002). I contend that 
might not is virtually impossible to read as a (strong) deontic modal in 
contemporary Standard English. Since the scopal ambiguity of cannot and could 
not means that interpretation is dependent on a presupposed epistemic policy, I 
eliminate cases of modal verbs with adjacent not from this analysis. 
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It is possible that the strength of these modal verbs could be modulated by adverbs 
(e.g. possibly must, or certainly might, both of whose complements would receive 
the opposite epistemic force reading from that of the modal verb). In fact, such 
collocations were rare in my corpora, with only 3 instances of a modal verb being 
immediately followed by a modal adverb.  
 
Table 3.6 Coding distinctions for modal verbs 
 
Strong (necessity) 
 
 
must, will 
 
Weak (possibility) 
 
 
may, might 
 
 
Will is commonly used to mark the future tense, and its optionality as a future 
marker is separate from its optionality as a marker of strong modal commitment. 
However, all modal verbs can convey futurity in addition to modality. In other 
words, while the verbs in Table 3.6 are etymologically diverse, I suggest that they 
are functionally differentiated only in the dimension of modal strength (see 
discussion in Chapter 2), which is in contrast to other excluded verbs such as can 
and dare which convey additional semantic content). 
In addition to modal verbs, I also examined 4 adverbs with (epistemic) 
modal character, chosen from the small number of adverbs listed in Table 2.1 
(Chapter 2, based on Biber et al. 1999). These adverbs may be classified as strong 
or weak in the same way as the modal verbs above. There were only 4 tokens of 
definitely, so this variant was omitted. Likely and unlikely were excluded because 
they are ambiguous between being adjectives and adverbs; and perhaps was 
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excluded because it is morphologically different from the rest of this class (i.e. it 
lacks the ly suffix). These linguistic considerations would have introduced 
potentially confounding factors. Eliminating these also made the sample of 
adverbs more balanced between the rarer strong forms and the more common 
weak forms. 
 
Table 3.7 Coding distinctions for modal adverbs 
 
Strong (necessity) 
 
 
certainly, necessarily 
 
Weak (possibility) 
 
 
possibly, probably 
 
 
Again, I suggest that these four forms, while etymologically heterogeneous, are 
functionally equivalent, and can therefore be considered variants of a single 
variable (see discussion in Chapter 2). Across all three corpora, 41 out of 89 
tokens of necessarily occurred in not necessarily, and such cases were coded as 
weak (since ¬□a = ◊a). 2 out of 58 tokens of possibly occurred in not possibly, 
and were thus coded as strong (¬◊a = □¬a). Adverbs followed by not do not 
appear to have their strength changed: ‘necessarily not a’ is still strong, and 
‘possibly not a’ is still weak.  
Finally, I investigate the linguistic correlate of I-policy (investigative 
position) by looking at evidential verbs with subjectivity or objectivity as part of 
their semantic content. Alethic modality relates to the truth of a proposition; its 
logical necessity or contingency, its possibility or impossibility, its truth or falsity. 
This kind of truth is taken to be objective, i.e. speaker-independent truth-in-the-
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world. Epistemic modality on the other hand relates to the status of a proposition 
as knowledge, and thus relates a proposition to a mind, subjectively, as truth-in-
the-mind. Alethic and epistemic modality is not distinguished via modal verbs, 
and their semantic distinction is a matter of dispute. Von Wright (1951) and 
Lyons (1977) suggest an analytic distinction between alethic and epistemic 
modality, although Nuyts (2000) notes that these modalities are not distinguished 
formally in English, or perhaps in any language. Cinque (1999) proposes that 
these forms are distinguished syntactically via functional projections, although 
this will not be examined here. A putative alethic/epistemic distinction will be 
explored by examining the distribution of lexical verbs related to the status and 
assertion of knowledge, i.e. evidential verbs in the broad sense (Chafe and 
Nichols 1986: 261). 
 
Table 3.8 Coding distinctions for evidential verbs 
 
Alethic (speaker-independent) 
 
 
demonstrate, prove, indicate, show 
 
Epistemic (speaker-dependent) 
 
 
think, believe, know, infer, expect, argue, claim 
 
 
Table 3.9 summarizes my predictions for these three variables, which I then 
explain below. 
 
Table 3.9 Prediction summary 
Archetype Policy elements EPR Modality Evidential verbs 
Arts 〈So, KJB, Isubj〉 wide strong > weak epistemic > alethic 
Science 〈S+, KJTB, Iobj〉 narrow weak > strong alethic > epistemic 
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The epistemological archetypes are listed in Table 3.9 together with the epistemic 
policy elements relevant to the present discussion. Also given is the corresponding 
epistemic policy range (EPR) of each archetype. The two right-hand columns 
make predictions for the relative distributions of strong and weak modality 
(including verbal and adverbial), and for alethic and epistemic evidential verbs, 
which I discuss now in reverse order. 
First, evidential verbs. In the case of Arts, where the prevailing I-policy is 
one of investigative subjectivism 〈Isubj〉, I predict that epistemic evidential verbs 
will be preferred over alethic evidential verbs. In other words, I predict that an I-
policy that treats epistemic subjectivity as an irreducible aspect of knowledge 
claims will dispose speakers to frame their claims as knowledge rather than as 
truth, and that they will materialize this by preferring epistemic verbs over alethic 
ones. In the case of Science, I predict that the opposite pattern will obtain since 
the prevailing I-policy is investigative objectivism 〈Iobj〉. This I-policy considers 
knowledge claims not to be dependent on epistemic subjectivity, but rather to be 
mind-independent. I predict that this will dispose speakers to favour alethic 
evidential verbs over epistemic ones. 
Lastly, modality. These predictions are based on K-policy and EPR. The 
K-policy of Arts 〈KJB〉 is less stringent than that of Science 〈KJTB〉. Furthermore, 
the Arts are relatively permissive in respect of the epistemic policies they tolerate, 
i.e. they have a relatively wide epistemic policy range (EPR) when compared to 
Science. On this basis, I predict that discourses and individuals who align with the 
Arts archetypal epistemic policy bundle will generally make stronger claims than 
those who align with Science. This is because their criteria for claiming certainty 
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are less strict. Conversely, the discourses of Science are predicted to sound 
relatively cautious by using a higher frequency of weaker modals than strong. 
I have constructed three corpora to reflect the recursive pattern of epistemological 
differentiation that I argue is found in academia. Given this recursivity, I predict 
that the patterns described in Table 3.9 will be recapitulated in all three corpora to 
some extent. It is likely that the epistemological diversity of the Two Cultures 
corpus is greater than that of the two disciplinary corpora, and that the TCC will 
have a correspondingly more exaggerated pattern of variation. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
In this section I summarize the distributional properties of all three variables, and 
then interpret them in light of the predictions above. I first look at evidential verbs 
in Section 3.3.1, then modal verbs in Section 3.3.2 and finally modal adverbs in 
Section 3.3.3.  
Pearson’s χ2 test of independence is performed on raw counts (i.e. 
numbers of words rather than frequencies) throughout to establish whether the 
relevant groups are statistically significantly likely to be independent of each 
other.64 This is to lend quantitative support to the interpretation of patterns in the 
data in terms of epistemology by increasing confidence that those patterns would 
not be better explained as due to chance. 
64 Recall from the thesis outline that I am following Dines’ (1980) recommendation to initially use 
a frequency-based analysis. Frequencies will be compared, and the significance of the differences 
between them will be tested on the raw count data (i.e. numbers of tokens). ANOVA testing—
which is used in later chapters—would not be appropriate for testing these raw count data since 
only the total counts over multiple research articles were recorded. 
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I adopt the standard social sciences alpha level of 0.05. This means that if a χ2 test 
returns a p-value of 0.05 or less, then that will count as a significant result. This 
means that, if the χ2 test determines that there is only a 0.05 probability that the 
result was due to chance, then that will be judged as sufficiently unlikely to count 
as not being due to chance. 
In some cases, multiple χ2 tests are performed on the same data. This 
increases the risk of type I error. In other words, by testing the same data lots of 
times, one runs the risk of finding an apparently significant result by chance. To 
counter this possibility, the alpha level should be reduced during multiple 
comparisons. If 20 tests are performed on the same data, then alpha should get 20 
times smaller. This is called Bonferroni correction (Dunn 1961). Most of my p-
values are too small to be affected by Bonferroni correction, but where this is not 
the case, I have indicated that the alpha level should be adjusted down. 
 
3.3.1 Evidential verbs 
 
Recall that alethic evidential verbs present information as “mind-independent”, or 
in terms of objective reality, whereas epistemic evidential verbs present 
information as “mind-dependent”, or in terms of subjective knowledge (see Table 
3.8 above). 
Table 3.10 shows the numbers and frequencies per mil (‰) of evidential 
verbs in the three corpora. Each corpus is broken down according to the 
epistemological archetypes Science, Arts and “Mixed”, with the total word count 
157 
 
shown for each sub-corpus. The Two Cultures corpus does not contain any Mixed 
journals.  
 
 
Table 3.10 Number and frequency (‰) of evidential verbs 
Corpus Division Alethic Epistemic Total words 
  N (freq.) N (freq.) in sub-corpus 
TCC Science 456 (4.249) 56 (0.522) 107322 Arts 108 (0.740) 367 (2.514) 145964 
PsyC 
Science 230 (3.215) 146 (2.041) 71547 
Mixed 496 (2.256) 620 (2.820) 219878 
Arts 49 (0.517) 116 (1.224) 94797 
SLC 
Science 372 (3.118) 264 (2.212) 119323 
Mixed 435 (1.874) 664 (2.860) 232151 
Arts 126 (1.017) 322 (2.600) 123864 
 
 
The balance of alethic/evidential verbs is significantly different between Science 
and Arts. The difference is in the same direction as predicted, and it is regularly 
repeated in all three corpora. The following figures and discussion elucidate these 
findings further.  
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Figure 3.1 Frequency of evidential verbs in the TCC 
(χ2 = 442.61; df = 1; p < 0.001)65 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the frequency distribution in the Science and Arts journals of 
the TCC. Alethic verbs are about 8 times more frequent than epistemic verbs in 
Science journals. The opposite distribution obtains in Arts journals, where 
epistemic verbs are about 4 times more frequent than alethic verbs. These 
distributions agree qualitatively with prediction. 
 Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the balance of evidential verbs in the 
psychology corpus and the sociolinguistics corpus respectively. The Science and 
Arts journals within those corpora exhibit the same kind of pattern as those in the 
TCC. The Mixed journals follow the Arts pattern qualitatively, while they differ 
quantitatively. 
 
65 p-values below graphs refer to omnibus statistics for all data represented. 
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Figure 3.2 Frequency of evidential verbs in the PsyC 
(χ2 = 53.06; df = 2; p < 0.001) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Frequency of evidential verbs in SLC 
(χ2 = 108.05; df = 2; p < 0.001) 
 
Both the PsyC and SLC recapitulate the TCC pattern qualitatively, but to a 
smaller quantitative degree. Science journals use around 1.5 times more alethic 
verbs than epistemic verbs, while Arts journals use around twice as many 
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epistemic than alethic verbs. Pairwise comparisons between Science and Mixed, 
and between Mixed and Arts journals were all significant in both the PsyC and the 
SLC.66 
 This means that the significant differentiation in TCC has been recursively 
instantiated in PsyC and SLC. The disciplinary level pattern is also significant, but 
quantitatively smaller. The similarity between the PsyC and SLC is remarkable. 
Both these corpora represent different disciplines, but they share virtually 
identical differentiation with respect to their use of evidential verbs. This is strong 
evidence that these verbs are linked to the epistemological differentiation on the 
basis of which the corpora were assembled. 
 The Mixed journals were described earlier as being tolerant of diverse 
approaches, but as being overall more scientific in character. The Mixed journals 
however appear to use their evidential verbs in a manner that qualitatively 
resembles the Arts, i.e. with more epistemic than alethic verbs, although the 
Mixed patterns are statistically significantly different from the Arts. I suggest then 
that tolerance of other epistemic policies may be a better predictor of evidential 
language use than the details of one’s epistemic policy. In other words, I propose 
that the qualitative similarity between Arts and Mixed journals in the PsyC and 
SLC is due to their sharing a relatively wide epistemic policy range (EPR). The 
Science journals in contrast have relatively narrow EPR, which associate with a 
qualitatively different distribution of evidential verb use (alethic > epistemic). The 
66In the PsyC, Science differed significantly from Mixed (χ2 = 31.49; df = 1; p < 0.001), and 
Mixed from Arts (χ2 = 12.79; df = 1; p < 0.001). 
In the SLC, Science differed significantly from Mixed (χ2 = 57.90; df = 1; p < 0.001), and Mixed 
from Arts (χ2 = 16.40; df = 1; p < 0.001). 
                                                     
161 
 
explanatory utility of EPR will be evaluated against the remaining results in this 
chapter, and also in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.2 Verbal modality 
 
Recall that modal verbs were coded as weak (may, might) and strong (will, must). 
Table 3.11 shows the numbers and frequencies per mil (‰) of modal verbs in the 
three corpora. 
 
Table 3.11 Number and frequency (‰) of modal verbs 
Corpus Division Strong Weak Total words 
  N f N f in sub-corpus 
TCC Science 56 0.522 83 0.773 107322 Arts 357 2.446 234 1.603 145964 
PsyC 
Science 69 0.964 113 1.579 71547 
Mixed 314 1.428 476 2.165 219878 
Arts 50 0.527 137 1.445 94797 
SLC 
Science 178 1.492 177 1.483 119323 
Mixed 271 1.167 340 1.465 232151 
Arts 174 1.405 132 1.066 123864 
 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of strong and weak modal verbs in the TCC. The 
relative overall frequency of modal verbs in Arts and Science is quite divergent, 
with modal verbs being between 2 and 5 times more common in Arts articles. 
Again we find significant differentiation such that Science uses about 1.5 times 
more weak than strong modal verbs, and Arts uses about 1.5 times more strong 
than weak. These distributional differences agree qualitatively with prediction. 
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Figure 3.4 Frequency of modal verbs in the TCC 
(χ2 =18.54; df = 1; p< 0.001) 
 
 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the distribution of modal verbs in the psychology corpus 
and the sociolinguistics corpus respectively. This time the TCC pattern is not 
recursively instantiated in the same striking manner as before. Pairwise 
comparisons show that Science and Mixed are not significantly different from one 
another in either the PsyC or the SLC, while Mixed and Arts are significantly 
differentiated in both.67 
In the PsyC, all journals follow the TCC’s Science pattern (Figure 3.5). 
The Arts journal in PsyC uses about 3 times more weak than strong modal verbs, 
while the Science/Mixed journals use about 1.5 times more weak than strong. 
Overall then, these journals demonstrate epistemic caution, and it is the Arts 
67 In the PsyC, Science did not differ significantly from Mixed (χ2 = 0.21; df = 1; p = 0.65), 
however Mixed did differ significantly from Arts (χ2 = 10.95; df = 1; p < 0.001). 
In the SLC, Science did not differ significantly from Mixed (χ2 = 3.02; df = 1; p = 0.082), 
however Mixed did differ significantly from Arts (χ2 = 12.77; df = 1; p < 0.001). 
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journals that are particularly cautious. This runs counter to expectation. The 
behaviour of the Science journal articles however agrees with prediction. 
The Mixed journals this time match the Science pattern rather than 
matching than the Arts as was the case for evidential verbs. This presents a 
challenge for the explanatory power of EPR suggested above. If the relatively 
wide EPR of the Mixed journals could indeed account for their similarity to the 
Arts journals in respect of their distributions of evidential verbs, then it is not 
clear how a wide EPR can also account for their similarity to the Science journals 
here. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Frequency of modal verbs in the PsyC 
(χ2 = 10.96; df = 2; p = 0.004) 
 
 
In the SLC, the Arts research articles follow the same qualitative pattern as the 
Arts journals of the TCC, but to a smaller degree (see Figure 3.6 below). This 
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time the frequency of weak modal verb use is about 1.3 times higher than that of 
weak. The Mixed journals follow the TCC’s Science pattern, with around 1.3 
times more weak than strong modals. This pattern is expected given the similarity 
in evidential verbs patterns of the Mixed and Science journals. The Science 
journals do not appear to be significantly differentiated with respect to modal 
verbs, although they did not differ significantly from the Mixed ones.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Frequency of modal verbs in SLC 
(χ2 = 13.03; df = 2; p = 0.001) 
 
 
The picture for modal verbs is not as clear as it was for evidential verbs. TCC 
behaved as expected, with Science using more weak than strong, and Arts using 
more strong than weak modal verbs. However, only some aspects of this were 
recursively instantiated in the PsyC and SLC. This casts some doubt on the 
explanatory power of EPR as a predictor of evidential language behaviour.  
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3.3.3 Adverbial modality 
 
Modal verbs were coded as weak (possibly, probably) and strong (certainly, 
necessarily), and Table 3.12 shows their distributions in the three corpora. 
 
Table 3.12 Number and frequency (‰) of modal adverbs 
Corpus Division Strong Weak Total words 
  N f N f in sub-corpus 
TCC Science 3 0.028 26 0.242 107322 Arts 32 0.219 37 0.253 145964 
PsyC 
Science 3 0.042 19 0.266 71547 
Mixed 28 0.127 39 0.177 219878 
Arts 6 0.063 10 0.105 94797 
SLC 
Science 12 0.101 36 0.302 119323 
Mixed 30 0.129 41 0.177 232151 
Arts 19 0.153 20 0.161 123864 
 
 
 
Again, these variants are more frequent in Arts articles, and there are very low 
token numbers in the Science articles of the TCC and PsyC. Figure 3.7 shows the 
distribution of strong and weak modal adverbs in the TCC. Here the distributional 
differences within Science agree qualitatively with prediction, while those in Arts 
do not. 
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Figure 3.7 Frequency of modal adverbs in the TCC 
(χ2 =11.55; df = 1; p <0.001) 
 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the distribution of modal adverbs in the psychology 
corpus and the sociolinguistics corpora respectively. Pairwise comparisons show 
that Science and Mixed are not significantly different from one another, and 
neither are Mixed and Arts in either the PsyC or the SLC.68 
All journals follow the Science pattern with respect to their balance of 
strong and weak modal adverbs. They all use more weak than strong modal 
adverbs.  
 
68 In the PsyC, Science did not differ significantly from Mixed (χ2 = 5.78; df = 1; p = 0.049*), and 
neither did Mixed from Arts (χ2 = 0.098; df = 1; p = 0.75).  
In the SLC, Science did not differ significantly from Mixed (χ2 = 3.73; df = 1; p = 0.053), and 
neither did Mixed from Arts (χ2 = 0.43; df = 1; p = 0.51). 
*Bonferroni correction makes the alpha level here 0.05/3 = 0.17, so this is not significant. 
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Figure 3.8 Frequency of modal adverbs in the PsyC 
(χ2 = 5.80; df = 2; p = 0.055) 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Frequency of modal adverbs in SLC 
(χ2 = 5.83; df = 2;  p = 0.054) 
 
 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 give the impression of a shifting distribution from left to right. 
It appears that the Sciences have a very strong preference for weak over strong 
modal adverbs, while this preference is less strong for Mixed and Arts journals. In 
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light of the pairwise comparisons, however, this apparent difference, while 
suggestive, is not statistically significant.69 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
This chapter started from three theoretical assumptions: first, that disciplines vary 
in their tendencies to adopt various epistemic stances, and that differential patterns 
of stance-taking are related to the epistemic policies assumed within disciplines. 
Secondly, it was assumed that disciplines recursively instantiate the same patterns 
of epistemological difference internally as are proposed to exist between 
disciplines. Thirdly, it was theorized that epistemological difference is indexically 
linked to patterns of linguistic difference, and that linguistic variation would 
therefore track epistemic policy variation. In the present chapter I aimed to test 
whether linguistic variation could be predicted by epistemological variation. 
Next, I argued that epistemological variation could be operationalized by 
sampling research articles from academic journals in different disciplines, and that 
the relationship between epistemological variation and linguistic variation could 
therefore be investigated by comparing the patterns of language use across and 
within disciplines. I then applied these ideas to the three evidential variables: 
evidential verbs, modal verbs, and modal adverbs. I reproduce here the variable 
coding distinctions for these variables, as well as my predictions about their 
behaviour. 
 
69 Pairwise comparisons were also done here between Science and Arts. This was not significant in 
the PsyC (χ2 = 2.92; df = 1; p = 0.087) or SLC (χ2 = 5.28; df = 1; p = 0.022**). 
**Bonferroni correction makes the alpha level 0.05/5 = 0.01. 
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Table 3.13 Variable summary 
Modal verbs Strong must, will 
Weak may, might 
Modal adverbs Strong certainly, necessarily 
Weak possibly, probably 
Evidential verbs Alethic 
(mind-independent) 
demonstrate, prove, 
indicate, show 
Epistemic 
(mind-dependent) 
think, believe, know,  
infer, expect, argue, claim 
 
 
Table 3.14 Prediction summary 
Archetype Policy elements EPR Modality Evidential verbs 
Arts 〈So, KJB, Isubj〉 wide strong > weak epistemic > alethic 
Science 〈S+, KJTB, Iobj〉 narrow weak > strong alethic > epistemic 
 
There was striking agreement with prediction for evidential verbs: Arts journals 
used more epistemic than alethic, and Science journals more alethic than 
epistemic. This pattern was recursively instantiated in all three corpora. This 
means that scholars within single disciplines are using the same evidential 
language as that which differentiates the Arts and Science archetypes. Intra-
disciplinary (PsyC and SLC) differentiation between Arts and Science journals 
was smaller than inter-disciplinary (TCC) differentiation. This recursive 
patterning of evidential verb distribution is strong quantitative support for the 
applicability of the social semiotic processes described in Chapters 1 and 2. A 
wider EPR was suggested as an explanation for why Mixed journals resembled 
Arts more than Science in their patterns of evidential verb use. 
 Modal verbs and adverbs did not demonstrate such clear agreement with 
prediction. Modal verbs were differentially distributed according to prediction in 
the TCC. The disciplinary corpora only repeated this pattern partially. The pattern 
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for adverbs appeared to be recursively instantiated, but the more even distribution 
of Arts was not significantly different form the divergent distribution in Science. 
 In the next two chapters, I look at an expanded range of evidential 
language available in the linguistic materialization of epistemic stance. I control 
for a range of internal and external variables via linear mixed modelling, and 
compare inter-disciplinary variation with variation by epistemic policy. In this 
way I am able to investigate not only inter- and intra-disciplinary variation of the 
type explored in the corpus study here, but I also look at intra-speaker variation. 
That is, I not only look to see whether the patterns of variability that obtain in 
larger social levels are recursively instantiated at smaller scales, but I also ask 
whether they are available for stylistic variation according to topic of speech. 
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Chapter 4. Interview Methods and Results (Internal Factors) 
In Chapter 3, corpus analysis of research articles revealed cross-disciplinary 
variation in the frequency of evidential verbs, and also of modal verbs and 
adverbs. Within the “Two Cultures” corpus, Science journals preferred the more 
“objective” alethic verbs (e.g. demonstrate, show) while Arts journals preferred 
the more “subjective” epistemic verbs (e.g. believe, know). This inter-disciplinary 
pattern was recapitulated at the intra-disciplinary level in both the sociolinguistics 
and psychology corpora, providing quantitative evidence of indexical recursivity. 
Furthermore, strong modal verbs (e.g. must and will) were more common than 
weak modal verbs (e.g. may and might) in Arts journals, while the reverse was 
true in Science journals. This pattern was not repeated for the modal adverbs, 
however, nor was it recapitulated in the disciplinary corpora. 
 In this chapter and the next I analyse interview data in order to 
quantitatively and qualitatively interrogate these findings in ways that were not 
practicable with the corpus analysis. I investigate how these variables act in 
concert to communicate epistemic information when set against the (controlled) 
backdrop of a range of linguistic and social variables. I also investigate whether 
these epistemic variables are involved in style shifting, in other words, whether 
individual speakers use these variables differently in different contexts for 
different ends. On this basis, I examine the extent to which the patterns of 
difference described above generalize to other populations (within academia) and 
to other modes of communication (talk versus writing), and I hence evaluate the 
robustness and wider significance of my findings. 
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In the present chapter, I first describe in Section 4.1 how I recruited my interview 
population of 34 academics from a range of disciplines including critical studies, 
geography, law and physics. As noted in Chapter 0, these disciplines partially 
overlap those investigated in Chapter 3 so as to look for patterns that generalize 
across a broad range of disciplines, and across talk and text. I describe the 
structure of the interviews in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 I describe how I 
operationalize and code the linguistic (internal) variables that could influence 
epistemic variables of the type treated in Chapter 3.70 Given the fact that 
epistemic information can be expressed via a range of linguistic strategies in 
English, including lexical and modal verbs and adverbs (e.g. Kärkkäinen 2003), 
hedges and boosters (e.g. Holmes 1990), and tag questions (e.g. Schleef 2009), I 
develop a novel epistemic stance index (ESI) that scores each utterance on the 
basis of a broader suite of epistemic features than was used for the corpus analysis 
(cf. Van Hofwegen and Wolfram 2010). I then present and discuss the findings in 
respect of these internal variables in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. 
 
4.1 Interview participants 
I emailed prospective participants at colleges of the University of London: a large 
and diverse group of academics who nonetheless share a city and a greater 
institutional culture. This afforded a degree of control over two demographic 
variables. I also wanted to avoid the participants thinking about disciplinary 
difference ahead of time since this would have introduced a further variable, so 
the bare minimum of information was provided in the contact email in order to 
ensure that consent to participate would be meaningful. I explained that I am a 
70 In the next chapter (5) I examine the social (external) variables affecting epistemic variables. 
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PhD student researching the language of academia, and I asked if they were 
available to be interviewed about their research and academic experience. I said 
that the interview would last around one hour, be recorded for transcription and 
analysis, and that all materials would be anonymized. Interviews were arranged in 
this way with 34 participants from epistemologically diverse disciplines as listed 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Interview participants 
Discipline Speaker 
code 
EPR PhD year Academic 
age 
Sex Native 
speaker? 
Arts 
a W 2002 10 F Y 
b W 2002 10 F Y 
c W 1997 15 F N 
i N 1997 15 M Y 
j N 2006 6 M Y 
k N 1999 13 F Y 
Law 
3 W 1990 22 M Y 
d W 1992 20 M Y 
e W 2003 9 F Y 
m W 1973 39 M Y 
n N 1988 24 M Y 
Geography 
1 N 2006 6 F Y 
2 N 2004 8 M N 
f W 1997 15 F Y 
g N 1993 19 M Y 
h W 2004 8 F Y 
l N 1990 22 M Y 
z W 1973 39 F Y 
Economics 
v N 2002 10 F N 
w N 1993 19 M N 
x W 2005 7 M N 
y N 2001 11 M N 
Physics 
6 N 1998 14 M N 
8 N 2001 11 F N 
p N 1978 34 M Y 
q N 2000 12 M Y 
r N 2001 11 M Y 
s N 2000 12 M N 
Maths 
4 N 2007 5 M N 
5 N 1983 29 M Y 
7 N 2004 8 M Y 
o N 1990 22 M Y 
t W 1997 15 M Y 
u N 1995 17 M Y 
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Inter-disciplinary epistemological variation71 was well represented among 
participants, as suggested by the list of disciplines in Table 4.1. Arts includes 
comparative literature, English literature and film studies. ‘Law’ includes mainly 
jurisprudence and sociology of law. ‘Geography’ is split between physical and 
social geographers. ‘Economics’ is split between macro- and micro-economists. 
‘Physics’ means empirical physics: materials science, particle physics and 
cosmology. ‘Maths’ includes theoretical physics (quantum field theory and string 
theory), and also geometry and statistics. 
These subject descriptions suggest that intra-disciplinary epistemological 
variation72 was also well-represented in the participant population. This 
differentiation was operationalized via a binary variable called epistemic policy 
range, which can either be wide or narrow (this appears as ‘EPR’ in Table 4.1). 
Recall from Chapter 2 that the EPR is a somewhat impressionistic notion of how 
many epistemic policies73 a person can “legitimately” apply to their research. In 
Science, the prevailing EPR is narrow, such that a biologist and a physicist will 
agree on the use of the scientific method, on the utility of hypothesis testing, on 
evaluating a theory on the basis of its predictive power. In the Arts, the prevailing 
EPR is wide, such that a scholar may apply several mutually contradictory 
epistemic policies during their career, and members of the same department can 
71 This between-discipline variation was examined via the “Two Cultures” corpus in Chapter 3. 
72 This within-discipline variation was examined via the psychology and sociolinguistics corpora 
in Chapter 3. 
73 Epistemic policy was defined in Chapter 1 as incorporating ways of finding things out. 
Epistemic policies partially frame the phenomena which are the objects of beliefs, and hence they 
correspond to ways of seeing and interpreting the world. Epistemic policies are distinct from 
theories and paradigms which are falsifiable. Rather, policies are value-laden values, attitudes and 
interpretive norms with respect to facts, and, as such, they are less likely than theories and 
paradigms to be overturned by new facts. 
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disagree about the best epistemological basis for research. The discipline of 
Linguistics recapitulates this “Two Cultures” pattern: it is separated into formal 
research on the one hand, and socially-situated research on the other. Formal 
linguistics places scientific method explicitly at its core, devoting a remarkable 
amount of its discourse to describing its own status as a science, and rejecting 
theories if they make counterfactual predictions, or if they fail to make testable 
predictions. Socially-situated linguistics in contrast encompasses positivistic 
studies of sound variation and change; linguistic constructionist accounts of the 
performance of identity; and critical theoretic work in linguistic anthropology. It 
is not uncommon to see positivism and linguistic constructionism represented 
within a single paper. Formal linguists are likely to be skeptical of these 
approaches to the study of language. 
Participants were coded as having a narrow or wide EPR depending on 
their responses to the interview prompts discussed below. While narrow (N) EPRs 
are more common in Science, and wide (W) EPRs in Arts, Table 4.1 shows 
considerable variability within the disciplines. EPR is discussed at length in the 
next chapter as part of the analysis of external variables. 
The recruitment process described above yielded a good overall spread of 
age, sex and native speaker status, albeit quite variable between different 
disciplines, as summarized in Table 4.2. These variables are discussed briefly 
below and at length in the next chapter. 
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Table 4.2 Interview participants’ vital statistics 
Discipline EPR Sex Native? Academic age 
N W F M Y N Mean SD 
Arts 3 3 4 2 5 1 11.5 3.51 
Law 1 4 1 4 5 0 22.8 10.76 
Geography 4 3 4 3 6 1 16.7 11.54 
Economics 3 1 1 3 0 4 11.8 5.12 
Physics 6 0 1 5 3 3 15.7 9.05 
Maths 5 1 0 6 5 1 16.0 8.85 
Total 22 12 11 23 24 10 15.8 8.93 
Academic age was calculated as years since PhD completion (range 5–39). This is 
a somewhat crude measure of academic lifetime, since it does not take account of 
the fact that PhDs have different durations in other countries, or may be 
completed part-time, and academics have diverse career patterns after graduation. 
Inclusion of age as a variable is however motivated by several factors. First, it 
seems uncontroversial that the extent to which an academic “sounds like” their 
discipline, or is sensitive to disciplinary difference, will be a function of their 
amount of exposure to the discourses of their discipline and academia (see 
discussion of language socialization in Section 1.2.1). Secondly, there is anecdotal 
evidence of a shift in stylistic behaviour during an academic’s career (e.g. Lakoff 
1990: 159). Lakoff described an impressionistic bell-shaped curve of disciplinary 
formality with career progression such that, undergraduates are not yet able to 
produce authentic disciplinary language, postgraduates and early academics are 
maximally able to do so, and professors and senior academics revert to a more 
informal style. This is perhaps truer in written Academic English than in 
spoken, and this variable will offer some insight into whether this claim is 
supported empirically. 
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Participants’ sex was also noted. In earlier work (Weston 2009), variable rule 
analysis indicated that sex was not a significant predictor of variation in modal 
verb strength in academic lectures.74 The present population will allow for further 
testing of this result within the context of interview talk. Within my sample 
population, men are overrepresented in some disciplines, while women dominate 
in others; this was not by design, but it reflects a historical pattern of sexual 
differentiation across the disciplines which still prevails today. 
Finally, speakers’ native language (L1) was noted in order to examine the 
relative effect of this and epistemological difference on variability in epistemic 
language use.  
 
4.2 Modified sociolinguistic interview75 
 
The time and venue of each interview was negotiated by email, and the interview 
was in all cases the first time I had met the participant. The majority of interviews 
took place in the participant’s office, although one requested that we meet in the 
Senior Common Room of his institution, and another requested that we meet in a 
pub. 
At the time of meeting, I introduced myself as John, and thanked them for 
agreeing to do the interview. I confirmed that they were happy to be recorded, and 
reiterated that the recordings would be anonymized. I then turned on the 
Dictaphone-style digital recorder and placed it on a desk top to one side of the 
conversational axis where possible, so as to be relatively unobtrusive. Participants 
74 Lectures were examined from a range of disciplines in the MICASE (Simpson et al. 2002) and 
BASE (Thompson and Nesi 2001) corpora of academic spoken English. 
75 Ethical approval was given for the interviews by the Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee. 
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often spontaneously closed windows if there was a surge in traffic noise (although 
this was generally not picked up significantly by the recorder). In the Senior 
Common Room, although initially empty of other people, there was an influx 
towards the end of the interview, and background noise grew to a level that was 
non-ideal. It was still possible to hear what I and the interviewee had been saying, 
but, for the subsequent pub interview, I decided to append lapel microphones to 
the recorder. This had in fact also been suggested by the participant. Although the 
recording equipment did not initially seem to distract him, he did comment on 
needing to be careful about what he said about some other academic disciplines. 
This led to a digression in the interview where I said that I would not be 
reproducing large sections of text in a way that would identify anyone or their 
institution, and this reassurance was given pre-emptively in subsequent 
interviews. 
In all cases I looked into the participant’s research interests and 
familiarized myself with one or two key dichotomies or research trends in order to 
prompt participant talk more smoothly. This was of course much easier in some 
areas than others, but I think on balance that expressing some specialist 
knowledge about the participant’s research domain was more fruitful than 
confounding. I explained that I had been a secondary science teacher when this 
arose naturally out of the conversation—which was often the case in disciplines 
allied to physics and maths. Conversely, in disciplines allied to the Arts, several 
participants commented on the relevance of linguistics (my specialism) to their 
work, and they often assumed that I had a working knowledge of the cultural field 
in which they worked. On balance, I think I was able to demonstrate sufficient 
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credentials to at least appear genuinely interested in the details of interviewees’ 
research in all disciplines. At the end of all interviews I gave a short debrief in 
which I explained that I was primarily interested in patterns of language use, and 
that I would inform them of results when available if they wished. 
 The traditional sociolinguistic interview (e.g. Labov 1971) aims at 
promoting a range of narrative styles by directing the interviewee’s attention 
towards their speech to varying degrees. By giving prompts such as Please read 
out this list of words and Can you tell me about a time when you nearly died, the 
idea is to access the full range from greatest to least attention paid to speech, and 
therefore to produce that speaker’s full stylistic repertoire.76 I am not primarily 
interested here in formality or its association with social class (see Section 2.1.1): 
my questions are not designed to manipulate participants’ attention paid to speech 
for the purpose of accessing their stylistic variation as it recapitulates social class 
structures. Rather, my questions are designed to manipulate participants’ choice of 
epistemic policy in order to access their stylistic variation as it reproduces social 
epistemological structures at the level of the discipline, wider academia, or society 
in general. 
My interview schedule thus follows a modular pattern, with each module 
A to E focusing on a different aspect of academic experience, each time designed 
to promote a particular set of epistemic policies and thereby make particular 
stylistic options more felicitous. Furthermore, responses to some of the questions 
formed the basis of the EPR classification listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  Below I 
elaborate how these modules relate to the linguistic and epistemological variation 
76 A well-known problem at the “least formal” end of the style spectrum is the Observer’s 
Paradox, i.e. the problem that observing or recording someone speaking will introduce some 
irreducible level of formality into the situation (Labov 1972: 209–10). 
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under investigation. Each question was a starting point, and normally several 
related questions were developed on the basis of participants’ responses. 
 
A. Research and professional background 
1. What are you researching at the moment? 
2. How did you become an academic? 
 
Module A is designed to put the participant at ease, and also to encourage the use 
of two contrasting epistemic policies. Question A1 elicits how the participant 
views their research object, and how they are researching it—in particular, how 
they expect to arrive at new knowledge. Question A2 elicits biographical 
knowledge, gained experientially, and framed within the speaker’s subjectivity. It 
is possible that both these questions will elicit explications of epistemic policy, 
but one would expect this to be much more common in response to the A1 than 
A2.77 
 
B. Teaching and impact 
1. What courses do you teach/ have you taught recently? 
2. How do today’s students compare to x years ago? 
3. What alternative belief systems or misconceptions do you encounter 
among students? How do you “deal with them”? 
4. How important is public engagement with your subject? Do you give 
talks to the general public? 
5. What do you think of the “impact” agenda? 
 
77 The relationship between topic and epistemic policy is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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B1 is again an “easy” question for the participant, designed to facilitate transition 
to a new module area. It also provides a snapshot of the range of expertise of the 
participant. Question B2 was designed to elicit judgements about historical 
patterns of change that they have not formally studied.78 B3, B4 and B5 were 
designed to elicit comments on epistemic policy, i.e. what are the disciplinary 
norms; how do students acquire them; are they a barrier to communication beyond 
of the academy; do taxpayers have a right to understand how their money is 
spent? This sequence becomes increasingly morally charged, and participants 
almost universally greeted question B5 with a smirk. Some asked whether this had 
been the whole point of the interview; I assured them that it was not.  
 B3, B4 and B5 provided evidence of speakers’ epistemic policy range 
(EPR). Some speakers closed down these lines of questioning, saying that they 
had not thought about it and therefore could not comment. Others said they had 
not thought about it before, but could speculate. A third group had opinions on 
these matters that appeared more or less well-rehearsed. I took these three 
categories of response to indicate progressively wider EPR, since they provided 
increasing evidence of the participant habitually thinking seriously about issues 
that were outside of their research expertise. 
 
 
 
 
78 This question promoted quite diverse responses. Some participants assumed it was about change 
in the ethnic composition of the student body; others interpreted it in terms of declining standards 
of state school education; others in terms of changing governmental funding regimes and 
increasing corporatization of academia. In some cases this led to the participant saying that they 
didn’t feel competent to comment, while in others it promoted a “soapbox” soliloquy. 
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C. (Inter)disciplinarity 
1. Where is your field going in the next 10 years/other period? 
2. How important is inter-disciplinary collaboration in academia? What 
problems and benefits arise? 
3. How representative of your field are you/your research? 
4. What dimensions of variation would you include in a typology of 
academic disciplines? What do you think of [Figure 4.1]? 
 
 
 
abstract-reflective      pure   concrete-reflective 
(abstract) 
 
 
hard     soft 
(scientific)    (artistic) 
 
 
abstract-active   applied  concrete-active 
(concrete) 
 
 
Figure 4.1 A typology of academia 
(based on Becher and Trowler 2001: 36) 
 
 
 
Question C1 was difficult, and some participants commented that it was a 
professorial interview question. It was designed to give me an impression of the 
unity of the participant’s discipline, i.e. the extent to which the participant’s 
research fitted within a broader research programme, and also simply to 
encourage speculation about future events. Questions C2, C3 and C4 were 
designed to gain information about how the participant views their discipline and 
their place in it. The question of inter-disciplinarity produced quite divergent 
responses. Figure 4.1 was designed to simultaneously partially legitimize 
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problematic binary academic divisions (hard/soft and pure/applied); to offer less 
emotive alternative terms; and to provide a simplistic picture to react against. 
Participants used it in all these capacities. 
 Question C2 also provided further evidence for classifying the 
participant’s EPR. Some participants said that inter-disciplinary collaboration was 
a waste of time. Some said it was potentially useful within certain limits, e.g. 
between biology, chemistry and physics. Others said that collaborations between 
philosophers, critical theorists and geologists could be fruitful. I took this 
increasing level of openness to epistemologically diverse research interfaces to 
indicate progressively wider EPR. 
 Module D I consisted of two scenarios from experimental philosophy. 
This was to gain further evidence for classifying participants’ EPR, both in terms 
of their responses to the scenarios, but also in terms of their meta-task talk. These 
scenarios were originally designed to elicit judgements about the justification of 
knowledge, in particular, whether one can be said to know something by accident, 
and whether the nature of the accident affects people’s judgements about that.  
 
D. Experimental philosophy scenarios 
1. Jill’s Buick (Gettier 1963) 
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob 
therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, 
however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not 
aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different 
kind of American car.  
 
Which word best completes the sentence below? 
 
Bob ___________ that Jill drives an American car. 
 
believes doubts  knows 
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2. Truetemp scenario (Weinberg et al. 2001) 
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain 
becomes re–wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he 
estimates the temperature where he is. Charles is completely unaware that 
his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re–
wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his 
estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is 
at that time 71 degrees in his room.  
 
Which word best completes the sentence below? 
 
Charles ___________ that it was 71 degrees in the room. 
 
believes doubts  knows 
 
Some people deny that Bob or Charles have knowledge. Some judge that Bob 
does not, but Charles does, and some judge that both men know the fact in 
question. I take these responses to indicate progressively wider EPR. Each 
speaker was coded as having a “narrow” or “wide”’ EPR based on the balance of 
responses to these scenarios, and to questions B3–5 and C2. 
 
4.3 Variables: Operationalization and coding 
 
The 34 interviews (a total of just under 34 hours of recordings) were transcribed. 
Portions of each of the 34 transcripts were segmented into 8891 clausal79 tokens, 
and after discarding tokens that could not be coded, these were ultimately reduced 
to 8270, i.e. just under 50 tokens per topic per participant.80 This provided 
sufficient tokens for up to three binary variables to be compared in interaction 
simultaneously, and to still have at least 5 tokens per variant combination 
79 A clause is the smallest part of a sentence encoding a complete proposition (Kroeger 2005: 32). 
80 Two participants were very reluctant to discuss one topic, so fewer tokens were included in 
those instances. 
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(because 50 > 2 × 2 × 2 × 5). In other words, sufficiently many tokens were coded 
in order for statistical analysis to be reliable. In Section 4.3.1 I explain how the 
dependent variable—epistemic stance index (ESI)—is composed of 6 variable 
elements, and how these were coded to give a combined value for the ESI. In 
Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.8, I explain how the levels of each of these variables were 
coded for the internal variables listed in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Internal variables 
Variable type Variable Levels   
Dependent ESI (continuous) 
Independent main verb type affective, alethic, epistemic, other 
 aspectual class dynamic, stative  
 tense past, nonpast 
 voice active, passive 
 subject type pronoun, noun 
 polarity positive, negative 
 talk type evaluative, narrative 
Offset parameter81 log(words) (continuous) 
Grouping speaker 34 participants 
 
 
These variables are normally labelled “internal” in sociolinguistic analysis (e.g. 
Labov 1994: 1–3; Coupland 2001), i.e. they are defined in terms of linguistic 
phenomena in contrast to “external” variables which are defined in terms of social 
phenomena. Labov (1994: 3) notes that, in addition to this a priori distinction in 
variable type, internal and external variables behave differently in statistical 
model reduction.82 For these reasons, and others discussed in Chapter 1, I treat 
81 The log of the length (in words) of each clause was initially included in the maximal model as 
an offset parameter. Despite the fact that increasing the length of a clause could plausibly have a 
‘diluting effect’ on the force of an epistemic commitment, log(words) turned out not to 
significantly improve the fit of the models and was therefore removed. 
82 The removal of an external variable modifies the effect size of the other externals but not of the 
internals, while the removal of an internal variable generally affects neither. 
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them separately in this thesis. The present chapter looks at the internal variables 
listed in Table 4.3 above, while Chapter 5 looks at external variables.  
I now develop the epistemic stance index (ESI), and, in the following 
sections, arrive at predictions in terms of ESI scores by considering what I refer to 
as the intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic meaning of each internal variable elements. 
I argue that the variables in Table 4.3 contribute to epistemic stance both 
intrinsically, i.e. in virtue of their semantic “core” content, as well as extrinsically, 
i.e. in virtue of their association with the discourses of particular academic 
disciplines. I then evaluate these predictions using linear mixed modelling.   
 
4.3.1 A metric of epistemic stance 
 
Examples (3a–d) all encode the same proposition (that it is snowing), however 
they also encode information about the speaker’s epistemic stance towards that 
proposition, i.e. their judgement of its status as knowledge.83 
 
(3) a. Es schneit.84 
 b. It’s snowing. 
 c. It’s snowing, I think. 
 d. I definitely think it’s snowing. 
 
Examples (3a) and (3b) are “bald” expressions of the propositional content which 
would normally be interpreted as indicating that the speaker believes that the 
propositional content is true.85,86 In Example (3c), the propositional content is 
83 Cf. Johnstone (2009: 30–31).  
84 Tarski’s (1935: 271) example ‘,,es schneit“ ist eine wahre Aussage dann und nur dann, wenn es 
schneit.’ is made more perspicuous by translating it as ‘“es schneit” is true-in-German if, and only 
if, it is snowing.’ 
85 The analysis of these sentences draws on the discussion in Chapter 3 of Nuyt’s (2006: 1–2) view 
of modality as a super-category that subsumes several theoretical ‘difference[s] of opinion’. 
                                                     
187 
 
weakened with the discourse marker I think, which suggests that the speaker has 
doubts about the truth of the proposition.87  In Example (3d), the propositional 
content is again weakened with I think, and simultaneously strengthened with 
definitely. Furthermore, Examples (3c) and (3d) relativize the propositional 
content to the speaker with I think (as opposed to e.g. it seems or so they say), so 
in addition to the speaker’s judgement of the truth of the proposition, we also gain 
some information about the kind of evidence the speaker is using to make that 
judgement. 
The verbs and adverbs examined in Chapter 3 gave only a partial 
indication of epistemic stance, both in terms of what the variables indicate about 
epistemic stance (strength of commitment, and speaker-relativity), and in terms of 
the number of variants examined for each variable. Since these variants occurred 
in prohibitively low frequencies in interview talk, more variants were coded for 
the interview data, and four more categories of epistemic language were included 
to give a more complete picture of the epistemic stances speakers took, as 
described next. 
The strength of commitment to a proposition is reflected in the modality of 
the clause. The strong/weak distinction in verbal and adverbial modality used in 
Chapter 3 is applied here (with the addition of adjectival modality). Strong modal 
variants (e.g. must, necessarily, necessary) score +1, while weak variants (e.g. 
may, maybe, potential) score –1, as listed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  
86 This assumes that some version of Grice’s (1989: 26) maxim of quality is being observed, i.e. 
that truthfulness is desirable (and indeed possible). 
87 A formal analysis of (3d), and possibly (3c), would assume that it consists of two nested clauses, 
such that it’s snowing is the complement clause of the matrix clause I definitely think it’s snowing. 
Both clauses would be assumed to express propositional content. Since the matrix verb I think 
functions as an epistemic comment on the complement clause, however, I treat (3d) as expressing 
a single proposition (that it is snowing) and an epistemic stance with respect to that proposition. 
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Table 4.4 Verbal modality coding conventions88 
strong (+1) must, will, shall, cannot, should, would, have to, need to, be required to 
weak (–1) may, might, could, can, allow, let, permit, get to, don’t have to 
 
Table 4.5 Adverbial and adjectival modality coding conventions 
strong (+1) 
necessarily, certainly, necessary, (I’m) certain, be 
guaranteed that, simplest possible, (I’m) sure, I 
know89 
weak (–1) 
maybe, possibly, probably, likely, possible, 
probable, perhaps, potential, if you’re lucky, I’m 
not sure, I don’t know 
 
Examples (3) and (4) illustrate how these coding distinctions apply to tokens from 
my interview data. Example (3) scores +1 for a strong modal verb, and Example 
(4) scores +1 for a strong modal adverb. 
 
(3)     er: be be be because you you have to check EC.N.19.M90 
 
(4)     and certainly strategies that revolve around the term 
impact 
AR.W.10.F 
 
In addition to the strength of commitment to a proposition, epistemic stance can 
provide information about whether the speaker considers a proposition to be an 
88 While the examples given in Tables 4.4 to 4.9 are not exhaustive for any particular variety of 
English, they are exhaustive of the texts of the interviews analysed here. 
89 I know is included here when it was judged to have the same effect as I’m certain that or 
certainly. In this case, marked by emphatic prosody, it seems to carry relatively little subjectivity 
(relativity– in the terms of Table 4.5). I know was only used in this manner in a small number of 
tokens, which were not also coded as occurrences of lexical know. Stubbe and Holmes (1995) also 
suggest a class linkage such that you know is favoured over I think in working class speech. This 
linkage will not be investigated here since the small sample group was, I assume, relatively 
homogeneous with respect to socioeconomic class. 
90 Codes indicate participants listed in Table 4.1. In this case, economist, narrow EPR, academic 
age of 19, and male. 
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objective matter, or whether they consider it to be a subjective matter, i.e. the 
speaker-relativity of the proposition. Propositional objectifiers (e.g. actually, don’t 
forget that) score +1, and subjectifiers (e.g. I’d say, for me, personally) score –1. 
This scoring matches that of strong and weak modality respectively under the 
assumption that objective claims are stronger (and hence more easily defeasible) 
than subjective claims. 
 
Table 4.6 Relativity coding conventions 
objectifiers (+1) 
actually, in fact, you/we know, really, don’t forget 
that, if you think that, obvious/ly, looks like, 
sounds like, “cosmology tells us” 
subjectifiers (–1) 
I think, I’d say, for me/him/her, as I say, I’d 
prefer, I mean, I guess, I think you’ll find, as I 
said, seemingly, apparently, ostensibly, 
personally, I feel, seem to me 
 
 
Examples (5) and (6) illustrate how these coding distinctions apply to tokens from 
my interview data. Example (5) scores +1 as for its objectifier. Example (6) is the 
negation of an objective knowledge claim, and is scored as –1. 
 
(5)     and really asks me to MA.N.8.M 
 
(6)     but we don’t know what it is PH.N.11.M 
 
 
 
The domain of a proposition is related to its propositional quantification 
(universal versus existential). If the clause suggests universality by using 
generalizers (e.g. all, generally, typically) then this is treated as a relatively strong 
claim, and it is coded as +1. The use of restrictors (e.g. particular, certain, 
sometimes) was treated as weakening the claim, and was coded as –1. 
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Table 4.7 Domain coding conventions 
generalizers (+1) 
all, generally, always, never, constantly, everyone, 
people, tend to, whatever, normally, not a single, 
any, ever, never, typically, normally, (quite) often, 
all sorts, majority, most, a lot/many (people), 
(things) like that 
restrictors (–1) 
particular, specifically, simply, merely, just, at 
least, certain, some, kind, type, purely, exclusively, 
only, sometimes, right now, at the moment 
 
 
Example (7) scores +1 for a generalizer, while Example (8) scores –2 for doubly 
restricting its main verb. 
(7)     and I’m looking at all these numbers MA.N.17.M 
 
(8)     that you’ve you’ve added in some direct way from 
your own particular research 
LA.W.20.M 
 
The final two categories are related to Holmes’s (1990) ‘hedges and boosters’. 
Intensifiers and equators boost the strength of propositional commitment by 
presupposing a commitment to the equivalent un-boosted proposition: if Bob 
believes that it’s a very nice day, he must also believe that it’s a nice day tout 
court. Conversely, softeners and approximators do not seem to presuppose 
commitment to the core proposition: if Bob believes that it’s a somewhat nice day, 
then he does not quite believe that it’s a nice day. Softeners thus act as hedges, 
having a modal weakening effect. The intensity of a clause, as well as the use of 
comparators, thus provides modal information by implication rather than in virtue 
of its semantic content.91 
 
91 Holmes (1990) is careful to note that hedges and boosters are dependent on prosody such that 
their effect can be opposite to that described. In the data used here, sarcastic and other prosodic 
cues to such semantic inversion were rare, and they were coded as such when they did occur.  
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Table 4.8 Degree coding conventions 
intensifiers (+1) 
very (much), (too) much, indeed, quite, 
completely, so, entirely, bit more, awful lot, almost 
entirely, really, very few, just, not at all, 
increasingly, thoroughly, quite a lot 
softeners (–1) somewhat, a little, fairly, rather, quite, scarcely, a bit, hardly, try to, hope to 
 
 
Table 4.9 Comparator coding conventions 
equators (+1) precisely, exactly, equally, equivalent, the same as 
approximators (–
1) 
roughly, essentially, fairly, basically, in short, 
about, sort of, kind of, in a sense, like, in a way 
 
Example (9) scores +1 for an intensifier, and Example (10) scores +1 for an 
equator. 
 
 
(9)     erm. so I see those connections as enormously 
important 
LA.W.20.M 
 
(10)     who exactly their mother was MA.N.17.M 
 
 
 
The six categories described above—verbal modality, adverbial and adjectival 
modality, relativity, domain, degree and comparators—were combined to give an 
overall epistemic stance index (ESI). The ESI is thus able to capture the combined 
effect of modality, evidential verb choice, etc., on epistemic stance, in contrast to 
the separate analysis of Chapter 3. The epistemic stance index ESI is the sum of 
the scores for the six epistemic language components described above, and it is 
therefore used to operationalize epistemic stance. As illustrated in Examples (11) 
to (13), more positive ESI scores indicate greater certainty, objectivity, and 
generality, while more negative ESI scores indicate greater caution, subjectivity 
and specificity. 
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(11)     well don’t forget that most serious 
teaching I do is really running phd 
students 
 
PH.N.34.M 
 don’t forget (relativity+) +
1 
 most (domain+) +
1 
 really (relativity+) +
1 
  ESI +
3 
 
 
(12)     er I mean the: micro one course I 
wouldn’t say it’s identical 
 
EC.W.7.M 
 I mean (relativity–) –
1 
 I wouldn’t 
say 
(relativity–) –
1 
 not identical (domain–) –
1 
  ESI –
3 
 
 
 
 
(13)     I think that we’ve got it about right in 
physics er with about [cough] typically 
teaching two modules. er. 
PH.N.34.M 
 I think (relativity–) –
1 
 about × 2 (comparator
–) 
–
2 
 typically (domain+) +
1 
  ESI –
3 
 
 
Example (13) shows that multiple tokens of the same epistemic stance element—
in this case about—are counted as contributing multiply to the ESI score. 
Examples (12) and (13) illustrate two different ways of scoring an ESI of –3. In 
terms of the received idea of the Two Cultures, scientists should generally score 
more positively than artists and humanists, since they strive to be objective, and to 
discover general laws. However, the evidence from the last chapter showed that, 
although these traits are reflected in evidential verb choice (see review in Section 
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4.4.2 below), scientists tend to favour weaker modal verbs. It is plausible that the 
more ambitious epistemic goals of science, as reflected in the ESI components of 
e.g. relativity and domain, are causally related to scientists’ being more cautious 
in the modal component; indeed all the components of the ESI could be said to be 
in opposition to each other in this way. 
 The ESI is a way to capture the linguistic materialization of epistemic 
stance, which is a discourse-level phenomenon. Stance is compositional, and the 
ESI is able to capture the combined boosting and hedging function of a wide 
range of linguistic forms acting in concert. However, it is also a simplification. It 
assumes that the evidential variables described can be unproblematically 
classified as strong or weak, whereas there are likely to be finer levels of 
distinction (see e.g. Coates 1983). Another type of detail not captured by the ESI 
is the ambiguity of multiple modal elements used together: it could be a single 
stance multiply modalized on the one hand, or several partially nested stances on 
the other. These distinctions are often elucidated prosodically, but this will not be 
explored here. I argue that, despite these limitations, it is appropriate that the first 
investigation into the relationship between sociolinguistic variation and 
epistemological variation should start conservatively, since building a more 
complicated model would also build in further assumptions about the relationship 
being investigated. 
 I now turn to the internal variables whose influence on the ESI scores of 
clausal tokens is being investigated in this chapter. 
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4.3.2 Main verb type 
 
Main verb refers to the verb that expresses predicative information in some 
proposition, for example, schneit and snowing in Examples (3a–d). Auxiliary 
verbs were coded under modality or tense as appropriate. The evidential verbs 
examined in Chapter 3 occurred with low token numbers in interview talk—too 
low to permit reliable analysis. For this reason, the number of verbs included in 
each class was expanded, as was the number of verb classes.  Table 4.10 shows an 
indicative list of verbs separated into four coding levels (emboldened verbs were 
included in the analysis in corpus Chapter 3). Every main verb in the interview 
data was coded in this manner, based on the major semantic domains of Biber et 
al. (1999: 360–71). My mental categories also include some examples of what 
Biber et al. class as communication verbs (e.g. argue) and existence verbs (e.g. 
look and seem).92 
 
Table 4.10 Main verb types in interview data 
Mental 
Alethic show, demonstrate, prove, indicate, hear, listen, look, see, 
search, observe, detect, find, measure, determine, tell 
whether, verify 
Epistemic think, believe, know, infer, expect, argue, claim, 
interpret, 
see as, view, visualize, be aware, notice, learn, recognize, 
remember, imagine, intend, wonder, predict, forecast, 
estimate, calculate, figure, consider, suspect, feel, 
perceive, presume, assume, posit 
Affective93 prefer, like, love, want 
Non-
mental 
Other All other verbs 
 
92 Biber et al. (1999: 361) base their classification system of verbs on their ‘core meaning (i.e. the 
meaning that speakers tend to think of first).’ They go on to note precisely the domain overlaps 
that I exploit here as problems for designing a satisfactory coding system. 
93 Notable absences included hope, hate, suffer, appreciate, blame, and fear. 
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The alethic verbs are factive, i.e. the truth status of their complements is 
presupposed.94 Mary can demonstrate that 2 + 2 = 4, but not that 2 + 2 = 5. In 
contrast, I argue that epistemic verbs cannot be considered factive because they 
relativize the truth status of their complement to a knower. Mary may think or 
believe that 2 + 2 = 4 or that 2 + 2 = 5. Whether she could be said to know that 2 + 
2 = 5 is less clear. Speakers with a narrow epistemic policy range might be more 
inclined to dispute that someone could know something that is “demonstrably” 
false, while wide EPR speakers may allow this usage if the knower is sufficiently 
committed to the propositional complement irrespective of some consensus view 
of its truth status. It seems then that weak epistemic verbs like think are not 
factive, and that strong epistemic verbs like know are factive for Narrow types and 
non-factive for Wide types. Affective verbs introduce propositions that have 
fulfilment conditions rather than truth conditions. A person can prefer or like 
things irrespective of the actual status of those things in the world. Mary could 
prefer that 2 + 2 = 5 at the very same time as she knows that 2 + 2 = 4. The 
intrinsic epistemic content of these verbs then consists of their decreasing 
factivity/objectivity and increasing subjectivity, along with the orthogonal 
contribution of their strong/weak modal character (which was not coded for the 
present analysis, but is included as ‘±’, i.e. a mixed positive and negative 
contribution to ESI scores, for epistemic verbs in Table 4.11 below). 
Evidential verbs were found in Chapter 3 to differ significantly in their 
frequencies in Arts and Science research articles: alethic verbs (demonstrate, 
prove, indicate, show) were preferred in the sciences, while epistemic verbs 
94 Indicate can be factive or nonfactive. 
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(think, believe, know, infer, expect, argue, claim) were preferred in the arts. This 
was explained in terms of the greater emphasis placed on objectivity (relativity+) 
and generality (domain+) in the sciences, i.e. the verbs associate with particular 
disciplinary practices according to whether that discipline fosters discourses of 
objectivity and generality or subjectivity and specificity. However, Chapter 3 also 
revealed that the sciences are more epistemically cautious, using a higher 
frequency of weak than strong modal verbs, i.e. that the greater claim to generality 
associates with a weaker claim to certainty (modality–). This latter relationship 
predicts that affective verbs, which are even more subjective, should associate 
with even stronger modality than epistemic verbs. It is cautiously predicted that 
these results will be repeated in the interview data. Table 4.11 summarizes the 
intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic content of the evidential verb types, broken down 
by epistemic stance element. Intrinsic content is epistemic meaning conferred by 
the semantics of the verb, or by its denotation, while extrinsic is meaning 
conferred by is patterns of usage, or by its connotation. Alethic verbs have more + 
symbols than – symbols, i.e. they are predicted to associate with overall more 
positive ESI scores. Epistemic verbs are more mixed, and affective verbs are 
predicted to associate with more negative ESI scores. 
 
Table 4.11 Predicted effects of main verb type on ESI 
  Alethic Epistemic Affective 
Intrinsic modality + ±  
 relativity + ± – 
Extrinsic modality – + + 
 domain + – – 
 relativity + – – 
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The distribution of mental verbs in the interview data was too uneven to compare 
these three levels of mental verb against all non-mental verbs, so they were first 
examined is a more articulated comparison (with more levels for the non-mental 
verbs), as well as in isolation, in Section 4.4.1, and then as a collapsed category—
mental versus non-mental verbs—as discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
 
4.3.3 Main verb aspectual class 
 
All main verbs were coded as having either stative or dynamic lexical aspect. 
Modern (particularly scientific) technical discourse tends to package information 
in noun phrases rather than verb phrases (see e.g. Biber and Gray 2013). This 
phenomenon, as well as the historical process of language change from more 
“verbal” to more “nominal” styles (Wells 1960), are both referred to as 
nominalization. The following examples from Halliday (2006: 34) illustrate 
progressively more nominalized versions of the same information. 
 
(14) a. Glass cracks more quickly the harder you press on it. 
 b. Cracks in glass grow faster the more pressure is put on. 
 c. Glass crack growth is faster if greater stress is applied. 
 d. The rate of glass crack growth depends on the magnitude of the applied 
stress. 
 e. Glass crack growth rate is associated with applied stress magnitude. 
 
Nominalization seems to associate with stative lexical aspect. Example (14a) 
expresses the relationship between stress and fracture progression with two verbs 
of dynamic lexical aspect (crack and press), while depends in (14d) and is in 
(14e) are both stative verbs. Stative verbs resist the continuous aspect (*The cup 
was being small), applying to imperfective events, i.e. those that do not terminate 
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within the time referred to (*The cup was being small until Geoff turned up). On 
the other hand, dynamic verbs, comprising Vendler’s (1967) activities, 
achievements and accomplishments, are perfective, i.e. they terminate within the 
time of reference (The cup was sitting on the table until Geoff turned up). As 
such, stative verbs are more amenable to generalizations: things that obtain not 
merely in the time of reference, but at all times. This intrinsic epistemic content 
(domain+) should make stative verbs associate with the higher ESI scores of the 
more epistemically certain universal laws and generalizations of science. 
 
Table 4.12 Predicted effects of main verb aspectual class on ESI 
  Stative Dynamic 
Intrinsic domain + – 
Extrinsic domain + – 
 
 
As noted in Section 4.3.1 above, main verb type and lexical aspect are not 
orthogonal variables. Some epistemic verbs are exclusively stative (e.g. know, 
believe), some also have a homonymous dynamic version which describes 
cogitation (e.g. think), and some are just dynamic, e.g. argue and discuss 
(activities with no fixed endpoint), realize (a non-agentive achievement) and learn 
(an agentive accomplishment). Alethic verbs are always dynamic, and affective 
verbs are always stative.95 The distribution of lexical aspect and main verb type 
was thus highly skewed among the affective and alethic verbs in the interview 
data (see Table 4.13). In order to compensate for this skew, and also to include 
lexical aspect in the same model as verb type, it was necessary to bin main verb 
type into non-mental and mental verbs. 
95 Affective verbs are undergoing a change in some varieties of English such that it is now possible 
to say e.g. I’m liking that T-shirt, while I’m knowing that fact remains impossible in those varieties 
(for further discussion see Comrie 1976; Binnick 2006). 
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Table 4.13 Numbers of verbs 
Main verb Dynamic Stative 
Affective 0 233 
Alethic 367 0 
Epistemic 233 220 
Mental 600 453 
Non-mental 3987 3230 
 
The effect of mental verb type on ESI is examined in isolation from the effect of 
aspectual class in Section 4.5.1. The binary binned version of main verb type is 
then examined in Section 4.5.2, and aspectual class in Section 4.5.3. 
 
4.3.4 Tense 
 
All clauses were coded as being either past or non-past. The past tense should 
associate with more positive ESI scores simply in virtue of its meaning. 
Intuitively, other things being equal, one can be more certain about (recent) past 
events than about future or currently unfolding events.  However, this intrinsic 
epistemic content of tense is supplemented by extrinsic epistemic content: Myers 
(1992) notes that the past tense is used in science research articles for methods 
sections, while the present tense is used for well-accepted facts. The use of the 
past tense to describe experimental procedures is a distancing strategy, making the 
text seem more objective, and thereby augmenting its persuasive force for readers 
who are persuaded by the semblance of objectivity (e.g. scientists). However, the 
past tense is specific to a time, while verbs marked as morphologically present can 
serve as “tenseless” verbs for expressing “timeless” truths or general laws (see 
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e.g. Silverstein 1976: 195).96 The extrinsic epistemic meaning of tense then seems 
to partly oppose its intrinsic epistemic meaning. Extrinsically, the present tense 
would be predicted to associate with higher ESI scores compared to the past 
because of their respective associations with making generalizations (domain+) 
and being specific (domain–), and also because the present indexes the certainty 
of universal laws (modality+), suggesting the relative uncertainty (modality–) of 
the past tense. However, the past indexes detachment/objectivity (relativity+), 
suggesting that the present indexes subjectivity (relativity–). Both the intrinsic and 
extrinsic predictions are given in Table 4.14.  
 
Table 4.14 Predicted effects of tense variants on ESI 
  Past Non-past 
Intrinsic modality + – 
Extrinsic modality – + 
 domain – + 
 relativity + – 
 
 
Since the extrinsic associations of tense with the components of ESI overall 
favour the association of past tense with lower ESI scores, the overall prediction 
for extrinsic epistemic meaning of tense is that the past is “less certain” (i.e. 
associates with more negative ESI scores) than the present. This contradicts the 
prediction based on intrinsic epistemic meaning. The effect of clause tense on ESI 
is explored Section 4.4.4. 
 
96 This contrasts with the domain component of the intrinsic epistemic meaning of tense—any 
tense intuitively implies a restriction on the domain of application of the proposition of that tensed 
clause. In the present data, morphologically non-finite clauses were assumed to inherit the tense of 
the main verb that they complement. 
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4.3.5 Subject type 
 
The subject of the main verb of each token was coded as I, we, you, he/she, 
animate it/they, inanimate it/they and that/this, generic you, generic we, expletive 
pronoun, or noun phrase. This was based on the standard first, second and third 
person distinction plus nouns. It was expanded to include generic pronouns, since 
these seem to have epistemic content; the animacy distinction in the third person, 
since this might be discipline-sensitive, and expletive pronouns so as to 
exhaustively classify the clausal subjects of the interview data. Personal pronouns 
such as I, you and we are intrinsically (inter)subjective, i.e. they anchor the 
predicative content of a proposition to individuals present in the interaction 
(relativity–). This might be expected to make them associate with more negative 
ESI scores. Third person pronouns have a relative distancing effect (relativity+), 
and generic pronouns can function as generalizers (domain+). Nouns are more 
distant still, since the object to which they refer is more likely to be novel: the use 
of pronouns presupposes an already-familiar referent. This intrinsic epistemic 
content is set against a considerable burden of polysemy: we can be used 
inclusively or exclusively (e.g. we’re getting along fine versus we don’t like you); 
we and you can be used generically (as in you can’t teach an old dog new tricks); 
and expletive pronouns do not refer to anything (e.g. it’s snowing). Fortanet 
(2004: 45) notes that the choice between I, we and you also reflects ‘levels of 
attempted rapport and degrees of personal involvement’, while Ochs, Gonzales 
and Jacoby (1996: 332–33) suggest that in interaction I and you can both refer to 
either the researcher or the research object or even a blend between these two 
roles. 
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Despite this somewhat noisy picture, personal pronouns have been found to 
pattern in a manner consistent with the broadest epistemological differences 
between disciplines. Hyland (2001, 2005: 148–49) notes that self-mention (I, me, 
my; and we, our) and reader pronouns (you and your) are less common in research 
articles in the sciences than in the arts. This would suggest that pronouns would 
associate with the ESI components characteristic of the Arts (relativity–, domain– 
and modality+). However, Kuo (1999) and Hyland (1994: 240) argue that the use 
of pronouns to position the reader and writer with respect to a text is at least as 
important for pronoun choice as the writer’s epistemological commitments. The 
fact that scientists are more likely than artists and humanists to collaborate in 
large groups for example may affect writers’ use of we to a greater extent than 
considerations of readability or epistemological consistency. Biber (2006: 50–51) 
notes that pronouns are more common in academic speech than writing, and that 
their tendency to replace nouns with pronouns increases with interactivity, such 
that “office hours” have the lowest frequency of nouns relative to pronouns. Biber 
et al. (1999: 235) found in the LSWE97 corpus that pronouns and nouns are about 
evenly split in general conversation (with frequencies respectively of 
approximately 17% versus 13%), while pronouns are rather rarer in academic 
prose (with frequencies of approximately 3% versus 27% nouns, i.e. a ratio of 
1:9). This contrasts markedly with the present data in which pronouns and nouns 
are in a ratio of 6:1 (see Table 4.20 in Section 4.4 below). 
Table 4.15 summarizes the intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic content of the 
pronoun groups discussed above. Cells for which no prediction is apparent from 
97 Longman Spoken and Written English corpus (Biber et al. 1999). 
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the literature were completed by opposing the alternative categories. The 
predictions for the separate pronoun types were then combined, and the noun 
predictions oppose these. 
 
Table 4.15 Predicted effects of subject variants on ESI 
  1st/2nd 3rd Generic Pronouns Nouns 
Intrinsic relativity – + + + – 
 domain – – + – + 
Extrinsic modality +     
 relativity –     
 domain –     
 
The effect of subject type on ESI is explored in Section 4.4.5. 
 
4.3.6 Talk type 
 
Clausal tokens were categorized as narrative or evaluative. These were 
distinguished using Goffman’s (1974: 496–559) participant roles. The author of 
some communicative content is the person who chooses which form of words will 
be used; the animator is the person who delivers this message; while the principal 
is the person or institution with ultimate responsibility for the message. These 
roles are often assumed by the same person, but they coincide most clearly in the 
case of evaluative clauses, where affective language is used to attribute aesthetic 
or moral qualities to a proposition. Such judgements are imbued with subjectivity 
because the animator is normally understood to be currently experiencing the 
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judgement. This means that they are also authoring the content and form of the 
message, and they are in some sense also acting as principal for the message.98 
This is in contrast to narrative clauses for which the author and animator 
are more separated. This includes animation of one’s past self, and any events 
removed in time and/or space from the animator’s subjectivity. The extrinsically 
epistemic content of narrative and evaluative talk should then be expected to 
associate with the relativity component of ESI, and therefore also with the 
associated modal components as shown in Table 4.16. However, preliminary 
quantitative analysis demonstrated the reverse trend (t = 2.3515; df = 506.455; p = 
0.01908). 
 
Table 4.16 Predicted effects of talk type variants on ESI 
  Narrative Evaluative 
Extrinsic modality – + 
 relativity + – 
 t-test – 0.09018704 + 0.02155172 
 
This difference could be due to the dominance of the modal component of ESI. It 
is unlikely to be accounted for by interactions of talk type with e.g. main verb 
type since affective verbs (with positive ESI scores) are only marginally more 
common in evaluative talk: 
 
 
98 This doesn’t mean that they are choosing to have a particular affective response in a 
premeditated manner, but, should they express an evaluation that is not ratified by their employer, 
society or whichever institutions the speaker operates within (e.g. something held to be immoral or 
illegal), it will be the speaker and not the institution that deals with the consequences. On the other 
hand, should they not violate any institutional norms, it may be argued that those institutions are 
playing the role of principal. 
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Table 4.17 Distribution of verb types by talk type 
 Evaluative 
N (rel %) 
Narrative 
N (rel %) 
Affective 17 (3.663793) 214 (2.741481) 
Alethic 13 (2.801724) 354 (4.534973) 
Epistemic 23 (4.956897) 430 (5.508583) 
Other 411 (88.577586) 6808 (87.214963) 
 
To investigate this possibility the 464 evaluative tokens were analysed together 
with three random samples of 464 narrative tokens. A model containing main verb 
type, aspectual class, tense and subject type, as well as talk and all its two- and 
three-way interactions was stepped down for each of the samples (see section 4.4). 
 
4.3.7 Voice 
 
Passive constructions omit the verbal subject, and therefore make more limited 
knowledge claims than those that specify the subject (irrespective of the subject’s 
semantic role). Intuitively, other things being equal, the more limited one’s claim, 
the more certain one can be of it (modality+). The omission of the verbal subject 
also reduces the subjectivity of the clause (relativity+). This intrinsic epistemic 
content of voice is supplemented by extrinsic epistemic content: the passive voice 
has been previously found to be more common in (more speculative) research 
articles than in (more consensual) text books (Wingard 1981), i.e. it associates 
with uncertainty (modality–), and hence more negative ESI scores. Biber (2006: 
65) finds an 80/20 split in active/passive voice in textbooks, and 95/5 in academic 
speech (approximate proportions estimated from graph). This is in contrast to an 
approximately 98/2 split in general conversation in Biber et al. (1999: 476), which 
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is more or less consistent in classroom talk across the disciplines, while the 
proportion of passives rises to 30% in engineering texts and is almost as high in 
the natural sciences. This supports the interpretation that the passive voice 
performs a similar distancing function to the past tense, enhancing objectivity 
(relativity+). This means there is quite good agreement between predictions based 
on the intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic content of voice. However, the fact that the 
extrinsic modal content is negative, and given that modality counts for 2 out of 6 
of the ESI categories (verbal and adverbial modality) whereas relativity only 
counts for one, the extrinsic epistemic content of voice seems to predict more 
negative scores for passives and more positive scores for actives, as listed in Table 
4.18. The result of a preliminary quantitative analysis is also included (t = –
2.0092; df = 159.458; p = 0.04621). 
 
Table 4.18 Predicted effects of voice variants on ESI 
  Passive Active 
Intrinsic modality + – 
 relativity + – 
Extrinsic modality – + 
 relativity + – 
 t-test + 0.05194805 – 0.08649581 
 
 
The result of the t-test is in the direction predicted by the intrinsic epistemic 
content of voice. To see how robust this finding is, all 154 passive tokens were 
analysed together with three random samples of 154 active tokens. A model 
containing main verb type, aspectual class, tense and subject type, as well as voice 
and all its two- and three-way interactions was stepped down for each of the 
samples.  
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4.3.8 Polarity 
 
There is an asymmetry in epistemology and the philosophy of science such that it 
is impossible to prove a universal law, but it is possible to disprove its negation.99 
This is the reason why the sciences traditionally express null hypotheses which 
are then disproved rather than hypotheses which are proved. This asymmetry 
amounts to intrinsic epistemic content in polarity, but not in the dimensions 
considered for the ESI. The role of negative polarity in hypothetico-deductive 
science would however suggest that Science uses more negative polarity than the 
Arts. The received idea of the sciences as more objective and more general, and of 
the arts as more subjective and more particular, would then suggest an extrinsic 
association of negative polarity with positive ESI scores as listed in Table 4.19. 
Included too is the result for the category of modality from corpus Chapter 3. This 
category comprises two separate scores for verbal and adverbial/adjectival 
modality, and so it may influence the overall score more than the other single 
categories. Finally, the marginally significant result of a preliminary quantitative 
analysis is also included (t = –1.8154; df = 860. 428; p = 0.06981). The t-test 
shows that the mean ESI of positive clauses is higher than that of negative 
clauses, albeit not significantly so. 
 
 
 
99 A classic example is the sentence All swans are white which, to be proved true, would require 
all swans in the universe to be examined and shown to be the correct colour, which is supposed to 
be impossible. On the other hand, No swan is white can be disproved quite readily. Framing 
hypotheses in a manner amenable to disproof is widely regarded as a sine qua non of scientific 
method. 
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Table 4.19 Predicted effects of polarity variants on ESI 
  Positive Negative 
Extrinsic modality + – 
 relativity – + 
 domain – + 
 t-test –0.07773053 –0.14650538 
 
A model containing main verb type, aspectual class, tense and subject type, as 
well as polarity and all its two- and three-way interactions was stepped down for 
each of the samples. 
 
4.4 Results 
 
Table 4.20 shows that the variables described above are rather unevenly 
distributed in the “naturally occurring” interview talk data. Talk type, voice and 
polarity are particularly uneven100, making it unwise to include them as factors in 
a mixed model. Furthermore, preliminary quantitative analysis revealed that their 
variants have significantly different mean ESI scores (see discussion of tables 
4.16, 4.18 and 4.19 above for t-tests), so they are likely to contribute a large 
amount of noise to the data set. For this reason, a sub-corpus was taken consisting 
of just the major variant of each of these three variables. This is referred to below 
as the NAP corpus (narrative talk type, active voice, and positive polarity). The 
mean ESI values are only significantly different for talk type, voice and polarity, 
and the statistical tests are reported under the relevant section below. 
 
100 ‘Particularly uneven’ means worse than the 90/10 split, which Guy (1993) suggests as a cut-off 
point in order to preserve the statistical power of significance tests. 
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Table 4.20 Distribution by levels of internal variables in full corpus 
Variable Level N (%) Mean ESI 
Main verb type mental 1051 (12.7%) –0.07802 non-mental 7219 (87.3%) –0.08478 
Aspectual class dynamic 4589 (55.5%) –0.09370 stative 3681 (44.5%) –0.07172 
Tense nonpast 6391 (77.3%) –0.08152 past 1879 (22.7%) –0.09207 
Subject type noun 1224 (14.8%) –0.05229 pronoun 7046 (85.2%) –0.08941 
Talk type evaluative 464 (5.6%) –0.02155 narrative 7806 (94.4%) –0.09019 
Voice active 8116 (98.1%) –0.08650 passive 154 (1.9%) –0.05195 
Polarity negative 744 (9.0%) –0.14651 positive 7526 (91.0%) –0.07773 
 
Figure 4.2 is a histogram showing the frequency distribution of ESI values in the 
NAP corpus. The data are approximately normally distributed, although there is a 
slight right skew, and a degree of leptokurtosis. Figure 4.3 is a Q-Q plot which 
shows that the distribution closely approximates normality in the central region 
where the bulk of the data are to be found, with a slight sigmoid deviation for 
more extreme ESI scores (i.e. below –2 or above +2). Shapiro-Wilk tests on 
samples of these data confirm that they deviate significantly from normal (p < 
0.001). This means that non-parametric statistical tests should be used on this data 
set. However, parametric tests such as ANOVA can still be informative in cases 
where data is not normally distributed, provided one is cautious when interpreting 
them. I will therefore proceed cautiously with parametric tests on these data. 
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Figure 4.2 Frequency distribution of EI scores in NAP corpus 
Figure 4.3 Q-Q plot of ESI values in NAP corpus. 
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There is a wealth of research on the interactions between social categories such as 
class, ethnicity and gender in conditioning the behaviour of linguistic variables (for 
discussion see e.g. Milroy and Gordon 2003: 88–92).  For this reason, it is standard 
practice in sociolinguistics to use statistical modelling not merely as a means to test 
hypotheses, but also to explore which interactions are able to explain more or less 
of the variation in the dependent variable under investigation (see e.g. Gries 2013: 
255–59). This exploratory approach is particularly suited to an initial quantitative 
study of the linguistic behaviour of a population that has not yet been well 
characterized. I therefore adopt the standard sociolinguistic practice here of 
stepping down from models including all 2- and 3-way interactions in respect of all 
recorded social factors in Chapter 5, and of all recorded linguistic factors in the 
present chapter.101 
A linear mixed model was fitted to the interview sub-corpus data using the 
R statistical software (R Core Team 2013). Along with the dependent variable 
(epistemic stance index ESI), four predictors were included (main verb type, 
aspectual class, tense, and subject type), as well as all their two- and three-way 
interactions.102 This maximal model was stepped down by eliminating the third-
order interaction with the highest p-value greater than 0.05 and re-running the 
new model until no non-significant (p > 0.05) third-order interactions remained. 
This procedure was repeated for those second-order interactions and main effects 
not contained in any higher-order interaction. Where a model term was of 
101 In both cases, all independent variables will be treated as fixed factors and none as co-variates. 
This is because the effects of the independent variables are unknown at this exploratory stage. In 
terms of the statistical package being used to perform the regression, models are built and function 
in exactly the same way whether variables are held to be co-variates or fixed factors (which is in 
contrast to other statistical packages, such as SPSS, where co-variates and fixed factors are 
incorporated into a model in separate steps) (Erez Levon, p.c.). 
102 The four-way interaction was too sparsely populated to be run in R. Furthermore, ‘interactions 
of an even higher order are extremely difficult to understand’ (Gries 2013:259).  
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marginal significance (i.e. its p-value would round down to 0.05 if expressed to 
two decimal places), it was not eliminated from the model. Each time, the new, 
smaller model was compared to the immediately larger model using a deletion test 
(an F-test) to check that the model term just removed indeed made no significant 
difference to the goodness of fit of the model. This procedure is described in 
Crawley (2007: 323–29). 
Tables 4.21 and 4.22 summarize the results of model step-down; the size 
and nature of the effects are discussed in Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.7 below. 
 
Table 4.21 Analysis of variance table of type 3 with Satterthwaite approximation 
for degrees of freedom for final linear mixed model of NAP corpus 
Fixed effects Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F statistic Denom p(>|F|)  
VerbType 1 0.0223 0.0223 2.2542 6950.4 0.133293     
AspClass 1 1.6056 1.6056 7.8327 6953.5 0.005145 ** 
Tense 1 0.0062 0.0062 2.2813 6960.0 0.130988     
VerbType × AspClass 1 4.7154 4.7154 6.2903 6948.6 0.012162 *  
VerbType × Tense 1 2.7798 2.7798 3.7506 6950.0 0.052830 .  
 
 
ANOVA Table 4.21 shows which variables have a significant effect on the ESI 
score. In this case, there is a main effect for aspectual class (AspClass), and a 
significant interaction between main verb type and aspectual class (VerbType × 
AspClass). To see what contribution each variable level makes to the model, we 
need more detail than the ANOVA table provides. A linear regression summary 
table provides this detail for the present model in Table 4.22. 
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Table 4.22 Regression summary table of final linear mixed model of NAP corpus 
Fixed effects Estimate Std.Err t-statistic p(>|t|) 
 (Intercept) -0.18439 0.04351 -4.248 2.54 × 10–5 *** 
VerbType non-mental 0.09773 0.04167 2.346 0.01903 * 
AspClass stative 0.17169 0.06064 2.831 0.00465 **  
Tense past 0.14046 0.07714 1.821 0.06869 .   
VerbType non-mental × AspClass stative -0.16222 0.06468 -2.508 0.01216 *   
VerbType non-mental × Tense past -0.15763 0.08139 -1.937 0.05283 .   
Random effects Variance Std.Dev REML crit’n 17751.19 
Speaker 0.009304 0.09646  N (obs) 6967 
 Residual 0.741161 0.86091  N (speakers) 34 
  
 
Table 4.22 shows how various levels of individual variables, and of variables in 
two-ways interactions, change the value of the ESI that the model estimates. All 
these changes are relative to the so-called intercept value in the top row, which is 
the value for the ESI that the model estimates when all the variables are in their 
default levels. Default levels are the first level in alphabetical order for that 
variable as listed in Table 4.20.103 
In the case of aspectual class, stative verbs have an estimated ESI value 
0.17169 higher than the default value (dynamic verbs). This is a significant 
difference, as indicated by the t-statistic and p-value in the right-hand two 
columns. However, the presence of a significant two-way interaction between 
verb type and aspectual class means that the main effect of aspectual class is 
restricted to just the mental verbs (see following sections for further discussion).  
 
103 Where models contain only binary variables, the choice of default level has no effect on model 
estimates. This is not the case in models including variables with more than two levels, and this is 
discussed in Section 4.4.1. 
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4.4.1 Main verb type: Mental verbs only 
 
Initially a 9-way distinction between verb type was made based on my three 
mental categories, and those of  Biber et al. (1999: 360–64). Figure 4.4 shows the 
mean ESI for these 9 categories. The graph was plotted in R using a bootstrap 
method to estimate confidence intervals. The horizontal lines are the 95% 
confidence intervals, i.e. they are the range within which one can be 95% sure that 
the true mean value lies. Since most of the lines overlap, it appears that most of 
these categories do not have means that are significantly different from each 
another. Affective verbs are significantly different from alethic and activity verbs. 
Activity verbs comprise a large, semantically heterogeneous class containing 
‘actions and events that could be associated with choice’ and that ‘can take a 
semantic agent as subject’ (Biber et al. 1999: 361). 
 
Figure 4.4 Mean ESI of 9 classes of verb 
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Figure 4.4 shows aggregate means for each verb, so it does not control for other 
factors. In this section I focus on just the mental verbs (affective, alethic and 
epistemic), which were included in a new linear model, along with tense, again 
with ESI as the dependent variable. Subject type was not included due to its 
highly uneven distribution (6% or fewer pronominal subjects for all mental verbs). 
Aspectual class was not included since it is non-orthogonal to main verb type (see 
Section 4.4.2 below). Speaker was included as a random variable. 
 
 
Table 4.23 Analysis of variance table of type 3 with Satterthwaite approximation for 
degrees of freedom for final linear mixed model of NAP corpus (mental verbs only) 
Fixed effects Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F statistic Denom p(>|F|) 
 VerbType 2 7.3371 3.6685 5.7259 836.64 0.00339 ** 
Tense 1 1.8118 1.8118 2.8278 834.44 0.09302 .  
 
 
Table 4.23 shows that verb type has a significant effect on ESI score, while verbal 
tense has a marginally significant effect. Since this is a small, exploratory corpus, 
I suggest that it is less appropriate to strictly follow the mechanical procedure of 
eliminating factors with p-values below 0.05. The predictions for tense were 
mixed, so it may be that some clarification can be gleaned by retaining this non-
significant factor in the model. 
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Table 4.24 Regression summary table of final linear mixed model of NAP corpus 
(mental verbs only) 
Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error t-statistic p(>|t|) 
 (Intercept) -0.18649 0.04800 -3.885 0.00016    *** 
VerbType affective 0.24242 0.07344 3.301 0.00100 ** 
VerbType epistemic 0.04629 0.06280 0.737 0.46124  
Tense past 0.12154 0.07228 1.682 0.09302 .  
Random effects Variance Std.Dev. REML criterion 2055.7 
 Speaker 0.006547 0.08091 N (obs) 851 
 Residual                    0.640696 0.80044  N (speakers) 34 
  
Alethic verbs have been set as the default level for verb type since the three 
mental verbs may be thought of as lying on a scale of increasing subjectivity. 
Alethic verbs are supposed to introduce objective facts; epistemic verbs introduce 
facts as knowledge; and affective verbs introduce knowledge construed loosely, 
with or without the factive requirement. 
Table 4.24 shows that the behaviour of the mental verbs exactly 
contradicts the intrinsic prediction summarized in Table 4.11 above: alethic verbs 
associate with the most negative mean ESI scores. Epistemic verbs are non-
significantly higher (+0.05), and affective verbs associate with significantly 
higher mean ESI scores (+0.24). This result partially supports the extrinsic 
prediction, which was based on extrapolating the corpus findings about the more 
objective alethic verbs and the more subjective epistemic verbs to the even more 
subjective affective verbs. Among the mental verbs, the past tense is associated 
with a non-significantly higher (+0.12) level of certainty, as measured by the ESI 
score, than the non-past, following the same trend as in the NAP corpus including 
all verbs. 
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I will now examine how the components of the ESI contribute to the model 
estimates for the mental verbs (Table 4.25) and for tense (Table 4.26). The darker 
grey panels of Table 4.25 are significant at the level of p = 0.05, while those in 
lighter grey are significant at the level of p = 0.1. The ‘composite ESI’ of the 
bottom row is the same one estimated by the models so far discussed. The 
‘component sum’ is the sum of the column of figures above it, which are 
estimates by the same model of values for the six different ESI components. In 
other words, the same model was run six times with a different ESI component as 
the dependent each time. 
 
Table 4.25 ESI component contributions for main verb type 
  Intercept (Alethic) Epistemic Affective 
ESI component Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
V–modality -0.01845 0.02566 0.01500 0.03228 0.02649 0.03775 
A–modality -0.02433 0.01065 0.01497 0.01438 0.01971 0.01681 
Domain -0.07307 0.02639 0.02974 0.03305 0.06510 0.03864 
Relativity -0.01424 0.02172 -0.02337 0.02664 0.06906 0.03113 
Comparators -0.06247 0.01606 -0.00241 0.01865 0.03739 0.02180 
Degree 0.00862 0.02151 0.00614 0.02757 0.02706 0.03224 
Component sum -0.18393 0.03102 0.04007 0.01820 0.24480 0.02116 
Composite ESI -0.18649 0.04800 0.04629 0.06280 0.24242 0.07344 
 
The sums of the component estimates are slightly different from the composite 
ESI scores because the assumptions of the models change when a single 
component of the ESI is included as a dependent instead of the full composite 
ESI. For this reason, comparing six different model runs on different components 
in this way is not strictly meaningful. It does however provide a guide to how 
much each component contributes to the overall significance (or lack thereof) of 
the composite ESI score. 
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Only the relativity component of the affective verb ESI score is significant by 
itself. Modal verbs and adverbs make no significant contribution to any mental 
verb’s ESI score, or to those of past or non-past tense (Table 4.26). However, the 
non-significant trends are encouraging for the ESI, and especially for the theory it 
relies on. In Table 4.25, all the ESI components show an overall pattern of being 
more positive for affective verbs than epistemic or alethic verbs, and most of the 
ESI components are more positive for epistemic than alethic verbs (except 
relativity and degree). This means there is an overall progression from more to 
less epistemically cautious ESI scores from left to right in the table. The relativity 
component is more positive for more objective verbs, and the score for objectivity 
follows the opposite trend to the rest of the ESI components by getting more 
negative from left to right among the evidential verbs (alethic and epistemic). For 
the non-evidential affective verbs (prefer, like, love, want), this trend is disrupted. 
The more positive (“more objective”) score here suggests that the affective verbs 
are cancelling the evidential reading of the stance elements in favour of rhetorical 
reading. In other words, objective variants like really and actually relate to how 
knowledge claims join up with the “real” or “actual” external world in clauses 
containing evidential verbs, whereas in clauses containing affective verbs, they 
relate to the subjectivity of the speaker, and hence they can be applied less 
cautiously. 
 These trends are thus suggestive of different epistemic policies being 
applied for different main verbs. However, these suggestions are not statistically 
reliable, and we will explore the effect of epistemic policy shift on ESI score in a 
more statistically principled manner in the next chapter. A second hint may be 
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gleaned from Table 4.26. Here the various modal elements are behaving in a more 
muddled way, being more positive in the past for verbal modality and degree, and 
more negative for the rest. 
Table 4.26 ESI component contributions for tense 
Intercept (Non-past) Past 
ESI component Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
V–modality -0.01845 0.02566 -0.00271 0.03718 
A–modality -0.02433 0.01065 0.01958 0.01654 
Domain -0.07307 0.02639 0.03005 0.03807 
Relativity -0.01424 0.02172 0.04361 0.03068 
Comparators -0.06247 0.01606 0.03138 0.02149 
Degree 0.00862 0.02151 -0.00267 0.03175 
Component sum -0.18393 0.03102 0.11924 0.01907 
Composite ESI -0.18649 0.04800 0.12154 0.07228 
4.4.2 Main verb type: Mental versus non-mental Verbs 
Mental verbs are present in only 13% of all tokens, so it is not clear how 
important their contribution is to ESI scores. Furthermore, main verb type and 
aspectual class are not orthogonal, yet, in order to compare the effects of these 
variables on mean ESI, it is necessary to include both in the same model. To make 
this possible, the four levels of main verb type were binned into two: mental 
(alethic, affective and epistemic) and non-mental (all other) verbs. Since the 
resulting mental level will consist of 329 alethics, 330 epistemics, and 192 
affectives, one would expect that the behaviour of the mental verbs will be 
dominated by the alethics and epistemics, and that therefore they should have a 
more negative mean ESI score than non-mental verbs. ANOVA Table 4.21 
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revealed that there is in fact no significant difference between the mean ESI scores 
of mental and non-mental verbs (F1,6950.4 = 2.2542; p = 0.133293). Regression 
Table 4.22 however shows that the fitted model estimates a significant difference 
between the lower ESI of mental verbs and the (+0.10) higher ESI of non-mental 
verbs. 
4.4.3 Main verb aspectual class 
ANOVA Table 4.21 shows a significant main effect for aspectual class (F1,6953.5 = 
7.8327; p = 0.005145). Table 4.22 shows that switching from dynamic to stative 
class is, as predicted, associated with an increase in ESI (of around +0.17; t = 
2.831; p = 0.00465).  
Figure 4.5 Effect of main verb type and aspectual class on mean ESI score 
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Figure 4.5 illustrates the significant qualitative interaction between main verb and 
aspectual class (F1,6948.6 = 6.2903; p = 0.012162): while stative verbs have overall 
higher mean ESI scores than dynamic verbs, it now appears that this is only 
significant for mental verbs. This is likely to be due to the fact that, while 
epistemic verbs are split between dynamic and stative classes, all affective verbs 
(associated with positive ESI) are stative, and all alethic verbs (associated with 
negative ESI) are dynamic. The non-significance of the difference between 
aspectual classes for non-mental verbs (see Figure 4.5) suggests that it is actually 
main verb type that is responsible for the significance of this interaction, not 
aspectual class. Furthermore, a t-test revealed that the stative and dynamic 
epistemic verbs do not have significantly different mean ESI scores (t = –0.9713, 
df = 318.037, p = 0.3322), again suggesting that aspectual class cannot account 
for this interaction. 
4.4.4 Tense 
ANOVA Table 4.21 shows that the mean ESI scores of past and non-past clauses 
did not differ from one another significantly (F1,6960.0 = 2.2813; p = 0.130988). 
However, Table 4.22 shows that past tense clauses are (non-significantly) higher 
than non-past (t = 1.821; p = 0.06829) by about 0.14 ESI units. There is therefore 
very weak linguistic evidence in support of the prediction based in the intrinsic 
epistemic meaning of tense: that one can generally be more certain about past 
events. There is also a marginally significant interaction between main verb type 
and tense (F1,6950.0 = 3.7506; p = 0.052830), and, as illustrated in Figure 4.6, 
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mental verbs were more differentiated than the non-mental verbs, although token 
numbers were lower, leading to larger standard errors. Table 4.27 shows that 
affective verbs occurred with past tense at a rate comparable with non-mental 
verbs (24%), while alethic and epistemic verbs were less likely to be found in the 
past tense (around 16%). This could account for the differentiation by tense of the 
mental verbs. 
Table 4.27 Number and relative frequency (%) of past and nonpast tensed verbs 
Non-past Past 
Total words 8908 5099 
N f N f 
Affective 146 76.0 46 24.0 
Alethic 277 84.2 52 15.8 
Epistemic 275 83.3 55 16.7 
Non-mental 4659 76.2 1457 23.8 
Figure 4.6 Effect of main verb type and tense on mean ESI score 
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4.4.5 Subject type 
 
 
Table 4.28 Mean ESI score by subject type 
Subject Mean ESI N (%) 
I -0.1109 1862 (36.47) 
Excl_we  -0.1533 276 (5.41) 
We_generic                   0.06061 90 (1.76) 
You -0.1067 64 (1.25) 
You_generic  -0.1163 926 (18.14) 
3rd_person_inanimate               -0.1201 1504 (29.46) 
3rd_person_animate  0.04206 892 (17.47) 
Expletive -0.0977 334 (6.54) 
Noun  -0.0523 1019 (19.96) 
 
The tendency across epistemic and disciplinary divisions was to use pronominal 
subjects in around 85% of clauses. Somewhat unsurprisingly, the data for subject 
type were rather noisy, as Table 4.28 suggests. No significant differentiation in 
terms of ESI score was found between pronouns and nouns in this most 
articulated model or in any principled concatenation of this variable. Subject type 
was thus eliminated from the models during step-down, indicating that it in fact it 
is not useful as an explanatory variable in these data, i.e. subject type is not a 
predictor of mean ESI value.  
 
4.4.6 Talk type, voice and polarity 
 
Table 4.20 showed that talk type, voice and polarity variables occurred with 
prohibitively uneven distributions, and these variables were therefore controlled 
during the examination of the remaining variables in all models so far described. 
Given the significant differentiation between the levels of these variables with 
respect to mean ESI scores shown in Tables 4.16, 4.18 and 4.19 above, mixed 
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modelling was attempted with samples that were balanced with respect to these 
variables. The results were highly variable, likely due to the low token number. 
An analysis will therefore not be attempted here, and these variables could be 
investigated in future work. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
There is little evidence that the variables considered above make an intrinsic 
contribution to the ESI, with the exception of mental verbs, which behaved rather 
differently in the interview data than in the corpus data. This differentiation was 
masked as a main effect in mixed models where the lexical aspect of the main 
verb was also included as a variable. This is because the non-orthogonality of 
these two variables meant that main verb type had to be collapsed into mental and 
non-mental verbs. The interaction between main verb type and lexical aspect 
provided evidence that aspect was a less useful predictor of ESI than main verb 
type. This was despite intrinsic and extrinsic epistemic reasons for expecting 
stative verbs to have higher ESI scores than dynamic verbs. There was a marginal 
effect for tense in the predicted direction, suggesting that tense too is a less useful 
predictor of ESI than main verb type. 
Subject type was eliminated during step-down modelling. This is 
surprising in view of the number of studies in the AE literature that find 
differential use of personal pronouns in research articles and speech in 
comparisons between even closely allied disciplines. The more articulated models 
including the full range of personal pronouns revealed no significant patterns, and 
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neither did the binary opposition between nominal and pronominal subject. The 
latter is surprising given different disciplines’ patterns of nominalization, and 
given the widespread practice of constructing arguments by referring to previous 
parts of text (including speech) with pronouns. 
Talk type, voice and polarity were all too unevenly distributed to permit 
robust analysis, however, t-tests revealed significant differentiation in mean ESI 
for these variables. Narrative talk has a more negative ESI than evaluative talk. 
The passive voice is associated with higher ESI scores than the active voice, as 
predicted. Positive polarity clauses had marginally significantly higher ESI scores 
than negative clauses, contradicting prediction. 
Despite the a priori plausibility that ubiquitous grammatical features such 
as pronominal person, lexical aspect, tense and voice should contribute to 
epistemic stance, there is little evidence here that the ESI is sensitive to their 
distribution. This may be due in part to their polysemy, however it also hints that 
the contribution that those internal factors make to epistemic stance is orthogonal 
to modality, speaker-relativity and generality as operationalized here. In other 
words, if ESI is indeed capable of capturing epistemological difference, then it is 
doing so at a different linguistic level than that explored in this chapter. Indeed, if 
ESI can be shown to track epistemological difference, this would suggest that the 
linguistic construction of epistemological difference is operating at the discourse 
level rather than at the level of isolated linguistic variables. This interpretation 
suggests that the linguistic expression of epistemic stance, i.e. the collocation of 
particular evidential variants, is a supralinguistic phenomenon. In other words, it 
suggests that stance elements are composed in response to social epistemological 
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pressures rather than due to influence from within the linguistic system. In short, 
style is social. In the next chapter I explore this possibility by investigating how 
the ESI interacts with external (social) variables. 
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Chapter 5. Interview Methods and Results (External Factors) 
 
In the last chapter, I developed a novel epistemic stance index (ESI) to 
operationalize epistemic stance. My interview transcriptions were segmented into 
clausal tokens, and each token was assigned an ESI score and also coded for a 
range of internal (linguistic) and external (social) variables. The last chapter 
analysed the effect of internal variables on ESI score; the present chapter deals 
with external variables. 
A clausal token contains propositional content which we can roughly 
understand as the “main information to be communicated” by the clause. In 
addition to propositional content, clausal tokens also contain evidential language 
which conveys what the speaker thinks about the propositional content as 
knowledge, e.g. whether it is certain or doubtful, universal or particular. I coded 
six evidential variables, assigning them scores of ±1 for each variant, and then 
summed them to get a single ESI score for each clausal token, as exemplified in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary of ESI components 
ESI component + – 
modal verb strong must, will, should 
weak 
may, might, could 
modal adverb/adjective strong necessarily, certainly, sure 
weak 
maybe, perhaps, possible 
relativity objectifier actually, in fact, really 
subjectifier 
personally, I’d say, for me 
domain generalize all, generally, always 
restrictor 
particular, some, sometimes 
degree intensifier very, indeed, completely 
softener 
somewhat, a little, fairly 
comparator equator exactly, precisely, equally 
approximator 
roughly, basically, sort of 
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Higher ESI scores are attributed to stances of greater certainty, objectivity and 
generality, and lower scores to stances that are more hedged, subjective and 
particular. In Chapter 4, I investigated whether the ESI is sensitive to internal 
variables such as tense, voice and lexical aspect, and found, surprisingly, that only 
main verb type appeared to contribute in a consistent manner to ESI scores. In 
other words, epistemic stance, as measured by the composite ESI score, is not 
affected by the grammatical features of the proposition (pronominal person, 
lexical aspect, tense and voice). The main verb of the proposition did affect ESI 
scores, with alethic verbs scoring lowest, followed by epistemic and then affective 
verbs. 
 In the present chapter I investigate whether the ESI is sensitive to external 
variables. I apply a novel, epistemologically-grounded, sociodemographic 
variable based on the notion of epistemic policy developed in Chapter 1. 
Epistemic policies are “ways of seeing” that are shaped by beliefs, values, and 
attitudes concerning the nature of knowledge. Based on their responses to 
interview questions, I categorize participants as having a wide or narrow epistemic 
policy range (EPR). I then perform a multivariate analysis of the effect on ESI 
scores of this novel EPR variable, as well as of affiliation to a particular academic 
division (Arts/Humanities, Social Sciences, and Science), and the traditional 
sociolinguistic variables age, sex and native language (L1), as well as institutional 
affiliation. In addition to these sociodemographic variables, I also include topic as 
a variable in order to look for linguistic variation within the speech of individuals. 
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5.1 External variables: Operationalization and coding 
 
Recall from Chapter 4 that 34 interviews (a total of just under 34 hours of 
recordings) were transcribed, and a subset of these transcripts was segmented into 
8270 clausal tokens. Epistemic stance index (ESI) scores were assigned to each 
clausal token, and I now develop predictions in terms of ESI scores for each of the 
external variables listed in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 External variables 
Variable type Variable Levels   
Dependent ESI (continuous) 
Independent EPR narrow, wide 
 academic division arts, humanities, sciences 
 topic autobiography, impact, 
teaching, subject, research 
 sex female, male 
 academic age younger, older 
 institution Birkbeck, Goldsmiths, 
Imperial, King’s, 
Queen Mary, UCL 
 L1 English, other 
Grouping speaker 34 participants 
 
 
5.1.1 EPR 
 
In Chapter 1, I reviewed the classical “ordinary-language” analysis of knowledge, 
namely, that in order to know a proposition p, you have to believe p, and p has to 
be justified and true. I symbolised this analysis of knowledge as JTB or B(JT).104 
This analysis raises questions such as: Whose language? What is “ordinary” 
104 B(JT) means belief in a justified truth. Justified truths can be called knowledge (e.g. knowledge 
stored in a book), but it would be odd for most people to say that the book knows anything. The 
verb know, then, seems to require belief by a knowing subject, whereas knowledge can exist 
without a knower. 
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language? What is belief? What is justification? And what is truth? I argued that 
the answers to these questions are partially constitutive of an epistemic policy. An 
epistemic policy, then, is an experience filter: a way of seeing and interpreting the 
world. It comprises a theory of knowledge (e.g. “knowledge is JTB”), and a way 
of finding things out (e.g. introspection), imbued with values, attitudes and norms. 
We all have several epistemic policies at our disposal that are each better or worse 
suited to particular epistemic tasks. 
I argue for a linguistically constructed view of epistemic policy. This 
means that our beliefs and attitudes about knowledge are materialized, or 
performed, linguistically, but also that they are constituted by linguistic practice. 
For example, the forms of talk habitually used in academic disciplines become 
enregistered as Medical English or Legal English, and those specialist registers 
make certain ways of knowing possible. Medical English stereotypically 
depersonalizes patients by referring to them as their disease: I saw an interesting 
case of plague today. This depersonalization may enable doctors to be more 
objective by abstracting a disease away from its psychosocial context. 
Unfortunately it can also make patients feel dehumanized or disenfranchised from 
their own health management. In this case, then, the linguistic expression of the 
medical epistemic policy of abstracting diseases from patients can be poorly 
received by patients who do not see their own disease as distinct from their lived 
experience of it. The slogan “Treat the patient, not the disease” is a reminder to 
doctors not to fall into this trap, and it is supposed to cause changes in medical 
practice in order to reduce this epistemic mismatch. This slogan has become 
popular among clinicians in recent decades as patients become more litigious, e.g. 
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to protect doctors from being sued for battery. At the same time, the notion of 
treating patients rather than diseases reflects a move towards personalized 
medicine in the age of genomics, as well as an increased understanding of the 
multifactorial nature of disease and health processes. The multilevel patient model 
is taught to today’s medical students, as are the linguistic practices that instantiate 
that refocused epistemic policy, e.g. the use of open questions in doctor-patient 
consultations, and the idea of “negotiating” a treatment plan. In summary, 
registers are the linguistic instantiation of consensus epistemic policy; language 
produces and reproduces epistemic policy. 
It is possible to conceive of a medical doctor applying a holistic, 
multilevel epistemic policy during a consultation with a patient, and then, having 
agreed a course of action, switching to an abstract, analytic epistemic policy in 
order to interpret test results or discuss treatment options with colleagues. It might 
not always be clear which epistemic policy in one’s repertoire is most appropriate 
in all situations. A doctor might be unlikely to consider an unorthodox course of 
action like homeopathy, perhaps objecting that “unorthodox medicine” is simply 
not a medicine: if it worked, then it would be part of the orthodoxy. An alternative 
position might be to consider a placebo response (i.e. an amelioration in health in 
response to a simulated treatment) to count as an effective treatment. If a patient 
were so skeptical of orthodox medicine that the only possible intervention they 
would consider would be homeopathy, then this might be the best course of action 
from an orthodox perspective too.105 Doctors who would consider homeopathy in 
105 Provided one could overcome the ethical problem of deceiving a patient “for their own good”.  
                                                     
232 
 
addition to the two epistemic policies described above have a wider epistemic 
policy range than those who would never consider it. 
Having briefly revisited the concept of epistemic policy, and illustrated 
what I mean by epistemic policy range (EPR), I now describe how I classified 
each interview participant according to their EPR. There are at least as many 
possible epistemic policies as there are people, and epistemic policies are 
somewhat nebulous entities. They consist of an analysis of knowledge (e.g. JTB), 
but also a range of other supporting beliefs and values (e.g. lying to a patient is 
bad). I developed a way of measuring epistemic policy range by measuring how 
participants’ judgements about knowledge varied in response to two experimental 
philosophy scenarios. I also looked at the content of their interview responses, in 
particular, what they said about the nature of knowledge, especially in terms of 
their values and attitudes with respect to knowledge. In this way I classified each 
participant as having a narrow or wide EPR. 
 I argued in Chapter 1 that the academic consensus analysis of knowledge 
is JTB. This means that academics will only describe their research output as 
knowledge if it is justified, true belief. Furthermore, justification has to be 
internal, since part of producing knowledge in academia is reproducing the means 
of production. In other words, knowledge claims have to be justified in order to 
count as knowledge claims; without justification, claims are mere opinion. This 
means that researchers must have reflective access to their means of justification: 
they must know how they know. However, researchers may informally ascribe 
knowledge in situations where the justification is not available to conscious 
reflection. The Gettier scenarios below are designed to elucidate this very 
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distinction: whether a participant is an internalist or an externalist about 
justification. Internalists require that, to know p, you have to have mental access 
to the justification for p. Externalists do not require mental access to justification, 
and they attribute knowledge as long as p is justified “somehow”. I call this 
variable view of justification J-policy. 
Participants were asked to read these two scenarios at the end of the 
interview. Their responses are shown in Table 5.3 below. 
 
1. Jill’s Buick (Gettier 1963) 
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob 
therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, 
however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not 
aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind 
of American car.  
 
Which word best completes the sentence below? 
 
Bob ___________ that Jill drives an American car. 
 
believes doubts  knows 
 
 
2. Truetemp scenario (Weinberg et al. 2001) 
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his 
brain becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever 
he estimates the temperature where he is. Charles is completely 
unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, 
this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his 
room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that 
it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room.  
 
Which word best completes the sentence below? 
 
Charles ___________ that it was 71 degrees in the room. 
 
believes doubts  knows 
 
Some participants stuck to the same response for both scenarios, and some 
changed. Those that stuck to the same answer throughout have a narrower EPR 
234 
 
because they accept a smaller number of ways of justifying knowledge (J-
policies) than those that changed. A narrower J-policy range indicates a narrower 
overall EPR. 
 
Table 5.3 Participants’ responses to two Gettier problems 
N (%) 1. Jill’s Buick  2. Truetemp reliabilism Int/ext 
21 (62) believe believe + int 
4 (12) believe know + ext 
3 (9) know believe106 –  
2 (6) either believe – int 
2 (6) believe either + ext 
2 (6) either either – ext 
 
 
The most common response (62%) was that neither Bob nor Charles knows 
anything, but rather merely believes it. This response indicates consistent 
internalism about justification since, although Bob and Charles are correct, neither 
of them knows why. Worse still, Bob is correct for the wrong reason: his 
knowledge is justified by out-of-date information; he is correct now only by 
accident. On the other hand, Charles (Mr Truetemp) is correct for good reasons: 
he has a reliable mechanism in his brain. He’s just not aware that he does. 
A J-policy of reliabilism and internalism is required for writing up 
research. Knowledge claims need to be shown to have been arrived at via a 
procedure that one can trust to work more generally than just in the production of 
that one piece of knowledge (reliabilism). Furthermore that justification has to be 
106 This response is surprising because it requires holding that knowing something by accident is 
knowledge, while knowing it because of a reliable mechanism is not. What the response may 
indicate is a process of attuning to philosophical scenarios, i.e. that the first scenario was answered 
naively, while the second was considered as a philosophical “trick” question, and so, more 
exacting standards of knowledge were applied to it. In this case, too, a shift of epistemic policy is 
implied. 
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explicated, so the researcher needs reflective access to it (internalism). All other 
responses indicate a variable J-policy since they are departures from the research 
norm. 
The classification of respondents according to wide or narrow J-policy 
range is indicative of wide or narrow EPR respectively, but I allowed this 
classification to be overridden if wide or narrow EPR was demonstrated 
elsewhere in the interviews. Below are some examples of where this was the case. 
After all, J-policy is just one element of the analysis of knowledge, which itself is 
just one part of the epistemic policy that derives from classical epistemology. 
Classifying participants purely on the basis of their responses about Jill’s Buick 
and Mr Truetemp would not only leave the classification vulnerable to the 
influence of “natural language” (by being sensitive to Standard English semantic 
judgements), but it would also place unwarranted importance on the analytic 
utility of classical epistemology. I am assuming here that the classical analysis of 
knowledge as JTB is not quite so central to epistemology as has been historically 
assumed, so the importance of J-policy should likewise be regarded as just one 
part of a more nuanced approach to classifying participants. I now illustrate some 
ways in which I classified participants. Around a third of participants were put 
into a different category from that predicted by their responses to the Gettier 
scenarios. 
Extract (1) is an interview extract which follows a description by the 
participant of a cross-disciplinary seminar she attended about encouraging critical 
thinking in students. She had been surprised to hear a scientist complain about 
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students who are ‘rigid thinkers’. I asked whether she could identify more or less 
rigid thinkers in her own discipline.  
 
(1) 
there are people who work with one idea for the whole of their lives 
and don’t. I guess to me the distinction would be between people who 
are still really happy with the book they wrote twenty years ago or the 
people who say “god I would write that thing completely differently if 
I could do it now”erm and that those kind of poles of thinking you 
know the constant revision of ideas versus the you know I agree with 
myself twenty years ago like I agree with myself today those are two 
different ways of thinking which I don’t think you know divide 
between arts and sciences at all […] it’s probably a road to a happier 
life because you’re happy with the things that you’ve done but I fall 
very much into the other camp where you know I can’t bear the thing I 
wrote yesterday coz I would write it differently today so I wouldn’t 
say one’s better or one’s worse but certainly I get one and I don’t get 
the other so 
ARTS.10.F 
 
ARTS.10.F uses quite neutral language to describe the two ‘poles of thinking’, but 
by placing herself ‘very much into the other camp’, she strongly suggests that 
disagreement with one’s past self, and hence a wide EPR, is a ‘good thing’. 
LAW.24.M made the opposite evaluation spontaneously when I asked him how 
he decided to do a PhD, saying he went from law to sociology of law in order to 
acquire permanent, cumulative scientific knowledge rather than mutable positive 
law of legal practice: 
(2) 
I was already feeling dissatisfied with law. er because I think I always 
wanted to find a way of erm getting something I thought of as real 
knowledge and the the hang up I always had with law was that you 
could learn a set of rules about something and the next day the court 
of appeal the of the house of lords could say could change the law you 
know so all you your knowledge on that particular subject could be 
just blown out of the water because somebody in authority says so 
says it’s wrong and I go- I was really dissatisfied with that tried to find 
a way of making law something that would er study of law (what) 
produced cumulative knowledge and I sort of I got the idea that 
237 
 
sociology might be a good bet to do that erm as a sort of underpinning 
for law so I could look at law from the outside I could try and look at 
it as a social scientist 
LAW.24.M 
 
LAW.24.M makes a value judgement about knowledge, saying that ‘real 
knowledge’ is not learning a ‘set of rules’, but that it should be ‘cumulative’.107 
This means that LAW.24.M favours universal truths over contingent, local truths, 
and I therefore classified him as having a narrow EPR. This contrasts with 
ARTS.10.F. 
If speakers closed down lines of questioning, for example by saying that 
they had not thought about it and therefore could not comment, then this was 
considered suggestive of a narrow EPR (although it was not by itself treated as 
categorical evidence). Alternative responses to unexpected or novel questions were 
that the participant had not thought about it before, but could speculate. A third 
group had opinions on these matters that appeared more or less well-rehearsed. I 
took these three categories of response to indicate progressively wider EPR, since 
they provided increasing evidence of the participant habitually thinking seriously 
about issues that were outside of their research expertise, including the 
epistemological character of their discipline, and its relation to others. The 
following examples illustrate this with respect to the discipline of geography. 
Extracts (3) and (4) show participants rejecting the possibility of integrating 
physical and social geography, while Extract (5) takes the opposite position. In 
107 This point of view contrasts sharply with legal positivism which maintains that “the rules” is all 
that the law, and hence legal knowledge, can consist of. Rather, LAW.55.M is a positivist about 
the sociology of law: he is concerned with objective knowledge about the process through which 
laws are constructed and used. 
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Extract (3), I had just asked the participant to elaborate on his comment that one 
would rarely see a job advertisement for a “historical” geographer. 
 
(3) 
geography’s a very strange discipline. you know so you turn up to 
give a for a job interview give your to give your presentation and if 
the whole department of any department is there: you’ve got 
everything from hardcore natural scientists who spend all their time in 
the lab or in the field erm through you know people who look more 
like economists political scientists sociologists through: the full range 
of the humanities up to people who are you know doing either purely 
theoretical work or: erm you know working on erm you know 
performance (bases) and and and you know and culture so you know 
there’s a. it it’s:. it’s hard to in some senses find the sort of coherence 
erm some of it is very present oriented which means that studies in the 
past you know are not can be not valued and are certainly not valued 
in certain erm departments I’d always liked the idea of asking 
someone who’s given something very contemporary “what’s the 
relevance of this for the seventeenth century” you know. coz it seems 
to me to be a fair enough question 
GEOG.22.M 
 
 
GEOG.22.M calls geography ‘very strange’ because of its epistemological 
diversity. He also says that ‘coherence’ is hard to achieve, and extract (3) finishes 
with him inverting what he sees as the typical attitude of physical geographers to 
his research. This is suggestive that GEOG.22.M thinks that coherence is a good 
thing, but that it is impossible in geography, and he therefore stakes his position 
firmly in the social camp. For these reasons, I classed GEOG.22.M as having a 
narrow EPR. GEOG.19.M makes a similar point even more forcefully in Extract 
(4) when I asked him about whether the physical and social geographers in his 
department share common discussion fora: 
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(4) 
different colleagues have very different views about this erm. so. I 
think probably if you ask my colleagues about my view on it they’d 
say I’m fervently for a split in the discipline and I’m always the guy 
who takes the piss out of physical geographers and vice versa erm and 
that that’s partly true you know I to be honest even as an 
undergraduate I never really got the fact that I could be studying Latin 
American shanty housing one moment and an hour later be looking at 
glaciers it just didn’t make any sense to me probably coz glaciers 
didn’t make any sense to me what I couldn’t see the cross-over for the 
life of me and people would say geography’s great coz it’s integrates 
the human and physical and of course the environment’s so important 
now and and I in the abstract I yes but in reality hardly anyone’s doing 
that. and they may be doing it in certain fields like you know land 
slippages in you know I can see huge value in that but actually the 
importance of the physical environment to [my research]108 really. it’s 
irrelevant you know architectural form makes a difference but that’s 
not what physical geographers look at 
GEOG.19.M 
 
Extract (5) is a response to my asking a different geographer whether physical 
geography is more similar to ecology than to social geography: 
(5) 
erm yes er. I think there’s a continuum heheh so I don’t I don’t think 
there’s a some people I think would think (that) there’s a split in in the 
discipline and you’ve human geographers and physical geographers 
and there’s no overlap again I haven’t found that and that’s because a 
lot of the work I do is quite applied it affects human beingser it inf it 
affects the environment in which they live and of course on the social 
side there’s the. er understanding of how people ek exist within their 
environment whether it’s in their houses or ororor outside and how in 
a way they they benefit from that environment or they use that 
environment so there is a continuum ermbut I think if you go to the 
extremes of the discipline erm there is probably no overlap between 
them no common language I mean it’s geography is an amazing 
discipline in how broad it is but in the area I’m in with the relevant 
area of social science I think there is it’s a bit like dealing with the 
ecologists it’s understanding where people are coming from and just 
and just knowing how to order things and how to package them and I 
think the other thing that is happening now erm probably partly driven 
by the REF and now need for impact and all the rest of it erm but it 
means that many people in geography now are focusing on erm 
societal needs for their work er and in doing that it is very logical to 
108 The research topic was removed as it may identify the participant. 
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work hand in hand with social scientists to move fields forward? so I 
think not only am I getting a better understanding of what the social 
scientists do but they’re getting a better understanding of what I do er 
in order to make their social science be founded on fairly solid natural 
science so 
GEOG.39.F 
 
GEOG.39.F is quite hard to gauge from this extract. She says that she has not 
found a clear separation between social and physical geography in her own 
research, but she allows that there might be non-overlapping approaches at ‘the 
extremes of the discipline’. Extract (5) ends with her suggesting that social 
science should ‘be founded on fairly solid natural science’, which strongly 
suggests a restricted view of what social geography means in comparison to that 
held by social geographers themselves. However, given the fact that GEOG.39.F 
also presents her work to, and collaborates with, engineers, policymakers, as well 
as academics from nearby but distinct disciplines, I classed her as having a 
(relatively) wide EPR due to the positive attitude towards epistemological 
pluralism that this suggests. 
I predict that participants classified as having a wide EPR will be more 
variable in the epistemic stances that they take across different topics. Topics were 
designed to promote divergent epistemic policies, as discussed below in Section 
5.1.3. If a participant has a narrow EPR, then I suggest that they will apply a 
relatively small number of policies across variable topics. This could correlate 
with less variable stance-taking behaviour overall, i.e. less variable ESI scores, 
among the narrow-EPR participants. 
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5.1.2 Academic division 
Perhaps the most important defining aspect of disciplinarity is that of a common 
object of study, and a shared set of ‘taken-for-granted values, attitudes, and ways 
of behaving’, i.e. epistemic policies, ‘which are articulated through and reinforced 
by recurrent practices’, e.g. epistemic stances (Becher and Trowler 2001: 23). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, disciplines have been analysed as discourse communities 
(e.g. Swales 1990), having a ‘broadly agreed set of common public goals’, and 
using specialized lexis and genres to achieve those aims. I suggested that these 
broad common goals are epistemological; that they are epistemic policies of the 
most fundamental type, restricting the range of epistemic commitments that 
‘count’ as legitimate within that discipline. At a smaller social scale, where small 
groups of individuals come together in mutual engagement, the model of the 
community of practice is more appropriate. For example, a departmental seminar 
or a research group reading group. However, these communities of practice are 
embedded within the epistemological matrix of the discipline, and the linguistic 
practice of such a community of practice must concord with the discourse of the 
wider discipline. In short, the academic discourse community is a large, diffuse 
social structure that reproduces itself discursively, and it is socially and 
linguistically reproduced by communities of practice whose epistemic 
commitments are ratified by those wider disciplinary norms. It is for future work 
to examine how academic communities of practice interface with the 
sociolinguistic structure at the level of the disciplinary discourse community 
discussed in the present work. 
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Members of an academic discourse community have a ‘broadly agreed set of 
common public goals’, and, I suggest, this promotes distinctive ways of seeing 
things, or epistemic policies. Furthermore, I argue that these epistemic policies are 
linguistically constructed: they are produced and reproduced via the taking of 
(epistemic) stance. In other words, the linguistic features that materialize 
epistemic stance become a distinctive way of speaking (or writing) for a 
community of practice centred on a common research object. A disciplinary 
consensus about how to produce knowledge is then produced and reproduced by 
the habitual taking of particular epistemic stances, and by habitually avoiding 
other epistemic stances (e.g. avoiding reliance on anecdotal evidence in 
medicine). Stances produce and reproduce epistemic policies, and a discipline’s 
totality of stances produce and reproduce its epistemic policy range. 
Institutional infrastructure is another defining aspect of disciplinarity. The 
establishment of a physical department populated by researchers receiving or 
generating funding not only facilitates the production of new knowledge—it 
elevates the status of that knowledge to a level more commensurate with wider 
academia. In other words, an area of study only becomes a fully-fledged discipline 
once it is built into a physical university. This makes a disciplinary community 
even more visible and distinctive than they were as a mere group of like-minded 
scholars; now they have an official status as Women’s Studies or Biosciences. At 
the same time, the linguistic materialization of their distinctive set of epistemic 
stances also becomes distinctive: it becomes enregistered. In other words, 
disciplinary register is language that has become recognizable as a distinctive way 
of speaking which is appropriate to the epistemic policies of that discipline. 
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 My interview participants affiliate with six academic disciplines, namely, 
critical studies, law, geography, economics, physics and mathematics (see Table 
4.2, reproduced below as Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4 Interview participants’ vital statistics 
Discipline EPR Sex Native? Academic age 
 N W F M Y N Mean SD 
Critical Studies 3 3 4 2 5 1 11.5 3.51 
Law 1 4 1 4 5 0 22.8 10.76 
Geography 4 3 4 3 6 1 16.7 11.54 
Economics 3 1 1 3 0 4 11.8 5.12 
Physics 6 0 1 5 3 3 15.7 9.05 
Maths 5 1 0 6 5 1 16.0 8.85 
Total 22 12 11 23 24 10 15.8 8.93 
 
 
We saw in Chapter 3 that disciplines are not monolithic with respect to their 
linguistic behaviour. Variability in evidential verb use at the largest scale of 
academic disciplinary structure (the “Two Cultures”) was recapitulated at smaller 
scales, within a single discipline in the case of psychology, and also within the 
sub-discipline of sociolinguistics. I argued that this recursive patterning of 
epistemic stance variables was related to epistemic policy diversity within 
disciplines. In short, psychology and sociolinguistics permit a range of epistemic 
policies, and that range is parallel to the range that exists across the whole of 
academia. Psychology and sociolinguistics were chosen as test cases precisely 
because of their epistemological diversity, and in the present chapter I investigate 
whether this internal structure generalizes to less epistemologically diverse 
disciplines. A discipline such as law is characterized by a relatively wide EPR 
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since it contains epistemologically divergent (and possibly irreconcilable) 
approaches to law such as legal positivism and social constructionism. In contrast, 
a discipline such as physics is relatively narrow: if you take a social 
constructionist approach to electronics, then you’re no longer “doing physics”. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship between academic discipline and EPR.  
 
critical 
studies law geography economics physics maths 
 Arts  Social Science  Science  
 The Arts   Science  
Figure 5.1 The relationship between disciplinarity and EPR 
 
 
The six disciplines are arranged from wide to narrow EPR from left to right. 
Critical studies is a constitutively pluralistic research programme. Critical theory 
aims to interrogate the forces shaping discourse, including research discourse. In 
other words, critical theory is reflexive since its research focus is partly directed at 
its own methods and assumptions. Law and geography are “broad church” 
disciplines that tolerate a range of approaches, but which do not necessarily 
integrate them. So-called “black letter law” tends to be distinct from the sociology 
of law, and physical geography tends to be distinct from social geography. The 
geography Extracts (3–5) above from members of the same department illustrate 
that responses to intra-disciplinary difference can be quite varied. 
Economics is a social science that has taken up critical approaches to a 
smaller extent than geography. It is rare to find a Marxist economist, let alone a 
post-structuralist economist. Physics and mathematics are narrower still. During 
analysis, this six-way disciplinary distinction was collapsed into three academic 
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divisions: Arts comprised critical studies and law; Social Sciences comprised 
geography and economics; and Science comprised physics and maths. This is 
represented by the middle row of Figure 5.1. C. P. Snow’s (1959) ‘Cultures’ are 
also shown, with The Arts and Science overlapping the social and physical 
aspects of the discipline of geography. The spectrum of wide to narrow EPRs is 
represented impressionistically by the gradual shift from grey to white (note that 
the balance is skewed to wide in The Arts and to narrow in Science). 
 To summarize, EPR is a property of individuals and of disciplines. In 
Section 5.2.1, I explained how individuals were categorized as having wide or 
narrow EPRs. In the present section I have presented a picture of disciplinarity 
that emerges from individual practice such that disciplines are categorized by the 
collective EPR of their members. Disciplines in the science division have 
narrower EPRs than those in the social sciences, and those in the arts have the 
widest EPRs. Individual members of these disciplines will tend to “match” their 
disciplinary EPR, but, given the linguistic constructionist model of disciplinarity, 
they are also able to agentively depart from it and exhibit an EPR that is atypical 
for their discipline. 
 I predict that the arts and social sciences divisions will show more 
variability in ESI scores than the physical sciences. If a division permits only a 
narrow EPR, then I suggest that its members will apply a relatively small number 
of policies across variable topics. This could correlate with less variable stance-
taking behaviour overall, i.e. less variable ESI scores, in the physical sciences 
compared to the other divisions. Furthermore, the corpus results in Chapter 3 
showed that science journals feature more weak than strong modality, and more 
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alethic than epistemic evidential verbs. Weaker modality contributes to a more 
negative ESI score. In contrast, alethic verbs connote objectivity and epistemic 
verbs connote subjectivity (see Chapter 3). This means that the corpus pattern for 
evidential verbs, if borne out in the interview data, would predict a more positive 
ESI score for the physical sciences. It is difficult to predict a priori which of these 
effects will dominate in speech data, although the latter effect was more robust in 
the corpus analysis of research articles since it showed recursive instantiation in 
discipline-level sub-corpora. 
 
5.1.3 Topic 
 
Recall from Section 4.4 that my interviews followed the following modular 
structure: 
 
A. Research and professional background 
B. Teaching and impact 
C. (Inter)disciplinarity 
D. Experimental philosophy scenarios 
 
Interview responses were coded into five topic areas with distinct epistemic 
characteristics: impact, teaching, autobiography, subject and research (see Figure 
5.2). 
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    Political       Impact      Subject 
 
 
        Teaching 
 
 
      personal  Autobiography    Research 
 
 
    subjective     objective 
           I-policy 
 
Figure 5.2 The epistemic dimensions of topic 
 
Autobiography is talk about the participant’s own life, particularly how they 
became an academic. Teaching covers what courses they teach, and what they 
think about teaching, students and their misconceptions. Impact covers talk about 
the political funding and measurement of research outcomes, including the 
RAE/REF. Subject refers to established, canonical knowledge claims of that 
discipline. Research refers to the participant’s own, more tentative, nascent 
knowledge claims. I classify the five topics according to two dimensions as shown 
on the diagram (cf. Levon’s 2009 two-dimensional division between 
narrative/opinion and gay/non-gay topics). The horizontal dimension is I-policy, 
i.e. investigative policy. This is the epistemic relativity of the researcher to the 
objects of their knowledge claims: do they make the claim on the basis of their 
own subjective experience, or is it due to some objective, mind-independent 
criteria? The vertical dimension on Figure 5.2, epistemic authority, can either 
derive from the person speaking, or from a political structure such as a discourse 
community. This means that knowledge claims can be made by individual 
Epistemic 
authority 
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academics on behalf of just themselves or on behalf of their discipline. This 
distinction is not clear-cut, and I will return to Goffman’s (e.g. 1974) participant 
roles to clarify the distinction further. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that Goffman proposed four participant roles with 
respect to a turn in conversation. The animator of an utterance is the person 
uttering it. The author is the person who wrote or formulated the utterance. The 
principal is the person on whose behalf the utterance is being made: they are 
ultimately responsible for the views expressed in it. The figure is ‘the social 
persona or ‘character type’ indexed by the uttering’ (Levon 2012: 204). In 
autobiographical talk, speakers are animating words that they have authored 
(either during the interview or in the past), and they are the principals of their own 
life stories. The figure indexed by this state of maximal alignment has been called 
the speaker’s natural figure, i.e. figures ‘that are the closest to what a person is (or 
desires to be); they are, in essence, acts of identity through which speakers 
animate a claim to a particular identity category’ (Levon 2012: 204; based on 
Hastings and Manning 2004). Autobiographical speech, then, is assumed here to 
reflect the participants as natural figures. Speakers can disalign their participant 
roles strategically, and I argue that this disalignment is the normal case for the 
other topics in interview. For example, the use of gestural “air quotes” or “eye 
rolls”, prosodic or voicing contrasts, or the use of quotatives or metacommentary 
can clarify that a speaker’s utterance is their own words but that the utterance 
“follows the party line” with which they agree (i.e. alignment of author and 
animator, but disalignment to principal). On the other hand, a speaker can use 
these linguistic means to indicate that what they are saying is a quote from an 
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official document or an imperative from a senior administrator with whom they 
disagree, i.e. which they animate while being neither author nor principal of the 
message. 
The topic of impact is a matter of heated discussion in all disciplines. The 
underlying idea is for funding bodies, and ultimately governments, to be able to 
establish that research offers value for money. What makes impact contentious is 
that ‘value for money’ means different things to different people, and there is 
quite pervasive concern that it will be applied narrowly as short-term, local, 
measurable economic impact. PHYS.34.M explains that, had such a narrow 
conception been in operation in the early 20th century, then it would have 
dismissed quantum theory and general relativity as low-impact blue skies 
indulgences. He illustrates his point in Extract (6) 
 
(6) 
it’s actually counter-productive. there was a committee that met very 
seriously in the early sixties I think it was they came out with the 
conclusion that the country needed three computers. one for the 
military one for weather forecasting and one for everything else 
PHYS.34.M 
 
When even such clearly economically impactful research is in jeopardy, the 
position of research with less tangible forms of impact looks quite bleak, as 
Extract (7) suggests: 
 
(7) 
I think there are intellect intellectual rationale for erm rewarding 
impact or consideration of impact in certain cases but to impose it 
across the board is is very dangerous and what is happening at the 
moment is absolutely erm. wrong in my view 
CRIT.10.F 
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The majority view among participants on the topic of impact was disdainful, but a 
sizeable minority were optimistic. In all cases, the epistemic authority for 
speakers’ responses did not rest merely on the shoulders of the individual, but was 
carried by the academic enterprise as a whole. This political authority and 
concomitant righteous indignation tended to be expressed as ready-formed or 
‘soapbox’ opinion, which Labov (2001b: 91) describes as the ‘extended 
expression of generalized opinions’. In Goffman’s (1981) terms, this means that 
the speaker is not presently authoring their utterance, rather, the content has been 
authored in the past. I suggest too that in the case of impact, and to a lesser extent 
teaching, the author (and possibly principal) is a collective one. In other words, 
pre-formed stretches of talk about impact and teaching are likely to have been 
‘worked out’ among academic peers. The epistemic authority for talk on the topic 
of impact therefore goes beyond the individual speaker: it is social or political 
authority. The following extracts show speakers referring to sources of epistemic 
authority outside themselves on these matters with the implication that eventually, 
a definitive definition of impact will be provided from outside. 
(8) 
I have a problem with it which is. that you can’t really use impact as a 
criterion to decide whether something is good or not because most of 
the time we don’t know what impact what things will have impact 
because it is like trying to read in the you know the crystal ball you 
don’t know what the conditions of the future will be that will make 
something produced in the recent past more or less relevant 
ARTS.15.F 
(9) 
I think in as far as I understand how what I understand of the impact is 
is yeah I mean you’re right I mean they’re not so much interested in 
the in the research impact on the research community that’s true 
ECON.11.M 
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ARTS.15.F talks in Extract (8) about the meaning of impact being external to her 
ken, and indeed unknowable in principal without some means of foreseeing the 
future. ECON.11.M refers in Extract (9) to ‘they’ who are setting the criteria for 
what would count as impact. ARTS.13.F also refers in Extract (10) to a socially 
grounded notion of impact which has ‘come on stream’ recently. This phrase 
implies that impact is an initiative which has been imposed from outside rather 
than a self-evident notion. 
 
(10) 
I I see it as quite a positive term I think it’s the difficulty with it is 
that. it has come on stream so recently that if you if you if you’re 
going to take it on board as part of your kind of picture of what you’re 
doing erm it requires some substantial adjustments and I II don’t think 
they are impossible adjustments 
ARTS.13.F 
 
(11) 
no I feel it’s going a lot of it’s going and I’m very disgruntled about it 
I am extremely critical of the research assessment exercise now (it’s) 
research excellence framework. I did write about this years ago I 
wrote an article in Times Higher Education supplement when I 
reported back on no it wasn’t the RAE but it was then when they had 
HEFCE higher education funding council of England when they sent 
in inspectors colleagues who were meant to be looking at your 
teaching and I wrote an article about my experience of our HEFCE 
inspector who came in and listened to me giving my class after a very 
good lunch where he’d had a little bit too much to drink and he was 
listening with his eyes shut breathing very heavily and I made that into 
a story about the value of this I’m extremely I understand completely 
that one has to decide how to allocate public purse and resources erm I 
think there are such it’s a system point the system has grown too big 
for itself it thinks it can do what it can’t do and what it doesn’t 
understand er I’ve got no solutions for this but I’m very critical of er 
of of the R E F I think it’s rubbish there we are and I’ve said it on tape 
LAW.39.M 
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LAW.39.M cites in Extract (11) an example of a failure of government oversight, 
and concludes with a general statement that ‘the system has grown too big for 
itself’. In both cases, he implies that impact and performance monitoring in 
general is doomed to failure: academia is too unwieldy to interface productively 
with politics as an evaluating force, and it also cannot evaluate itself in the form 
of an integrated political academia. In all these examples, speakers refer to 
epistemological limits. Either these are “hard limits”, i.e. unknowables in the 
future or unknowables implied by the nature of a reflexive system, or they are 
“contingent limits”, i.e. we just have not got the full picture yet of how this 
outside influence will play out for us in academia. 
Talk about teaching was quite generic; it did not in general deal with 
discipline-specific pedagogy or recent innovations in teaching practice. 
Postgraduate teaching qualifications were mentioned by some (especially 
younger) participants, but this tended to be for the purpose of situating an 
anecdote on a different topic. Even against the potentially challenging backdrop of 
the increasing commercialization of higher education, teaching was viewed less 
emotively than impact, and as more of a legitimate component of the academic 
profession that had been “signed up for”. The source of epistemic authority on the 
topic of teaching was either personal or political. In talk changing topic from 
autobiography to teaching to impact, then, speakers were able to draw on political 
authority to an increasing extent by disaligning their role as animator from that of 
author/principal. This produced two contrasting types of figure: the natural figure 
and the political figure. By strategically casting themselves as political figures, 
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academics were able to epistemically “close ranks”, and share the burden of 
epistemic responsibility among a wider academic discourse community. 
The last two topics were quite different. On the topic of subject or 
disciplinary knowledge, speakers draw their epistemic authority from the 
consensus of disciplinary members about the ‘hard core’ (Lakatos 1970) of 
knowledge and methods, i.e. knowledge that is part of the disciplinary canon, and 
that, as such, is more objective than the other topics described. This knowledge 
has been subjected to multiple triangulated interrogations and cross-examinations 
over many years, and it has been ratified by the community as counting as 
knowledge. In talk about this consensus subject knowledge, speakers index a 
disciplinary figure. This is an idealized scholarly figure whose epistemic authority 
derives from the epistemic policies of that discipline. This is in contrast to the 
political figure whose epistemic authority is largely detached from the content of 
research proper. Political epistemic authority could for example derive from a 
democratic vote; disciplinary authority cannot derive in this way. 
Finally, the research topic deals with knowledge that is on its way to 
becoming disciplinary consensus, relying partly on the epistemic authority of the 
discipline in terms of the theories and methods it uses, but also partly on the 
epistemic authority of the researcher. In summary, I argue that talk about research 
puts the speaker in the role of animator and author of their own words. They may 
also be principals, although among my participants this role would be more 
naturally ascribed to the research group, department, university or funding body. 
 The five topics were binned into 3 groups as represented in Figure 5.2 
above, where autobiography is isolated, impact and teaching are grouped as 
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generic academic topics, while research and subject are grouped as discipline-
specific topics. This was done to make the initial exploration of interactions more 
tractable: the more articulated model appeared to produce significant interactions 
with every other variable, and it was not clear if this was meaningful or the result 
of a noisy data set. Comparisons between all five topics are made throughout this 
chapter in the extracts of interview talk. 
I predict that participants will apply similar epistemic policies to 
autobiographic talk, treating subjective knowledge justified by personal authority 
as legitimate. I anticipate a relatively uniform shift towards more positive ESI 
scores for generic topics (teaching and impact), as participants draw on an 
academy-wide pool of epistemic resources and therefore are able to sound more 
epistemically confident. Conversely, I anticipate that participants will diverge on 
specific topics (subject and research) as they draw increasingly on their discipline-
specific epistemic policies, and hence that specific topics will correspond to a 
wider range of ESI scores. 
 
5.1.4 Academic age 
 
Participants were split into two groups intended to approximately fall either side 
of a salient career progression milestone: progression to professorship. The 
average time between gaining a PhD and becoming a professor varies between the 
disciplines, and depends on exigencies such as flexible working, maternity and 
paternity leave, budgetary constraints and the personal choices of the researcher. 
A cut-off of 10 years post-PhD was chosen as a compromise between these 
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factors: after 10 years, researchers generally begin to become eligible for 
professorships. 
I discussed language socialization in Chapter 1. This is the process 
whereby a speaker acquires the communicative norms of a community. The 
degree of competence that a speaker exhibits with respect to community norms, 
i.e. the extent to which they can ‘pass’ as community members (Bucholtz 1995), 
depends on how long they have been exposed to, and participating in, that 
community’s linguistic practices. One would therefore predict that academics 
would “sound more like” their disciplines if they have spent more years working 
in them. 
 In addition to this process of socialization, it is possible that speakers 
change the way they speak for other reasons. First is the possibility of age grading 
for reasons other than socializing into a community or acquiring ‘discoursal 
expertise’ (Swales 1990: 27). In the case of epistemic language for example, it is 
possible that people generally sound more confident with age. This would give all 
older participants higher ESI scores across the board. Another possibility is 
historical change: the meaning and use of the linguistic forms in question could be 
changing in the English language generally (however defined). If the general 
tendency in English were towards less confident-sounding ESI scores, then this 
might be reflected in the academic population too. Thirdly, there could be some 
combination of socialization, age grading and language change. 
Academics may change their epistemic stance-taking throughout their 
careers, exhibiting age grading of some ESI components, possibly becoming more 
epistemically confident with experience. This putative age grading in the direction 
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of higher ESI scores with age agrees partly with Lakoff’s (1990: 159) bell-shaped 
curve discussed in Chapter 4. In particular, Lakoff’s suggestion was that PhD-
level language is the most formal or most typical of the discipline, while language 
use becomes less formal with age.  
Leech, Hundt, Mair and Smith (2009: 73–75) observe recent historic 
change in modal verb use. They note a 10.6% fall in core modal frequency109 in 
written corpora and 11.8% in spoken corpora between 1961 and 1991. These 
findings are suggestive of a change in progress, but the decline was least marked 
in “learned” writing where there was in fact a non-significant increase in modal 
frequency (but almost entirely restricted to can and could). At the same time, 
semi-modals such as have to and be going to have increased at a similar rate, 
albeit at absolute frequencies too low to account for the drop in core modals.110 
Leech et al. sketch an explanation in terms of the epistemic policies of academia: 
 
It is difficult to hazard an explanation, without careful qualitative 
study of the data, of why the Learned sub-corpus bucks the trend in 
this way. Why should a genre that is otherwise very ‘written’ show 
an increase of modals, which are favoured by spoken language? In a 
number of ways, however, as we shall see, Learned writing is more 
conservative and conformist than other varieties, adhering to fairly 
strong conventions regarding what are considered ‘decent 
standards’ in academic communication. One aspect of this is the 
habitual avoidance of categorical assertions of truth and falsehood. 
The qualification of such assertions, through modal concepts such 
as ‘possibility’, ‘necessity’ and ‘likelihood’, is deeply ingrained in 
academic habits of thought and expression, and might well be on 
the increase. 
 
(Leech et al. 2009: 75) 
 
109 ‘Core modal’ here means verbs like must and may, i.e. not morphologically different modal 
verbs such as dare to, and need/s (see e.g. Coates 1983). 
110 Around 6 times too low in writing, and around 3 times too low in speech. 
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The possibility that academia is becoming more concerned with making epistemic 
stance explicit is interesting, and suggests that younger academics may use more 
epistemic stance elements than their older counterparts, but it is not clear that this 
should result in more positive or more negative ESI scores. 
Leech et al. also hint at the possible explanatory role of democratization, 
suggesting that current political exigencies may disfavour deontic modality which 
makes power inequality salient. It is not clear why this argument should be 
restricted to deontic modality (see discussion of modal flavour in Chapter 3). It is 
likely, then, that modal change is taking place in the UK and US, but that the 
special epistemic character of academia is resisting this change. 
 In summary, there appear to be several conflicting language socialization 
effects possibly operant on the academic population. As they age, they may sound 
more discipline-typical, or they may relax from the disciplinary standard and 
become more informal. There is also a possible diachronic process of heightened 
epistemic language use. This process, if robust, may be being driven by younger 
or older academics independently, or it may be present across the board. 
 
5.1.5 Sex 
 
Weston (2009) found that UK and US lecturers’ sex was a weaker predictor of 
their pronoun choice, use of tense and modal verb strength than their disciplinary 
affiliation. That may be borne out here, but the interview context may make 
intersubjective considerations more important to speakers than would be the case 
in lectures. In other words, the tension between the use of epistemic language for 
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politeness rather than for expressing an epistemic stance may be shifted towards 
the former in interviews. 
Research on language and gender has found that, on average, women use 
more positive politeness strategies than men (for reviews see e.g. Holmes 1995; 
Holmes and Stubbe 2003). This disparity in linguistic behaviour has been linked 
to disparity in power. In other words, many women’s more polite or deferential 
language corresponds to their relatively subjugated role in patriarchal society (for 
review see e.g. Thimm et al. 2003). “Women in academia” are also “women in 
society”, so it may be expected that, in taking stances, many female academics 
will draw more frequently than men on linguistic resources of deference and 
politeness. These resources are often ones of weak epistemic force including 
modal verbs (in imperatives such as could you pass me that?), hedges, and self-
undermining phrases (I don’t know anything about this but…). It is not clear 
whether the epistemic use of these forms, which I have argued is especially salient 
for academics, will tend to down-regulate their use in doing politeness work. If 
this is the case, then it might be expected that women and men’s language will be 
more disparate at the early stage of their academic careers, and that they will 
converge as they socialize towards a more exclusively epistemic use of evidential, 
and away from their use as politeness markers. 
 This putative levelling of language variation between the sexes assumes 
that academia is a less patriarchal system than society at large. However, Table 
5.4 shows that considerable gender disparity exists in the disciplines, although it 
has improved markedly in the last decade. Physics and mathematics are the 
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slowest reformers, and one immediately wonders about the extent of the social 
practices maintaining that sexist skew. 
 
Table 5.5 Percentage of female academic staff in UK universities111 
Discipline 2005 2008/09 2010/11 
Physical sciences 19 24 25 
Mathematical sciences 22 26 27 
Social sciences112 45 45 47 
Humanities113 35 38 39 
Law 41 47 48 
Languages 50 54 56 
Creative arts/ Design 39 42 43 
 
 
This is suggestive that, if a convergence effect is in operation, it will be more 
marked in e.g. law than in physics, because law seems to be a more egalitarian 
discipline. 
 
5.1.6 Other external variables 
 
The final two external variables are institutional affiliation and native language 
(L1). All participants were affiliated to institutions within the University of 
London, except for 3 at Imperial College London which has been independent 
since 2007. 4 participants were at King’s College London, 2 at University College 
London, and one each at Birkbeck and Goldsmiths. The majority of participants 
(23 out of 34) were affiliated to Queen Mary. There are too few participants from 
most of these institutions to permit meaningful comparison between them. It is 
possible to compare Queen Mary affiliates to all others, i.e. to examine whether 
111 Data compiled from Metcalf, Rolfe, Stevens and Weale (2005: 55) and HEFCE report Staff 
employed at HEFCE-funded HEIs: Trends and profiles 1995–96 to 2010–11 (2012: 28). 
112 The 2008/9 and 2010/11 percentages are for ‘Social/political/economic studies’. 
113 The 2005 percentage is for ‘Historical and philosophical studies’. 
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affiliation to Queen Mary corresponds to linguistic practices distinct from other 
colleges within the University. Queen Mary is distinctive from the other federated 
colleges in a number of respects. It is in the East End of London, and it draws a 
large portion of its student population from that area. It is also a campus 
university, offering on-site accommodation to all first year students. It also places 
a particularly high emphasis on student experience—particularly in terms of 
fostering a welcoming atmosphere. All of these factors could contribute to a less 
formal linguistic environment, possibly characterized by less cautious epistemic 
language (and hence higher ESI scores). 
Everyone interviewed was fluent in English and had had research articles 
published in English. However, some participants were native speakers of 
English, and others had learnt it as their second or third language. 10 out of 34 
participants had a language other than English as their L1: 4 had Italian, and one 
each had Brazilian Portuguese, Russian, German, Swedish, French, and Greek. 
Although it is questionable whether non-natives can be said to form a valid 
analytic category, there were certainly too few participants of any language other 
than English to permit statistical treatment of them individually. Furthermore, 
non-natives will have received explicit instruction about e.g. modality in a way 
that native speakers will not. I will therefore include L1 as a binary category. The 
effect of this on ESI is difficult to predict, but it could make participants find 
modal language more salient, and it could make them more likely to use it in its 
dictionary use rather than as a bleached discourse marker, or for politeness. If this 
is the case, then non-natives might use less evidential language in general, and 
have lower ESI scores than their native colleagues. 
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5.2 Results 
 
Linear mixed models containing all two- and three-way interactions between the 
external variables in Table 5.1 were fitted to the interview data using the R 
statistical software (R Core Team 2013). I explained above, in Sections 5.1.1 and 
5.1.2, that EPR and academic division are non-orthogonal categories. Scientific 
disciplines tend to have narrower EPRs than Arts disciplines. EPR and 
disciplinary affiliation were therefore included in separate linear regressions. 
 Table 5.6 shows that the levels of the six external variables were 
adequately evenly distributed. 
 
Table 5.6 Distribution of external variables by levels 
Variable Level N (%) Mean ESI 
EPR narrow 5280 (63.85%)  –0.10720 wide 2990 (36.15%) –0.04281 
Sex female 2709 (32.76%)  –0.11702 male 5561 (67.24%) –0.06779 
Academic age younger 2664 (32.21%)  –0.12950 older 5606 (67.79%) –0.06225 
Institution QMUL 5663 (68.48%)  –0.08441 Other 2607 (31.52%) –0.08285 
L1 English 5822 (70.40%) –0.08193 Other 2448 (29.60%) –0.08864 
Academic division 
arts 2682 (32.43%) –0.08799 
socsci 2647 (32.01%) –0.11636 
science 2941 (35.56%) –0.05100 
Topic 
biography 1654 (20.00%) –0.07013 
generic 3347 (40.47%) –0.07380 
specific 3269 (39.53%) –0.10125 
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5.2.1 EPR 
 
I begin in this section with models containing EPR as an external factor, and I 
substitute division for EPR in Section 5.2.2, where I also compare these two non-
orthogonal variables. Age, L1 and institutional affiliation were all eliminated 
during step-down, and the remaining main effects and interactions are shown in 
the ANOVA Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7 Analysis of variance table of type 3 with Satterthwaite approximation 
for degrees of freedom for final linear mixed model containing EPR (main corpus) 
Fixed effects Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F statistic Denom p(>|F|) 
 EPR 1 2.2283 2.2283 5.9443 29.6 0.020988 * 
Topic 2 1.6058 0.8029 0.9024 8247.1 0.405654 
 Sex 1 3.4311 3.4311 3.7407 31 0.062289 . 
L1 1 0.133 0.133 0.0317 31.6 0.859737 
 Topic×Sex 2 7.8483 3.9242 4.8077 8255.8 0.008189 ** 
Topic×L1 2 8.5509 4.2754 5.5078 8248 0.00407 ** 
 
 
There is a main effect for EPR, and no other main effects. Topic and L1 were 
retained in the model because those variables participate in two-way interactions. 
I will return in subsequent sections to these various effects, but will focus on EPR 
in the present section. 
Table 5.7 on the next page is a regression summary, with variables shown 
in normal type, and levels in italics. Main effects are shown in the upper portion 
of the table, and remaining two-way interactions in the lower portion. 
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Table 5.8 Regression summary table of final linear mixed model containing EPR 
(main corpus) 
Fixed effects Estimate Std.Err t-statistic p(>|t|) 
 (Intercept) -0.1355 0.056969 -2.378 0.02 * 
EPR wide 0.105721 0.043362 2.438 0.021 * 
Topic generic -0.12113 0.047538 -2.548 0.0109 * 
Topic specific -0.01212 0.0487 -0.249 0.8034 
 Sex male 0.054953 0.059443 0.924 0.3574 
 L1 other -0.03791 0.059528 -0.637 0.5254 
 Topic generic× Sex male 0.113724 0.05601 2.03 0.0423 * 
Topic specific× Sex male -0.02416 0.05668 -0.426 0.67 
 Topic generic× L1 other 0.140907 0.058244 2.419 0.0156 * 
Topic specific× L1 other -0.00464 0.058323 -0.08 0.9367 
 Random effects Variance Std.Dev REML crit’n 21456.37 
Speaker 0.008442 0.09188 N (obs) 8270 
 Residual 0.776246 0.88105 N (speakers) 34 
  
Table 5.8 shows how various levels of individual variables, and of variables in 
two-ways interactions, change the value of the ESI that the model estimates. All 
these changes are relative to the so-called intercept value in the top row, which is 
the value for the ESI that the model estimates when all the variables are in their 
default values. Topic was entered with biography as the default level. In this way, 
the contrast between biography and specific topics (subject and research) and 
between biography and generic topics (impact and teaching) can be assessed, 
which correspond respectively to the contrasts represented by the horizontal and 
vertical axes in Figure 5.2, i.e. I-policy (subjective to objective) and epistemic 
authority (personal to political). In the case of EPR, the default value is narrow, 
and the second row shows that a wide EPR corresponds to an estimate of 
0.105721, which is a significant value (as indicated by the t-statistic and p-value 
in the right-hand two columns). This is the amount by which the estimated ESI 
value increases for wide EPRs compared to narrow. In other words, the model 
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estimates that a narrow EPR has a relatively lower ESI, and that a wide EPR has 
an ESI 0.105721 larger. 
The difference in mean ESI of narrow and wide EPRs is shown in Figure 
5.3, which is a graph plotted in R using a bootstrap method to estimate confidence 
intervals. The vertical lines are the 95% confidence intervals, i.e. they are the 
range within which one can be 95% sure that the true mean value lies. The dot in 
the middle of each line is the mean ESI aggregated across that EPR category 
(these are the same values as quoted in Table 5.6). 
There is good agreement between the model estimate and the mean 
aggregate data. Both show wide EPR having a higher ESI, and both indicate that 
this difference, though modest in absolute terms, is significant at the p = 0.05 
level. 
Figure 5.3 Graph of aggregate mean ESI versus EPR 
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My prediction was that a wider epistemic policy range (EPR) would correspond to 
a more variable epistemic stance index (ESI). This has not been shown to be the 
case, rather, a wider EPR corresponds to a higher ESI score than a narrow one. 
The difference is of the order of 0.1 ESI units. This result agrees with the modal 
verb behaviour in the “Two Cultures” corpus in Chapter 3. I discuss this result 
further in Section 5.3 below. In the next section, I perform a similar analysis as in 
this section, but I use academic division in place of EPR in the linear regression 
model. I then compare EPR and division before examining the remaining external 
variables. 
 
5.2.2 Academic division 
 
Table 5.9 shows that academic division and institution were the only significant 
main effects in its regression model. The remaining external variables were 
retained during step-down because they participated in two- and/or three-way 
interactions. For example, even though the two-way interaction between topic and 
age is not significant by itself, because it is contained within a significant three-
way interaction, it must be retained in the model. 
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Table 5.9 Analysis of variance table of type 3 with Satterthwaite approximation 
for degrees of freedom for final linear mixed model containing academic division 
(main corpus) 
Fixed effects Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F statistic Denom p(>|F|) 
 Division 2 2.5479 1.2739 10.1752 18.6 0.00104 ** 
Topic 2 1.6968 0.8484 1.5917 8237.4 0.203645 
 Sex 1 0.7498 0.7498 0.0026 18.3 0.960151 
 Age 1 1.6418 1.6418 0.5475 20 0.467959 
 L1 1 0.0268 0.0268 3.1922 18.6 0.090288 . 
Institute 1 0.2011 0.2011 18.7236 19 0.000363 *** 
Division × Sex 2 1.25 0.625 5.4945 18.3 0.013498 * 
Division × Age 2 1.4313 0.7156 11.8465 19.6 0.000427 *** 
Division × L1 2 0.8775 0.4387 6.3336 18.4 0.008088 ** 
Topic × Age 2 4.0503 2.0252 2.5158 8235.4 0.080863 . 
Sex × L1 1 0.4498 0.4498 9.0155 18.1 0.007615 ** 
Age × Institute 1 20.6118 20.6118 26.1039 18.5 6.71 × 10–5 *** 
Division × Topic × Age 8 18.7905 2.3488 3.0267 8214.2 0.002132 ** 
 
 
There is a significant main effect for division, but it also participates in two- and 
three-way interactions with sex, age, L1 and topic. Once a higher-order interaction 
is present in a model, it becomes difficult to interpret its component interactants 
independently of each other. 
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Figure 5.4 Graph of interaction between academic division, topic and age 
 
Figure 5.4 represents the three-way interaction between division, topic and age. 
The error bars are large, indicating that there is no statistically significant 
differentiation of mean ESI across the groups, except in the case of academics in 
the arts division discussing generic topics. In this case, older participants have 
significantly higher ESI scores than their younger counterparts. This is the source 
of the significance for division in ANOVA Table 5.9. Regression Table 5.10 
indicates that this is indeed the only statistically significant differentiation within 
this three-way interaction. Given the appearance of the distributions in Figure 5.4 
however, one must be circumspect about interpreting this. In particular, although 
the differentiation between younger and older arts academics on generic topics is 
statistically significant, the actual mean ESI values fall within the error bars of 
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several other categories. In short, these data are noisy, and it may be the case that 
the linear regression is “modelling noise”. 
 
Table 5.10 Regression summary table of final linear mixed model containing 
academic division (main corpus) 
Fixed effects Estimate Std.Err t-statistic p(>|t|) 
 (Intercept) 0.72116 0.15401 4.683 9.91 × 10–5 *** 
Division socsci -0.43002 0.10458 -4.112 0.000121 *** 
Division sci -0.13774 0.22032 -0.625 0.537155 
 Topic generic -0.29367 0.07256 -4.047 5.23 × 10–5 *** 
Topic specific -0.09629 0.07632 -1.262 0.20711 
 Sex male 0.07809 0.07023 1.112 0.279971 
 Age older -0.84802 0.15848 -5.351 9.89 × 10–6 *** 
L1 other 0.06434 0.12291 0.523 0.6069 
 Institute QM -0.68666 0.13712 -5.008 8.16 × 10–5 *** 
Division socsci × Sex male -0.24446 0.11214 -2.18 0.042203 * 
Division sci × Sex male -0.61556 0.1863 -3.304 0.003896 ** 
Division socsci × Age older 0.68047 0.14816 4.593 2.49 × 10–5 *** 
Division sci × Age older 0.80678 0.19883 4.058 0.000233 *** 
Division socsci × L1 other -0.62609 0.17592 -3.559 0.002234 ** 
Division sci × L1 other -0.54797 0.19018 -2.881 0.009864 ** 
Topic generic × Age older 0.34297 0.09505 3.608 0.00031 *** 
Topic spec × Age older 0.0964 0.09787 0.985 0.324693 
 Sex male × L1 other 0.41224 0.1373 3.003 0.007615 ** 
Age older × Institute QM 0.63129 0.12356 5.109 6.71 × 10–5 *** 
Div socsci × Top gen × Age yng 0.41608 0.09986 4.167 3.12 × 10–5 *** 
Div sci × Top gen × Age yng 0.16522 0.12991 1.272 0.203482 
 Div socsci × Top spec × Age yng 0.15768 0.10293 1.532 0.125592 
 Div sci × Top Spec × Age yng -0.13468 0.13222 -1.019 0.3084 
 Div socsci × Top gen × Age old -0.05605 0.08798 -0.637 0.524139 
 Div sci × Top gen × Age old 0.00305 0.07889 0.039 0.969157 
 Div socsci × Top spec × Age old -0.0364 0.08817 -0.413 0.679715 
 Div sci × Top spec × Age old -0.01937 0.07854 -0.247 0.805213 
 Random effects Variance Std.Dev REML crit’n 21477.33 
Speaker 0.004389 0.06625 N (obs) 8270 
 Residual 0.77602 0.88092 N (speakers) 34 
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Figure 5.5 shows the aggregated mean values of ESI across the three academic 
divisions. Social sciences are significantly lower than physical sciences, but both 
overlap with Arts/ humanities.  
 
Figure 5.5 Graph of aggregate mean EI versus disciplinary affiliation 
 
These aggregated data illustrate that the significance of academic division is not a 
main effect but a conditional effect, i.e. its significance in the ANOVA and 
regression tables (5.9 and 5.10) derives from the three-way interaction of division 
with topic and age. The arts are distinctive among the divisions because, when 
discussing generic topics, their speakers are differentiated by age. 
Binning the three-way distinction between academic divisions into the 
Two Cultures obfuscates all internal variability, as shown in Figure 5.6. 
270 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Graph of aggregate mean ESI versus “culture” 
 
In Section 5.1.2, I suggested that the arts/humanities, having a wider EPR, would 
have a wider range of ESI scores. This does not appear to be the case. Rather, 
there is marginal differentiation between social sciences and physical sciences, 
with the former having a lower mean ESI score. The model containing academic 
division contains a three-way interaction for division with topic and age, while the 
model containing EPR contains only a main effect for EPR. In other words, EPR 
is a quantitatively more important predictor of ESI than academic division. 
The difference in modelled behaviour between EPR and academic division 
could be due to the same kind of intra-disciplinary differentiation suggested by the 
corpus analysis in Chapter 3. The model containing EPR showed that wide EPR 
corresponds to a higher ESI than narrow EPR. If disciplines are, to varying 
degrees, “broad churches” that contain individuals with both narrow and wide 
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EPRs, then one would expect any differentiation in ESI score to be obscured by 
aggregating into disciplines. 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 break the ESI down into its components, and show 
the relative contribution that each component makes to the mean ESI scores of 
narrow and wide EPRs (Table 5.11) and the three academic divisions (Table 
5.12). Twelve separate regressions were run: one for each component of the ESI 
for both EPR and division. As a composite of different model regressions, these 
tables are thus only a guide to the relative contribution of each component to the 
ESI, although the total ESI calculated from these different models (‘component 
sum’) actually agrees quite closely with the model estimates reported in Tables 
5.8 and 5.10 (included again here as ‘composite ESI’). Only the shaded panels are 
significantly different from the intercept (light grey panels are marginally 
significant at p < 0.1).  
 
Table 5.11 ESI component contributions for EPR 
  (Intercept) Narrow Wide 
ESI component Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
V–modality –0.00637 0.02203 0.02122 0.01596 
A–modality –0.02591 0.01086 0.00764 0.00770 
Domain –0.04382 0.02231 0.00465 0.01385 
Relativity 0.02107 0.03050 0.01803 0.02472 
Comparators –0.09168 0.02406 0.01245 0.02018 
Degree 0.01208 0.02689 0.04174 0.02077 
Component sum –0.13463 0.04149114 0.10572 0.01334 
Composite ESI –0.13550 0.05697 0.10572 0.04336 
 
Every component is more negative for narrow-EPRs than for wide-EPRs except 
for relativity (a more positive relativity score means a more objective stance). 
114 ESI component sum ‘standard error’ is the standard deviation of all six components estimates. 
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This means that narrow-EPR participants use weaker modality, more restricted 
domain terms (particular, some), more softeners (fairly, a little), and more 
approximators (roughly); and they also use more objectifiers (actually, in fact, 
really). This concords with Salager-Myer’s (1992) claim that ‘the more universal 
the pretension of the claim, the more hedged the discourse’. In other words, in 
striving to be objective, narrow participants use more cautious evidential language 
to soften their broader claims. However, these differences are only statistically 
significant for the shaded panels. 
Table 5.12 in contrast shows a slightly more mixed picture in terms of the 
comparison between physical sciences and arts: the direction of difference in 
verbal (V–)modality is opposite to that for adverbial/adjectival (A–)modality. This 
undermines an explanation of modal use that is linked to EPR. Furthermore, 
although A–modality in social sciences is at a level between the two more 
epistemologically extreme disciplines, V–modality bucks this trend. With regard 
to domain, the physical sciences are the most general, the social sciences the least, 
and the arts at an intermediate position. Relativity, comparators and degree are 
highest in arts/hums and variably differentiated in the physical and social 
sciences. 
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Table 5.12 ESI component contributions for division 
  (Intercept) Arts Social Sciences Physical Sciences 
ESI component Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
V–modality 0.08132 –0.04964 –0.04964 0.04788 0.0673 0.10499 
A–modality –0.03947 0.0533 0.0533 0.02348 0.08437 0.05081 
Domain 0.00155 –0.01247 –0.01247 0.04504 0.1623 0.08689 
Relativity 0.33343 –0.13229 –0.13229 0.06426 –0.24256 0.14918 
Comparators 0.07183 –0.15342 –0.15342 0.04271 –0.15298 0.09734 
Degree 0.27136 –0.13341 –0.13341 0.0541 –0.05229 0.11987 
Component sum 0.72001 –0.42793 –0.42793 0.08219 –0.13385 0.1549 
Composite ESI 0.72116 –0.43002 –0.43002 0.10458 –0.13774 0.22032 
 
Again, the general picture is rather noisy when the data are analysed by discipline, 
and rather cleaner when analysed by EPR. EPR reveals patterns in the ESI 
components that are harmonic: the value of one component can be explained by 
reference to the others. This is not the case in the division by discipline, where A-
modality and V-modality are at odds, and the social sciences, which would be 
expected to occupy an intermediate position with respect to stance components is 
overall more negative than both other divisions. I therefore suggest that EPR 
reveals the underlying epistemological character of stance by contrasting two 
internally coherent patterns of stance-taking language. In contrast, an analysis by 
discipline is unable to do this due to its internal epistemological diversity which 
materializes in apparently chaotic aggregated stance-taking behaviour.  
 The following two extracts are from two participants who are both in 
literary studies, which is allied to the Arts epistemological archetype. However, 
ARTS.15.M has a narrow EPR and ARTS.10.F has a wide EPR. Their ESI 
averages for these extracts are almost the same, but they exhibit different patterns 
of stance taking as evidenced by ESI. 
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(12) Narrow (ARTS.15.M) 
literary studies is is a pretty fragmented discipline -1 
in the sense that there are so many different theoretical 
approaches to the subject 
+1 
which are informed by different often political orientations -1 
whichno longer really communicate with each other… 0 
and there’s very little discussion anymore among those 
different groups 
+1 
as to which method is the best one right 0 
I mean those discussions are over 0 
in the sense there’s just you have a position +1 
and you don’t necessarily go over to the other side -1 
so I think that’s a problem -1 
in the sense that I I still think that a me that a method of 
interpretation has to prove itself 
0 
to be the best method 0 
or to show that it has that it has cogency in comparison with 
other approaches to a text 
0 
and what I would liketo see happen is -1 
that there’d be renewed dialogue between different theoretical 
approaches 
+1 
Mean ESI 0.07 
 
In Extract (12), ARTS.15.M says of the proliferation of theoretical approaches 
that ‘I think that’s a problem’. He also says that these approaches are ‘informed 
by different […] political orientations’ which are serving to isolate approaches 
from each other. This suggests that he thinks that political convictions should not 
be allowed to fragment a discipline, i.e. that they should be external to the 
discipline’s theories. Rather, he suggests, interpretations (i.e. ways of seeing the 
facts) should be compared to others, and should survive on their merits, including 
‘cogency in comparison with other approaches’. I classed this as a narrow EPR, 
since it expresses a desire to separate subject matter from context, and to totalize a 
diversity of theoretical approaches into a single unified framework. 
Extract (12) is also instructive in that it shows that researchers are aware of 
variability (and even competition) in epistemic policy. He implies that a 
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multiplicity of incoherent policies is a bad thing, and a single big theory made of 
coherent parts is a good thing. This is a value judgement about epistemic policy 
range (that narrower is better). ARTS.10.F takes a different view. She suggests, in 
Extract (13), that individuals can have wide or narrow intrapersonal epistemic 
policy ranges (‘poles of thinking’), and also that the wide/narrow distinction is 
orthogonal to the arts/science divide. 
 
 
(13) Wide  ARTS.10.F 
i think there is never and there oughtn’t to be a consensus in 
these disciplines 
+1 
because the way that knowledge works 0 
and the way that people yeah the way that that thought works 0 
that you never come to a a closed framework or or a poi +1 
you never really come to a point of closure in that sense -1 
so these debates are 0 
what makes a a discipline healthy 0 
and i think that it’s right -1 
so in ten years’ time no i think definitely there m there will not be any 
consensus 
+1 
Mean ESI 0.11 
 
Extract (13) ends with a remarkably definitive statement against consensus, again 
couched in values. She says that ‘knowledge works’ dialectically, and that this 
negates the possibility of general consensus, and this is ‘right’. 
  The patterns of stance-taking, as quantified by the ESI, are qualitatively 
different between these speakers. ARTS.15.M, who has a narrow EPR uses 
positively and negatively scoring epistemic stance elements in very close 
proximity, so that he “self-corrects” around an average of zero. In contrast, 
ARTS.10.F uses some repetition and iterative rephrasing to revise her stance, and 
by doing this she separates out her stance-shifting over more clauses in the 
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extract. In other words, she seems to take her positively or negatively scoring 
epistemic stance and discursively emphasize it via repetition, whereas 
ARTS.15.M, by oscillating more rapidly between positive and negative scores, 
achieves a more blended stance that gives an overall impression of being more 
epistemically tentative (cf. Extracts 1 and 2 above; and Section 5.3.1 below). 
In the rest of Section 5.2 I discuss the remaining main effects and 
interactions in the EPR model (Tables 5.7 and 5.8 above), and I set aside those 
revealed in the academic division model as possibly spurious, and in need of 
further investigation elsewhere. 
 
5.2.3 Topic 
 
Table 5.7 showed no group-wide significant main effect for topic, although there 
were significant differences between Biography and Generic topics (see Table 
5.8). These within-group differences are, possibly, conditioned by a further 
significant interaction with sex and L1. I take a detailed look at the shift in ESI 
score by topic in one speaker in Section 5.3.1. Figure 5.7 shows how the 
aggregate mean ESI values across topics diverge from the values shown in 
regression summary Table 5.8. The interaction with sex and L1 are discussed in 
their respective sections below. 
 
277 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Graph of aggregate mean ESI versus topic 
 
5.2.4 Academic age 
 
Age was eliminated as a variable during step-down. There was no significant 
main effect or interaction for age. This means there is no quantitative evidence of 
a socialization effect, age-grading or of diachronic change. 
 
5.2.5 Sex 
 
There was a marginal main effect for sex (see Table 5.7), and this is illustrated in 
Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8 Graph of aggregate mean ESI versus sex 
 
There was a significant interaction between sex and topic such that men had 
higher ESI values than women on generic topics. The sexes were not significantly 
differentiated on the topics of autobiography or specific topics (research and 
subject content). The linear regression Table 5.8 shows that there was a significant 
differentiation is +0.113724 ESI units, i.e. it is of the same approximate size as the 
difference between narrow and wide EPRs (see Figure 5.9 below). 
 Recall from Section 5.1.3 above that I classed autobiography and generic 
topics (impact and teaching) as promoting a more subjective investigative policy, 
and specific topics (research and subject) as promoting a more objective I-policy. 
This means that on generic topics, one can act as the source of one’s opinion, 
whereas on specific topics, one needs to refer to objective standards of evidence to 
support one’s position. In both cases, speakers can draw on personal or political 
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epistemic authority (see Figure 5.2). Personal authority means that one has found 
it out oneself, while political authority relies on matters of consensus within some 
relevant community. The difference between generic topics and specific topics, I 
argued, is that the community to which one refers for epistemic authority is wider 
academia in the case of generic topics, and one’s own discipline in the case of 
specific topics. 
Figure 5.9 shows that speakers do not differ much across topics except in 
the case of generic topics, where men have markedly higher mean ESI scores than 
women. I suggest that this is because women and men are deferring to a gendered 
order of knowledge for generic topics. In other words, wider academia still 
prejudices against women in many disciplines, and in terms of the number of 
heads of department, executive positions, and presidents of learned societies.  
 
 
Figure 5.9 Graph of interaction between topic and sex 
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Table 5.4 above showed that in 2010 only around 25% of academic staff in UK 
maths and physics departments were women, this was 40-50% in arts/humanities, 
and 45% in social sciences. Figure 5.10 shows that it is only within the social 
sciences that men and women differentiate significantly on their generic topics, 
with women’s mean ESI scores being about –0.2 lower than men’s. This is 
suggestive that, even if the actual internal structure of a discipline does not reflect 
the balance of sexes found in wider society, men and women may orient towards 
their discipline as if it did. In other words, the men and women interviewed may 
tacitly view disciplinary knowledge as relatively gender-neutral, and academy-
wide knowledge as more mired in hegemonic patriarchy. This speculative 
explanation is difficult to reconcile with Figure 5.10 where, in Science, women 
have more positive ESI scores than men across the board. Indeed, it is social 
sciences that carry the interaction illustrated in Figure 5.9. Further research is 
required to establish whether there is ethnographic support for speakers 
linguistically maintaining a gendered epistemological system in the academy.  
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Figure 5.10 Graph of interaction of academic division, topic and sex 
 
A further complication is that my presence as a male interviewer reproduces a 
participation frame within which power is unevenly distributed: I ask the 
questions, and the participants are unaware of the overall direction of the 
interview, or of the subtext of my questions. It is possible that men and women 
responded differently to this participation frame, being generally able to adjust 
their position to achieve a more equal footing on matters of their expert 
knowledge (subject, research and their own life stories); but being less able to do 
so in response to my questions about generic topics (teaching and impact). These 
topics are especially potent topics within academia that may have a general role in 
reproducing gendered power hierarchies. 
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5.2.6 Other external variables 
 
Institution was eliminated during step-down. There was no significant main effect 
for L1, as illustrated in Figure 5.11. Speakers with languages other than English as 
their L1 contributed to a slightly more varied range of ESI scores, as evidenced by 
their larger error bar in the graph. There was no aggregate effect from any explicit 
instruction received in the use of evidential language in English. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Graph of the effect of topic and L1 on ESI 
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Figure 5.12 Graphs of interaction between topic and L1 
 
 
Figure 5.12 shows that non-native speakers of English have significantly higher 
ESI scores when discussing generic topics than specific topics; they are more 
epistemically cautious about discipline-internal topics. They do not differ 
significantly from natives on any individual topic area however; their overall 
amount of topic-linked shifting is just greater. This may be the result of an 
exaggerated attention-paid-to-speech effect, where non-natives are egregiously 
attentive about their professional language. PHYS.12.M, who is Russian, notes in 
Extract (14) that modal language can be used in a variety of ways depending on 
context. 
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(14) 
so let’s say must depending on who said and on the context said it’s 
the same word but er it it really can go anything from ought to or I 
would advise you to er to to real must but then advise there is a special 
form ‘I would advise you to’ which which people can use if they want 
to but then again if if somebody of er let’s say er er a powerful 
Russian man tells me and I was (working there) let’s say I’m working 
in a Russian department somewhere if he would tell me ‘I would 
advise you to’ that sounds even hh more than advise so hh 
 
PHYS.12.M 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 
Epistemic policy range and academic division were included in separate linear 
models, and, while both were significant as main effects, only EPR was 
unconditional. A wide EPR was associated with a higher epistemic stance index 
score, around +0.1 ESI units higher than the mean score for participants classed as 
having a narrow EPR (see Table 5.8 above). I suggest that this higher score for 
wide EPR speakers is due to less strict knowledge criteria. Speakers with wide 
EPRs are able to vary their epistemological commitments to a greater degree than 
speakers with narrow EPRs.  This means, I suggest, that their conception of 
knowledge becomes more permissive within any given assumed policy, since they 
are more habituated to taking multiple perspectives.  
This ESI difference between narrow and wide EPR speakers is composed 
of the coherent behaviour of all the component elements that make up the ESI 
score (see Table 5.11 above). In other words, verbal and adverbial/adjectival 
modality, domain, comparators and degree all have relatively positive scores for 
wide-EPR speakers, connoting greater strength of commitment to propositions of 
greater generality. The relativity component was oppositely directed to this trend, 
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being more negative for wide-EPR speakers. This connotes greater investigative 
subjectivity rather than objectivity. Although the composite ESI scores of narrow 
and wide-EPR speakers were significantly differentiated, only the degree 
component was significantly differentiated by itself. In short, speakers who take 
more objective stances are correspondingly more cautious (modally weaker and 
more restricted) about their claims. The overall effect of this greater caution is to 
overall achieve a more negative ESI score, i.e. they do not perfectly cancel out the 
epistemic strength of their objective language, rather, they overshoot into negative 
scores that connote a marked level of caution compared to a “bald” statement or a 
“neutral” stance. 
Note that a narrow EPR does not automatically indicate an objective I-
policy. It is possible to be narrowly subjective, as was illustrated among the social 
geographers quoted in Extracts (5) and (6) above. 
The linear regression model containing academic division instead of EPR 
estimates that the social sciences were significantly more negative (by around 
−0.4 ESI units, i.e. approximately four times the difference between narrow and 
wide EPRs.) than the arts/humanities, and the physical sciences were intermediate 
between these (see Table 5.10 above). This picture departs from these divisions’ 
mean aggregate behaviour where their ESI scores are all negative (Figure 5.5). 
The regression summary table shows that the mean ESI score of the physical 
sciences does not differ significantly from the social sciences. When we look at 
the components of the ESI, we see that they do not operate in the same concerted 
manner that they did for the EPR (see Table 5.12 above). Modal 
adverbs/adjectives contribute significantly positively to ESI scores of social 
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sciences, while there is a non-significant negative contribution for arts/humanities. 
In other words, social sciences sound more epistemically confident with respect to 
their modal adverbs and adjectives. This trend is however oppositely directed for 
modal verbs, albeit non-significantly. These facts are hard to reconcile with the 
idea that modality tout court corresponds to epistemic commitment. Domain is the 
only ESI component that is significantly different from arts/humanities in the 
physical sciences, where it is positive, suggesting greater generality. Relativity 
behaves oppositely to expectations, being most negative in physical sciences 
(although not significantly so), and significantly more negative in the social 
sciences than in arts/humanities, indicating a trend to greater subjectivity as one 
moves from arts/humanities to social sciences to physical sciences. 
The ESI components, then, pattern counter-intuitively in the divisions. The 
social sciences are characterized by stances that are more subjective (relativity–) 
and modally stronger (A–modality+), but also fuzzier (comparators–) and less 
intense (degree–). The arts/humanities meanwhile sound relatively objective, but 
also relatively intense (degree+). In short, ESI components within academic 
divisions pattern in a discordant manner, while, in contrast, they pattern 
concordantly within EPR subtypes. This suggests that EPR better reflects an 
epistemologically meaningful social division than does disciplinary affiliation, 
since it is able to capture stances that index tenable epistemic policies. In other 
words, disciplines are epistemologically heterogeneous, so it is difficult to 
materialize a discipline-typical epistemic stance: it would likely sound self-
contradictory.115 On the other hand, the narrow/wide EPR distinction represents 
115 This would violate the de facto norm of non-contradiction in academia: it is not an absolute 
metaphysical requirement that epistemic stances not contradict themselves. 
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tenable, albeit polarized, epistemic stances. Academic division, in amalgamating 
narrow and wide EPRs, produces an aggregate epistemic stance measure that 
indexes untenable epistemic policies (e.g. simultaneous weak degree and strong 
modality), or ones that seem to conflict with disciplinary epistemology (e.g. 
greater objectivity in the arts than in the social sciences). On the other hand, the 
narrow/wide division is tenable as a means of materializing epistemological 
difference with a single discipline as well as between different disciplines. 
There was no main effect for topic, although it interacted with sex, and 
also separately with L1. Men and women diverged significantly in their ESI 
scores on generic topics (impact and teaching) and not on others (autobiography, 
subject and research). I suggested above that this was due to speakers drawing on 
socially broader sources of epistemic authority for these topics. I argued that 
academic disciplines are relatively egalitarian with respect to sex, so drawing on 
disciplinary consensus knowledge would not produce sex differentiation in ESI 
scores. Conversely, wider academia is more inequitable, and the differential 
power distribution is reflected in relatively more deferential language of women 
on the topics where they draw epistemic authority from that community. I 
illustrate this in Section 5.3.1 below in the case of one speaker across several 
topics. 
The interaction of topic and L1, though significant, was less convincing 
(see Figure 5.12 above). Again, it was generic topics that displayed differentiation 
among speakers, with non-natives having higher ESI scores than natives, although 
this was of marginal significance. Non-natives also have significantly lower ESI 
scores on specific topics (research and subject) than on generic topics (impact and 
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research). This is suggestive of a difference in attention-paid-to-speech. In other 
words, it is possible that the politically charged and evaluative nature of the 
generic topics led to a reduction in attention paid to speech. In this case, the 
epistemic function of the ESI components could become less prominent than their 
rhetorical or emphatic use. Institutional affiliation was not a significant predictor 
of ESI score. 
In the next section I illustrate topic-linked style shifting for one speaker, 
LAW.9.F, in order to show how epistemic policy shifts relate to variable use of 
ESI components. 
 
5.3.1 An example of EPR/ESI shift by topic 
 
The following four extracts illustrate style shifting by LAW.9.F, who had the 
largest shift in mean ESI of all participants, shifting by an average of –1 on the 
topic of impact. This is equivalent to using one weak modal verb more in every 
clause. I argue that this is in response to topic, and that LAW.9.F draws on 
different sources of epistemic authority depending the topic. For specific topics 
(research and subject), she appeals to intra-disciplinary consensus knowledge, and 
for generic topics (impact and teaching), she appeals to extra-disciplinary 
knowledge. I propose that these knowledge bases are gendered, i.e. that extra-
disciplinary social organization instantiates a subordinate position for women, 
with associated “powerless” language. This relative powerlessness is materialized 
linguistically via more tentative epistemic stances, and correspondingly lower ESI 
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scores. In contrast, the intra-disciplinary knowledge base is relatively egalitarian 
with respect to gender, and does not reveal a corresponding drop in ESI score. 
 Extracts (15–18) have weaker ESI elements highlighted with italic type, 
while stronger elements are underlined. The ESI score for each clause is shown on 
the right. Recall that this is the sum of all positive and negative evidential 
language elements in that clause, so in some clauses this adds up to zero. Some 
clauses extend over several lines. The mean ESI score for each extract is shown at 
the bottom. 
(15) Topic: subject 
but if you maybe look at it more 0 
that it could somehow tie in to: moral philosophy –2 
then that’s sort of been going on since Aristotle erm but 
maybe not –2 
the distinction really between what is morally good +1 
and what is legally good 0 
wasn’t really made quite so much erm –2 
so from the nineteenth century onwards there’s been a much 
more of a you know divided divide between sort of positive 
law and law strictly so-called black letter law +2 
as opposed to sort of natural rights and erm moral questions 
of goodness –1 
which is still generally seen to be er I suppose the mainstream 0 
but since nineteen forty-five I suppose after the after the 
second world war with the development of international 
human rights law there’s been more of a revival of that sort of 
way of thinking in law –2 
so it depends which  0 
what way you sort of interpret it  –1 
whether it’s much more of a sort of a you know morally good 
natural rights type of an argument 0 
Mean –0.54 
 
Extract (15) features appeals to outside authority or self-evidence. ‘If you look’ 
suggests that the truth of the following proposition is objectively manifest, as does 
the reference to what is ‘generally seen’. LAW.9.F also cites other scholars, albeit 
in a rather non-specific way, with ‘since Aristotle…’. 
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(16) Topic: research 
I’m more interested in the jurisprudential sort of side of things 
than the theoretical aspects of it 
0 
because my work is er 0 
I’m a specialist really in jurisprudence and legal theory? +1 
and that’s where I’m coming from as a specialist in [legal 
theory?]116 
0 
and linking that to [legal] application so 0 
and I’m thinking of it in as a social justice erm topic and also 
as you know (law’s sort of real) purpose 
+1 
what is law for 0 
if it’s not to try and make people’s lives better 0 
or if it’s not to try and make people free 0 
or to be able to live 0 
the life they want to 0 
so it’s very much from that sort of perspective er +1 
which does have that sort of overarching philosophical basis 
as far as I’m concerned 
–2 
in the work that I do 0 
er so it’s not a comparative black letter as I call it black letter 
law 
–1 
looking at the statute 0 
looking at case law 0 
to see  0 
‘in France they do this 0 
and in England they do this 0 
isn’t that interesting to see that’ 0 
it’s not at all that +1 
it’s much more erm well why +2 
and how has the court developed er these particular social 
psychological and philosophical concepts 
–1 
to mean this 0 
and enshrined (them then) in law 0 
and whether that’s a good or a bad thing 0 
how they’ve done 0 
how they’ve interpreted it 0 
so then it’s sort of like saying –2 
‘well actually (they’ve) interpreted it going down the wrong 
track 
+1 
or they’ve interpreted it going down the right track 0 
er and why (I think) that 0 
Mean ESI +0.03 
 
116 Square brackets contain modified material as the original may have identified the participant. 
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In Extract (16), LAW.9.F makes frequent appeals to her own epistemic authority. 
She introduces her research as what ‘I’m more interested in’ and ‘where I’m 
coming from’. The reason for her enquiry is located in her own interests, which 
provides ‘adequate causality’ in Linde’s (1993) terms: no further explanation is 
required. She describes her individual subjective perspective on her legal research 
object: ‘I’m thinking of it as’, ‘from that sort of perspective’, ‘as far as I’m 
concerned’. She also contrasts this with positions that she is not taking by using 
two quotatives, the first about a descriptive approach to law, and she says ‘it’s not 
that at all it’s much more…’ a normative/evaluative approach to law as illustrated 
in the second quotative. 
 
(17) Topic: teaching 
I think there might actually be: there’s a couple of things –2 
I think there might be a very general view of 0 
they’ve got lots of knowledge about criminal. law or about law 
in general 
+2 
or about what justice is? 0 
er and. because may maybe some of them might have done A 
level law 
–3 
they think  0 
they know quite a lot about it already +1 
and then they’re a bit surprised when –1 
they they see actually it’s a very rigorous: discipline +2 
and you really need to have your sources +2 
you need to bolster everything with evidence +2 
you can’t just be this sort of broad sort of make these broad 
sweeping statements erm 
+2 
or you can do it –1 
but you’re not going to get very good marks erm +2 
and .erm. so I think it’s or so there’s that –1 
I also think that they don’t that they maybe actually slight I 
don’t know whether they are slightly disillusioned or not 
–4 
or change their minds throughout 0 
in terms of actually what is justice  +1 
or you know (we didn’t [inaudible]) much more sceptical +3 
the more they look into +1 
the way judges decide cases or whatever erm 0 
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and they may or they may not be I suppose it just depends on 
their interpretation of erm of the of the work 
–2 
that they then do 0 
I think maybe the most difficult thing is –1 
for us to get beyond erm 0 
them. just sort of examining the the paperwork in front of them 
erm 
0 
and just explaining what a case is saying +1 
or what ‘judge so and so said this in such and such a case –2 
whereas judge so and so said this in another case’ –2 
and so when when I’m giving them feedback on their essays 0 
it’s like ‘but you’ve got to analyse it 0 
you’ve got to say +1 
what you think is right or wrong about it’ –1 
and they they always look shocked +1 
it’s like “well what does my opinion matter or” erm.. –1 
Mean ESI 0.00 
 
In Extract (17), LAW.9.F draws heavily on her first-hand experience of 
teaching. She does not appeal to the expertise of other teachers or to wider 
academic consensus. She generalizes from her personal experience using 
illustrative quotatives, suggesting that her own experience is an adequate 
evidential basis for her claims. 
 
(18) Topic: impact 
well I suppose with my work it would be: you would sort of I 
would try and think 
0 
that it might be applicable at a sort of an institutional level as 
well as potentially at case law level and judicial interpretation 
erm 
   –3 
so if (I got) an article published 0 
then: it might be cited in a court case –1 
but probably I suppose it just depends –1 
how thorough some of the barristers may be –2 
if they and if they think it supports their argument er in some 
way 
–1 
it could come up quite soon –2 
after it’s published erm 0 
to my knowledge that hasn’t happened yet er yet hh –1 
but it may have –1 
I’m I’m not very good at researching finding these citations –1 
293 
 
but I need to do that for the REF +1 
but erm also I would like to think that it has an impact at sort of 
institutional levels for the Council of Europe  
–3 
for example (now) last year I was approached by an MP from 
the co 
–1 
(who) sits on one of the committees at the Council of Europe –1 
and I: you know she said she +1 
when I met her 0 
I said ‘how did she hear about my work’ 0 
coz I don’t know her 0 
I don’t know anyone +1 
who knows her 0 
she’s from [the Mediterranean] 0 
and she said ‘I read your article [...]’ 0 
so: she must be just reading this sort of stuff 0 
or maybe she read the Human Rights Quarterly –1 
she might read human rights journals or something –2 
and erm or perhaps her researcher did –1 
and pointed it out 0 
er and therefore she approached me er 0 
to come and give an opinion erm at a committee on [...] in 
Europe 
0 
because they were commenting on another report 0 
that had been done on [my research area as it applies] in 
Europe generally 
+1 
and [inaudible] so this committee was looking at 0 
how it might impact on [European citizens] er –1 
so that’s obviously something that you know is quite was an 
immediate within the net a year or so of things being published 
erm well I suppose a couple of years from the first thing being 
published er and erm. 
–4 
so so I’m thinking that sort of like Council of Europe or other 
European institutions although that hasn’t happened yet 
–3 
although they may be reading it I don’t know hhehh –2 
Mean ESI –
0.74 
 
Extract (18) is characterized by appeals to outside sources of evidence about 
impact. LAW.9.F mentions barristers and MPs who can bestow impact on her 
research by reading it and applying it, depending on ‘how thorough’ they are or 
whether they or their researchers read that type of thing and will therefore notice 
her work. LAW.9.F does not talk about generating impact from her own initiative, 
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nor does she evaluate the whole enterprise negatively as in some earlier extracts. 
Since impact for LAW.9.F is generated the use of her research by those outside 
academia, she cannot determine based on her own epistemic resources what 
impact her work has had. Rather, barristers and MPs must do this, and with 
respect to them, LAW.9.F is therefore epistemically powerless. This contrasts 
with e.g. PHYS.34.M and CRIT.10.F in Extracts (8) and (9) above, who also defer 
to outside arbiters of impact, but with a rather more contemptuous attitude. 
 The four extracts from LAW.9.F are illustrative of shifting epistemic 
policy. From teaching to impact, and from research to subject, the speaker shifts 
from a personal evidence base of her own experience and expert perspective 
towards socio-political sources of evidence. In the case of impact, this evidence 
comes from barristers and MPs who decide from outside academia what counts as 
impact. In the case of research, evidence is drawn from what is self-evidently true, 
and by citing a scholarly consensus. The mean values for the ESI scores in these 
examples show a large negative shift as the speaker moves from intra-personal to 
extra-personal/political sources of evidence. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
Speakers’ knowledge and beliefs underpin every aspect of their use of language. 
This means that epistemology has a foundational role in any model of situated 
language use. For this reason, I have argued that it is incumbent on sociolinguists 
and linguistic anthropologists to take an epistemologically principled approach to 
their research. This thesis provides the groundwork for an epistemological turn in 
sociolinguistics. 
The present research characterizes epistemological difference by 
elaborating on the philosophical notion of epistemic policy. In addition to 
specifying further details of the structure of epistemic policy, particularly in terms 
of peoples’ variable beliefs about the nature of knowledge, I have argued that 
epistemic policy should be conceived of as a linguistic construction. This means 
that epistemic policy shapes, and is shaped by different knowledge practices, 
since epistemic policy is materialized linguistically via the taking of epistemic 
stance. Through stance-taking, speakers position themselves relative to the 
propositional content of their utterances, relative to other subjects including their 
interlocutors, and relative to other social objects such as institutions. In so doing, 
they draw on the linguistic resources associated with a range of epistemic policies 
to construct a particular epistemic stance. Stance therefore indexes epistemic 
policy, and it also constitutes it by materializing it linguistically, and by 
reconfiguring it recombinantly in interaction. 
In Section 6.1, I review the main empirical findings reported in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5. This exploration of the relationship between language and 
epistemology was restricted to the case of academia, but the methods and 
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concepts apply equally well to individuals and communities beyond the academy. 
In Section 6.2, I illustrate the broader applicability of epistemic policy in the case 
of research on language and gender. In that section I also argue that social 
semiotic processes such as indexicality, enregisterment, and stance-taking—social 
meaning-making in general—are epistemologically nuanced in a way that has 
been underexplored in research so far. I suggest that the notions of epistemic 
policy range (EPR) and the epistemic stance index (ESI) are of importance to 
sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and research on English for Specific Purposes. 
In Section 6.3 I argue that the ESI also amounts to a tool for a 
sociolinguistic turn in philosophy. So-called natural-language philosophy cannot 
rely merely on armchair intuitions about Standard English, and experimental 
philosophy cannot take its linguistic formulations for granted. Socialized 
philosophy already acknowledges these shortcomings, but has so far lacked a 
quantitative methodology. This thesis shows how variationist sociolinguistic 
methods can be used to quantify epistemological variation. Finally, I suggest 
some applications in the field of knowledge management, including knowledge 
transfer among epistemologically divergent groups. 
 
6.1 Main empirical findings 
 
In Chapter 3, I explored the distribution of three evidential variables in academic 
research articles. Modal verbs and adverbs were classed as strong or weak in the 
same way as in later chapters, and evidential verbs were classed as alethic (more 
objective) and epistemic (more subjective). I found that arts journals make greater 
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use of epistemic than alethic verbs, while this pattern is reversed for science 
journals. This was to be expected, given received stereotypes of the arts and 
sciences as respectively more subjective and more objective disciplines. What was 
not predictable from that received distinction between the Two Cultures was that 
this pattern of difference in the linguistic representation of epistemic stance would 
also be recapitulated within disciplines. In other words, the linguistic forms that 
indexed objective and subjective epistemic stances in the arts and sciences were 
also being used within single disciplines to index the same epistemological 
differentiation. A corpus of psychology articles manifested the same kind of 
difference in epistemic and alethic verbs as was present in arts and sciences writ 
large. This pattern of epistemological difference was so robust that it even 
recurred within a sub-disciplinary corpus of sociolinguistics articles. In short, the 
linguistic difference of the largest academic structure was repeated at the level of 
the discipline and also the sub-discipline. 
A recursive distribution was not demonstrated for modal verbs and 
adverbs however. In the “Two Cultures” corpus of science and arts articles (the 
largest academic scale), it was found that the arts make more use of strong modal 
verbs than weak, while the sciences use more weak than strong. Modal adverbs 
followed the same pattern in the sciences, but were not differentiated within the 
arts. This was suggestive that sciences are more epistemically guarded than the 
arts, which is again remarkable given popular stereotypes of the bombastic, black-
and-white scientist, and the woolly, muddled humanist. 
So, there was robust evidence of linguistic recursivity for evidential verbs, 
with the sciences favouring alethic over epistemic verbs, combined with a less 
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robust pattern of favouring weak over strong modality. The opposite pattern of 
evidential verb use was demonstrated in the arts, and this too recurred robustly at 
smaller scales. These results make sense given that a more objective knowledge 
claim is more difficult to justify, and hence needs to be hedged more carefully. 
The recursive aspect makes sense given that the ideological basis of linguistic 
difference at the large scale is epistemological in character. At the smaller scales 
of the discipline and sub-discipline, it is also possible to adopt epistemologically 
divergent positions, and these correspond to linguistic differentiation which draws 
on the same linguistic resources as large-scale differentiation. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I looked at a wider selection of epistemic language in 
the speech of 34 academics in interviews in order to develop a more accountable 
measure of the linguistic construction of epistemological difference. In Chapter 3, 
I had counted positive tokens and compared their balance. While suggestive, this 
provided an incomplete picture. In Chapters 4 and 5, I included more linguistic 
variables implicated in the taking of epistemic stance, but importantly I delimited 
the stance envelope as the clausal environment of a proposition. The proposition 
is the thing that is modalized by a modal verb; it is what gets hedged or boosted; it 
is the thing about which one takes an epistemic stance. The clause is the minimal 
linguistic unit containing a proposition, and I operationalized it here to include 
modal and other evidential language including discourse markers that can carry 
epistemic information. 
I developed a novel epistemic stance index (ESI) to quantify the combined 
effect of six types of epistemic language in each clausal token of my interview 
data. Parametric statistical tests were used to analyse the interview data, despite its 
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non-normal distribution, and it is necessary to be circumspect about interpreting 
those tests for that reason. There was no evidence of a relationship between 
internal factors and ESI, which suggested that epistemic stance is a social 
phenomenon. In other words, the linguistic construction of epistemic stance did 
not appear to be constrained by the grammatical features of the propositional 
content.117 In Chapter 5, I showed that ESI correlates with epistemic policy range 
(EPR). I argued that this means that epistemic stance is constrained by, and 
constrains, epistemological difference. In other words, epistemic policy affects the 
linguistic materialization of epistemic stance, but language-internal constraints do 
not. 
So, while the investigative element of epistemic policy (I-policy) had been 
shown to correlate with differential use of alethic and epistemic verbs in Chapter 
3, it was the variability in epistemic policy that was found to correlate with the 
broader suite of epistemic language examined in Chapter 5. In other words, the 
total range of epistemic policies to which one has access (wide versus narrow) is 
predictive of the language used to take stance, as measured by the ESI. A wide 
EPR correlates with a more positive ESI, while a narrow EPR correlates with a 
more negative ESI. Why should this be so? I suggest that having a wide range of 
epistemic policies at one’s disposal makes one more likely to use the language of 
strong modality, greater generality, etc., because one is able to arrive at epistemic 
certainty through more policy routes. Furthermore, a wide EPR may make the use 
of epistemic language for rhetorical effect more likely. For example, using strong 
modality for emphasis, as opposed to using it in its strict epistemic meaning, to 
117 It could have been the case that, e.g. propositions in the past tense generally associate with 
more confident-sounding ESI scores. 
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connote greater certainty, might be more likely for wide EPR speakers since the 
strict meaning is only “strict” relative to a narrow EPR. In short, a wider EPR 
makes more interpretations available, and may therefore lead to semantic 
bleaching. 
Academic discipline did not capture variability in epistemic stance as 
effectively as EPR. This is remarkable given that disciplines are widely 
understood to reflect distinctive epistemic practices and policies that have been 
institutionalized. This lends further support to the use of epistemologically 
grounded measures of the linguistic construction of epistemic stance, rather than 
relying unquestioningly on the analytic utility of higher-level structures. In 
addition to more effectively elucidating linguistic variation, the EPR-ESI model is 
also detailed and perspicuous. It traces the epistemic belief through to its 
linguistic materialization in epistemic stance, and quantifies it in a way that 
remains straightforward to interpret, which is in contrast to some other top-down 
composite measures of discourse-level variation.  
An interaction between topic and sex, and between topic and L1 was 
found in the linear regression model containing EPR. Both effects were 
concentrated in so-called generic topics (impact and teaching), while the ESI 
scores among the other topics were not significantly different. I illustrated the 
variability in ESI scores for one participant, and argued that this related to 
switching from one source of epistemic authority to another. In talking about 
teaching, the participant relied on her own experience and personal epistemic 
authority to justify her knowledge claims. When talking about impact, she 
switched to external sources of justification. This corresponded to a drop in ESI 
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scores, i.e. less confident language, and I argued that this is because of the relative 
powerlessness of this epistemic policy. In other words, in deferring to a source of 
justification out of one’s control, one relinquishes epistemic authority, and this is 
reflected in less confident epistemic stances. I suggested that this effect is more 
exaggerated when deferring to external authority outside of one’s discipline (or 
outside of the academy) than when deferring to external authority within one’s 
discipline. To illustrate the latter case, a topic shift between talk about the 
participant’s own research to talk about discipline consensus subject knowledge 
was shown to also associate with a drop in ESI, but this time a smaller one. While 
suggestive, this result was not quantitatively meaningful in the form presented; it 
would be an interesting area for further exploration in future work. 
 
6.2 Implications for linguistics 
 
I argued at length in Chapter 2 that beliefs have a crucial role in understanding 
how sociolinguistic variation takes place. How people conceive of their place in 
society, what they think about society, what social import a linguistic variable 
has—these sets of beliefs are what enable individuals to be sociolinguistic beings. 
If beliefs and language shape one other, then this suggests an empirical question: 
do people with different epistemological commitments behave differently 
linguistically? I have shown that the answer to this question is yes in the case of 
academia, and I hypothesize that this is generally the case. I advocate an 
epistemological turn in sociolinguistics to evaluate this hypothesis more widely. 
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This is important because epistemology has an explanatory and predictive role to 
play that has so far been underexplored. 
Epistemology is the layer beneath sociolinguistic beliefs. This means that 
epistemological variation has the potential not only to lead to different 
sociolinguistic beliefs, but to produce qualitatively different semiotic processes. 
Indexicality is predicated on noticing difference and then attributing it to socially 
salient explanatory categories. It is clear that different epistemic policies (ways of 
seeing facts) will correspond to people attending to different differences, that is, 
they will notice different contrasts within the sociolinguistic field, and as a result 
they will see different indexical links from other people. Indexical fields (Eckert 
2008) are therefore likely to vary from person to person in terms of their content 
and interrelationships. 
A more fundamental possible implication of epistemological variation for 
indexicality is that the notion of difference may be different for some speakers. I 
will illustrate this via the case of mainstream feminism. Second wave feminists 
are defined in terms of seeking equal social status for men and women, i.e. 
reducing the disparity in social status between the sexes.118 Third wave feminists 
are skeptical of attempts to totalize identity categories, and criticise the reliance on 
reductive binaries. An example of this is sex, which is seen by second wavers as a 
binary biological variable. Third wavers problematize this by drawing attention to 
additional forms of biological sex, and also by advocating that greater attention be 
paid to gender, i.e. the social construct of sexual difference. They argue that the 
way that people conceive of their own gender is not fully determined by their 
118 First wave feminism is a historically prior women’s movement to gain political 
enfranchisement in terms of the right to vote and own property. 
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biological sex. The epistemological difference between second and third wave 
feminists may itself be (strategically) reduced to approximate a binary opposition 
between structuralists and post-structuralists respectively. In terms of this 
caricature, second wavers see difference as essential and foundational to human 
biology, but they want to challenge sexism by bringing about structural symmetry 
in society. Third wavers on the other hand see categoricity as oppressive, and their 
discourse focuses on nuanced and personal experiences of gender which resist 
totalization under the rubric of simple categories which it views as the instruments 
of hegemony, while at the same time being opposed to sexism. 
Given this sweepingly general picture of feminism in late modernity, there 
appear to be some epistemological differences between second and third wave 
feminists. The former rely on objective categoricity to cut up social space, while 
the latter reject this conceptual move, preferring to proliferate subjectivities. Third 
wavers might be expected to have wider epistemic policy ranges than second 
wavers, and therefore to take epistemic stances with more positive ESI scores. In 
short, third wavers should sound more epistemically confident than second 
wavers. A further possible empirical implication is that post-structural feminists 
could be more inclined to reject binarity tout court, including at the semiotic level. 
If rejecting binarity politically could become internalized to the point where it pre-
empts the “noticing” required to develop indexical links between linguistic 
variants and social categories, then post-structuralists might be expected to 
conceive of indexical fields in a rather sparser, or at least less fixed, manner. Is it 
possible to conceive of a post-structuralist semiotics that does not rely on 
304 
 
distinction? Is that even a thinkable system of meaning-making? Do we therefore 
need a more general model of social semiosis to describe that? 
Another implication for sociolinguistics is in respect of how we look at 
variation other than sociophonetic variation. To study socially situated meaning-
in-interaction—the use to which language is put—quantitatively, it seems 
perverse to restrict oneself to just phonetic variation. The traditional explanation 
for doing so is that all variants of a linguistic variable must have the same 
referential meaning. But this stipulation is not even tenable within structuralist 
linguistics, since the meaning of a word depends structurally on the meanings of 
others. This means that two people will never precisely coincide in their 
referential definition of a word because their linguistic systems will never 
completely coincide. So, if the initial sound in the word through is realised 
variably as [t] or [θ], it is not clear that these are variants of the same variable. In 
other words (th) in my through might be different from (th) in your through. 
Referential meaning is just as much subject to the effects of variable 
epistemological commitments as is social meaning, because all meaning is social 
(to an extent). 
The application of the present work to sociophonetics is most obvious in 
re-evaluating the nature of the indexical field, which has been assumed to be a 
shared semiotic space. If epistemological variation is pervasive in wider society, 
then a shared orientation to an indexical field cannot be assumed; it must be 
considered as a variable. It is also possible that phonetic variants could acquire 
epistemological meaning, which may be linked to socioeconomic class, e.g. by 
association with stereotypical middle class teachers, or, by indexical linkage to 
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intelligence or wit, or with being “precise” or “sloppy”, such as, respectively, the 
released [th] variant of (t) or the [ɪŋ] variant of (ing). 
Furthermore, prosody, information structure, and rate of speech are linguistic 
phenomena that also carry epistemic information, and have the potential to 
become epistemological indexes. Variable behaviour at these linguistic levels has 
been under-explored in sociolinguistics to date, and I suggest that epistemological 
considerations are of transparent and central importance to their role in the 
construction of stance. 
Stance, then, is a multimodal phenomenon. Even the lexical and 
“modestly” morphosyntactic level that I’ve used in this thesis is partial. I have 
largely ignored prosody and other paralinguistic channels, let alone the physicality 
of stance, gesture (see e.g. Goodwin 2007), the kind of physical environments that 
we use in constructing stance, the interaction between buildings and the stances 
that they make possible. A large versus a small lecture theatre, different office 
arrangements will facilitate different stances. These wider contextual factors are 
no doubt important in the analysis of discourse variation, and they have been 
examined by various scholars. I suggest here too that these studies would be 
enhanced by attending to the epistemological assumptions upon which they base 
their models of situated language use. 
Stance is a way of looking at the relationship between epistemology and 
language. The ESI is a principled measure of epistemic stance with a perspicuous 
interpretation. EPR is way of classifying speakers according to their epistemic 
commitments. An implication for research on English for specific purposes (ESP), 
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e.g. medical or legal English, or English for academic purposes (EAP) is that EPR 
is a better guide to evidential language use than is disciplinary affiliation. 
One final possible implication for research on linguistics is in 
experimental linguistics. It would be interesting to see whether a model language 
with evidential suffixes of the type found in many of the world’s languages would 
evolve differently under experimental conditions between participants with highly 
varied epistemic policies, e.g. Derridean scholars versus materials scientists, or 
Biblical literalists versus “New Atheists”. 
 
6.3 Other implications 
 
I argued above for an epistemological turn in sociolinguistics. In this section I 
argue that this would have ramifications in disciplines that have undergone, or 
should undergo, a linguistic turn. These ramifications are more considerable in 
areas of study that have historically relied on a non-variationist conception of 
language, epistemology or both. 
In the case of “natural language” philosophy, I argued in Chapter 1 that a 
reliance on Standard English in analytic philosophy has led to a distorted analysis 
of knowledge in epistemology. This is because the meaning of words like know 
and knowledge are routinely assumed to be self-evident, and philosophical 
analyses are built by deduction from this assumption. I argue that, rather, these 
words carry variable epistemic value depending on one’s epistemic policy 
complement. 
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A wider epistemic policy range is associated with more positive ESI 
scores. I showed that this can be interpreted as a down-regulation of the epistemic 
meaning of epistemic stance elements, in favour of rhetorical meaning. In other 
words, strong modality does not mean strong epistemic commitment for a person 
with a wide EPR, rather it has more of an emphatic meaning. Likewise, the 
contrast between know and think or believe can be analysed as one of emphatic 
contrast. I suggest that this means that wide and narrow-EPR speakers will have 
different judgements about the meaning of these words. The formulation of 
questions in epistemology—Does Charles know or only believe—presupposes a 
theory of knowledge by suggesting that knowing is a more exacting standard than 
merely believing. It presupposes that everyone reading the question interprets 
know and believe in the same way, and that their judgements about whether 
Charles knows or not are based on their attitudes about justification. In fact, 
speakers are likely to differ on this interpretation of know and believe, and so part 
of their response will be informed by either a narrow or wide EPR. A wide-EPR 
speaker might attribute knowledge in a case where a narrow-EPR speaker does 
not, even though both agree about the nature of justification, for example. This is 
a severe challenge to the validity of many experimental philosophical survey 
questions. 
The EPR-ESI model offers a way out of this. Just as it is an 
epistemologically grounded model for investigating sociolinguistic variation, it 
can be applied in reverse as a sociolinguistically grounded model for investigating 
epistemological variation. Rather than framing epistemological research in terms 
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of isolated “controlled” thought experiments, then, my research offers a way to 
approach epistemological variation through quantitative discourse analysis. 
 The EPR-ESI model also suggests a way to interrogate and synthesize 
Chomsky’s (e.g. 1986) notion of knowledge of language on the one hand with 
Labov et al.’s (2011) notion of the sociolinguistic monitor on the other. Is 
knowledge of language subject to the same kind of epistemological influences as 
propositional knowledge seems to be? Are there different ways of knowing a 
language? Is sociolinguistic knowledge the same kind of thing as knowledge of 
language, or is it more like propositional knowledge? What light does a variable 
conception of epistemology shed on the interface between these two systems of 
linguistic cognition? 
There are implications of the present research for areas of inquiry beyond 
linguistics, but which use linguistically informed methods. In the field of social 
geography, our buildings and environment and the way we conceive of place, the 
way we get place from space, is contingent on the kinds of stances we can take up 
there.119 Buildings shape the way we talk, and the kinds of epistemic policies that 
persist into consensus. The EPR-ESI model thus has potential implication for new 
directions in research e.g. into the linguistic microclimate of institutions and the 
social epistemology of the built environment. 
In the field of science and technology studies (STS), the present study 
offers a quantitative tool for research into the social construction of knowledge. 
STS has a rich tradition of detailed ethnographic studies of epistemic communities 
(e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1986). In the related field of knowledge management, 
119 In social geography, place is the social construct relating to physical space, cf. gender/sex. 
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policies for the storage and dissemination of knowledge should take account of 
the linguistically constructed nature of epistemological difference. A message 
couched in the epistemic practices of one community may not be received in kind 
by, or may not be legible to, communities reliant on very different epistemic 
practices. This applies in education, the public communication of research, and in 
any communicative context characterized by epistemological difference or 
differential access to knowledge, such as expert-layperson interactions. The ESI 
offers a way to assess the amount of difference in the epistemic policies of two 
groups, and it offers information about how they differ. This can offer insights for 
reconciliation of conflicting interests by stakeholders in multidisciplinary fora that 
pervade organizational infrastructure. 
 
6.4 Conclusion: Power and knowledge, facts and values, is’s and oughts 
 
(15) 
I don’t think so. er I think it. the discovery of Bucky balls nanotubes 
and and graphene sort of had to get into. O level even science simply 
because the older textbooks say there are two allotropes of carbon and 
now there’s five hh so you’ve got to correct that two to five fairly 
quickly. 
          
PHYS.34.M 
 
In this extract, PHYS.34.M uses two strong semimodal verbs: have to and got to. 
These forms are often interpreted not epistemically, but deontically, i.e. in terms 
of obligations and rules rather than in terms of knowledge and logical necessity. I 
have argued that all epistemic policies, by which judgements about knowledge are 
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made, are largely matters of values, not facts. This means that they are ultimately 
positions about the way the world “ought to be”, not about the way it “is”. 
Epistemic authority is often presented as value-free, but it is not. 
In the extract, what is the source of the obligation? Where does this necessity to 
correct textbooks come from? It is predicated on several beliefs. First, there are 
instrumental beliefs about what textbooks should be for. In particular, 
PHYS.34.M thinks that science text books should reflect the latest discoveries by 
scientists, and not contain false information presented as “facts”. A glance at an O 
level biology120 textbook on the other hand will present a model of protein 
synthesis that omits the bulk of recent research on genes—including the fact that a 
gene is by no means a clearly-defined natural class of objects—in order to present 
material in an accessible way. Including 5 allotropes of carbon instead of 2 does 
not increase any student’s understanding about why allotropes can form in the first 
place, what they are for, or whether it is important to know about them. This 
points to an instrumental position about textbooks: What are they for? If it is to 
transmit facts in order to subsequently test the recall of facts, then it is far from 
clear where the “education” part comes into the picture. Rather, school subjects 
seem to be reduced to lists of words and numbers to be memorized. This seems to 
be a perverse motivation for updating textbooks as a matter of necessity, as 
PHYS24.M suggests. But perhaps this is a distortion of the situation. Perhaps he 
simply believes that the textbooks have to change because they are supposed to 
reflect reality dispassionately, i.e. to encode knowledge. We have seen that 
dispassionate epistemic policies are not possible. Even the cool scientific attitude 
120 O level is the former name for the GCSE public examinations in the UK that children take at 
the age of 16, when their compulsory education ends. Some exam boards still offer O levels too. 
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that textbooks should reflect reality implies that it is self-evident that there is one 
and only one reality to reflect. However, what is represented in the textbooks is a 
partial picture. Much that is important is left out, and much that is esoteric is 
included. Epistemic policies that presuppose realism about truth (i.e. that there is 
only one truth which corresponds to a universally-accessible reality) beg the 
question of whose truth? Why are children learning these facts and not those 
ones?  
PHYS.24.M almost seems to see textbooks as being nomically connected 
to reality. When a discovery about reality is made, a chain of events is ineluctably 
set into motion that will result in the textbook being modified to reflect the newly 
revealed reality. This seems to correspond to what would classically be analysed 
as an alethic modal, i.e. that the force of the modal necessity derives from matters 
of truth about the world. It might also be more commonly analysed as an 
epistemic modal, i.e. that the force of the modal necessity derives from what we 
know. Perhaps the “most natural” reading is one of deontic modality, where the 
source of the obligation is arbitrary social rules. How one interprets modal flavour 
will depend on how one views the relationship between textbooks and scientific 
discoveries in light of all the points discussed above. In short, modal flavour is 
contingent on epistemic policy. 
The values that imbue epistemic policy mean that diversity in epistemic 
policy constitutes ideological differentiation. Against this backdrop, differences in 
epistemic policy also associate with differences in epistemic stance. Iconization, 
erasure and recursion then operate on this field of sociolinguistic differentiation. 
The relationship between participants’ epistemic beliefs and their linguistic 
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expressions of those beliefs is embedded in value-laden ideologies that perpetuate 
difference semiotically. In other words, epistemic beliefs are linguistic constructs: 
they shape, and are shaped by, linguistic practice. 
This means that the distinction between is and ought, between the 
epistemic and the deontic, depends on the epistemic commitments of the analyst. 
A particular modal token may be interpreted as a logical deduction or as a forceful 
instruction, but the relationship between epistemology, language and ideology 
suggests that this difference is far from clear-cut. 
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